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I. INTRODUCTION  
The opiate economy in Afghanistan is a threat to the establishment of a stable 
central Afghan government, which is a primary strategic goal of the U.S.-led Global War 
on Terrorism.  This thesis analyzes the Afghan opiate economy and the counter-narcotics 
policy development of Afghanistan, the United Kingdom as lead nation for Coalition 
counter-narcotics policy, and the United States, through an Afghan cultural, historic, and 
rural power structure lens.  A historically and culturally nuanced understanding of the 
opiate economy and how it interacts with local power structures provides new insights 
into the true nature and potential of this illicit economy which go beyond what previous 
studies have provided, and establishes a means to assess what is both right and wrong 
with the current Coalition approach to confronting the Afghan opiate economy.  The 
findings developed through this analysis demonstrate that some aspects of the current 
counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan are jeopardizing the stabilization goal both 
through acts of commission and omission, and that a revised approach is required.   
A. IMPORTANCE TO U.S. POLICY 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrate the imperative of 
addressing problems created by weak or non-existent governance in areas exploited by 
global terrorist groups.  Denying a safe haven to Al Qaeda in Afghanistan is the primary 
motivation for America to work diligently to strengthen the nascent Afghan central 
government, yet threats to government stability and effectiveness still exist and are 
gathering strength.  In the past three years, opium cultivation and trafficking have spread 
to every province within Afghanistan.  In 2004, by United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) estimates, Afghanistan produced its largest-ever opium poppy crop.  It 
covered 2.9 percent of active Afghan farmland and produced 4,200 metric tons of opium, 
or 87 percent of world supply.  This crop was worth U.S. $2.8 billion dollars in export 
value as it crossed Afghanistan’s borders (if it was not stockpiled locally for future sale), 
a figure equal to 60 percent of Afghanistan’s licit 2003 GDP.  Roughly 356,000 farm 




depended on income from opium poppy cultivation to meet their daily needs.  At least 
another 500,000 earned income from work as itinerant farm labor, trafficking, and 
associated activity.   
Although opium poppy was grown in every province, cultivation was highly 
concentrated in historically-involved provinces and sparsely practiced elsewhere.  The 
percentage of the provincial populations dependent on the opiate economy for their 
livelihood vary from a few percent (single digits) to over 80% in some provinces where 
cultivation has been prevalent for over two decades.  These populations are at risk to 
become beholden to criminal and warlord (Non-traditional Commander) elements which 
control the opiate economy.   Non-traditional Commanders in particular use the power to 
capture rural power structures and coerce opium cultivation derived from this illicit 
economy to thwart central governance.  Rolling back and extinguishing the threat posed 
by the opiate economy is an imperative to the American national security goal of 
effective Afghan governance, but short-term and tactical wins against the opiate economy 
must not supplant our focus on and be pursued at the expense of central government 
stabilization.  In particular, it must be carried out in a way that reinforces central 
government authority in rural areas and it cannot drive rural residents into the arms of 
Non-traditional Commander groups.  A lack of central government jurisdiction creates a 
fertile environment for Al Qaeda to take up residence and pursue its international 
terrorism goals. 
B. COUNTERNARCOTICS POLICY AND THREATS TO GOVERNANCE 
Especially since 9/11, U.S. policymakers have highlighted the role that large illicit 
drug economies play in undermining government stability, both through corruption and, 
in many cases throughout the world, by funding anti-government insurgencies.  Given the 
seriousness of this threat, the counter-narcotics policy community often advocates 
aggressive programs intended to stamp out these illicit economies through decisive and 
immediate action.1  Unfortunately, although a concern for government stability provides 
the overwhelming impetus for aggressive counter-narcotics action, this concern recedes 
to the background when counter-narcotics policies are being conceptualized and 
                                                 
1   See Chapter IV for an extensive review of policy documents and statements promoting this 
viewpoint.   
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implemented.  Policymakers largely ignore the case-specific ways in which the drug 
economies interact with local politics and culture to affect central government stability, 
and, as a result, advocate polices that tend to exacerbate government instability.  What 
develops is an unwavering dedication to the chosen counter-narcotics policy path, at the 
expense of the true goals of government stabilization (which is necessary to enforce drug 
laws) and tailoring policies to achieve real and lasting reductions in illicit drug 
economies.  Since the chosen “path” to success is assumed to be the solution without 
regard for local circumstance, the same counter-narcotics policies are applied across the 
world.   
The counter-narcotics policy community’s faith in crop eradication is one 
example of this policy phenomenon, and arguments in support of eradication range from 
claims that denying the market of a “full” supply will increase costs of the final product 
and therefore reduce demand (which assumes production levels cannot not adjust to make 
up for losses—a false assumption for most cases), to claims that eradication can deter 
farmers from future cultivation (an argument which I debunk in this thesis, at least within 
the situational context of Afghanistan).2  The costs of the eradication approach are 
especially high when an anti-government insurgency is involved in the drug economy.3  
This conclusion is supported by studies of how coca eradication has strengthened South 
American insurgencies, and it is further supported in this thesis.  Crop eradication 
amounts to a government attack on the populace, which at the least fuels bitter anti-
government sentiment and can drive the populace to support an insurgency which offers 
them protection from government attacks on their livelihood.   
These facts do not change the counter-narcotics policy community’s stance on 
eradication.  Where cultivation takes place on very large scales and in difficult-to-access 
areas (due to terrain or security), aerial eradication is the policy community’s chosen 
                                                 
2   See United States Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2005, vol I, 
Drug and Chemical Control, (Washington, D.C.:  State Department, March 2005), 13 – 15, 268 – 269, 
http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2005/vol1/ html/42366.htm (accessed 27 May 2005); Robert B. 
Charles, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, testimony 
before the United States House Committee on Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, 
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 01 April 2004, http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rm/31039.htm, (accessed 
02 September 2005).  Additional sources are found in Chapter IV. 
3   One of the most cogent arguments supporting this conclusion is presented by Vanda Felbab-Brown, 
The Coca Connection:  The Impacts of Illicit Substances on Militarized Conflicts, p. 36 – 49, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, April 2004. 
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solution, and it has been strongly advocated for use in Afghanistan.  A casual review of 
Afghan history would indicate that the rural population’s experience with aviation and 
agriculture is comprised wholly of the Soviet use of attack helicopters to destroy farming 
infrastructure and communities; using herbicides which will destroy licit and illicit crops 
indiscriminately, and potentially cause heath problems in farming communities, will not 
be interpreted as being significantly different than the razed earth approach applied by the 
Soviets during the first half of their war in Afghanistan.  The presence of some 
Alternative Livelihood and other infrastructure development programs, which are being 
used in Afghanistan, could not possibly offset the predictable emotional response to 
aerial eradication. 
To date, many of the critiques of counter-narcotics policy in Afghanistan build on 
primarily an humanitarian or market-based logic.  These critics decry the current policy 
focus on eradication and claim that it unnecessarily hurts poor farmers and does nothing 
to solve demand for opiate products.  They advocate focusing much more on Alternative 
Livelihood development programs and other means of assisting the rural poor, but largely 
fail to consider the many other ways in which counter-narcotics policies undermine 
central government stability.  What is needed for Afghan counter-narcotics policy is a 
situational-specific analysis of the opiate economy and the policies which are being used 
to confront it.   
This failure to apply an Afghanistan-specific context has begun to be corrected by 
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the World Bank, and only rarely 
elsewhere.4  The World Bank in particular has paid attention to the connections between 
“warlord” anti-government interest and the trafficking portion of the opiate economy.  
                                                 
4   See World Bank Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, South Asia Region, 
Afghanistan:  State Building, Sustaining Growth, and Reducing Poverty--A Country Economic Report,  
(Report No. 29551-AF, 09 September 2004), 87; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 
The Opium Economy in Afghanistan 2003, (UNODC, 2003),  http://www.unodc.org/pdf/publications/ 
afg_opium_economy_www.pdf (accessed 09 June 2005); United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 
Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004, (UNODC, Vienna:  November 2004), http://www.unodc.org/pdf/ 
afg/afghanistan_opium_survey_2004.pdf, 71, (accessed 30 November 2004).  See also Barnett Rubin, Road 
to Ruin:  Afghanistan’s Booming Opium Industry,  New York:  New York University Center on 
International Cooperation, 2004; Barnett Rubin, Humayun Hamidzda and Abby Stoddard,  Afghanistan 
2005 and Beyond:  Prospects for Improved Stability Reference Document, New York University Center on 
International Cooperation, 2005, for the Clingendael Netherlands Insitute of International Relations. 
Additional sources noted in Chapters II and III.   
5 
This study builds on this nascent interest in how culture and local power structures affect 
the opiate economy and central governance, but goes beyond it by providing a more 
comprehensive and historically grounded assessment of these factors.  On the basis of 
this analysis, it also provides a more wide-ranging critique of current policy than either 
international institution is inclined to provide. 
C. FINDINGS AND LINES OF ARGUMENT 
A central argument of this thesis is that at every step in the development and 
implementation of counter-narcotics policy, the goal of government stability must come 
before and above any arbitrary counter-narcotics achievement standards.  Government 
stability and true success in rolling back the opiate economy will take many years to 
achieve; shifting policy focus to grasp short-term “wins” risks ultimate failure in stability 
and in counter-narcotics.  The primary lesson drawn from the cultural analysis is that we 
are confronting an Afghan problem involving narcotics, not a drug war problem 
involving Afghanistan.  The approach to understanding the problem and the 
recommended policies must not merely be taken in boiler-plate fashion from counter-
narcotics efforts in other regions of the world and applied to Afghanistan.  To do so risks 
destabilizing the Afghan central government.   
Chapter II develops important historical, cultural, and rural power structure 
insights which interact with the opiate economy and must be accounted for in counter-
narcotics policy.  Importantly, the Afghan central government and essentially all rural 
groups have existed with minimal interaction.  Rural social groupings traditionally hold 
the central government in contempt, and strive to maintain their autonomy from 
government authority.  For over a hundred years, the central government has gradually 
attempted to move itself from the periphery of society to the center.  Success was 
achieved when the shift was gradual, but attempts at rapidly transforming state-society 
relations have resulted in the two anti-government revolutions experienced in 
Afghanistan.  The second of these was the anti-communist revolution which began in 
1978, and resulted ultimately in civil war lasting until the fall of the Taliban in 2001.  
During those two-plus decades of conflict, the opiate economy expanded and entrenched 
itself in the social fabric of much of the country.  Now, with international assistance, the 
Afghan government must assert its authority in an unprecedented manner to change the 
6 
daily practices of much of the rural social structure by displacing the opiate economy 
which supports much of the rural society.  This must be done carefully and patiently. 
The rise of the opiate economy was not the only change in the rural social 
structure induced by the anti-Soviet jihad and the subsequent factional fighting.  The rise 
of Non-traditional Commanders, typically known as warlords, has introduced a 
fundamental challenge to Afghan society, and they are intimately connected to the opiate 
economy.  Prior to the anti-Soviet jihad, rural fighting units in Afghanistan typically 
resembled small militia units consisting of a few dozen fighters who were led by a local 
village leader and were economically dependent on their rural village group.  With the 
advent of massive international funding to the mujahidin, fighting organizations 
developed to encompass several thousand men under arms who were independent from 
the economic capacity of rural social groupings.  These organizations began even during 
the anti-Soviet jihad to utilize the separate international funding stream of opiate 
trafficking income, and the opiate economy has sustained many of them since.  The 
economic model in Afghanistan which functioned during the anti-Soviet jihad consisted 
of two parts.  The first is a rentier state in the traditional sense, in which the central 
government receives extensive external funding which allows it to function largely 
independently of its populace.  The second part of the economic model is a parallel 
international funding stream going to rural-based anti-government forces, on which they 
are largely dependent, and which provides them significant capacity in their anti-
government activities.  I term this economic model a bifurcated rentier economy.5   
The thesis demonstrates that the opiate economy funds some of the same Non-
traditional Commander organizations which waged the anti-(communist)-central 
government jihad, and that it has the capacity to fund those organizations at levels similar 
to those funding levels which forced the Soviet Union to decide to withdraw from 
Afghanistan.  The fight between the Communists and the mujahidin was essentially a war 
of economies as well as a struggle for authority over the rural populace, and the 
Communists failed because they could not strangle the economy which funded their 
opponents.  Similarly, the international Coalition which strives to stabilize the Afghan 
                                                 
5   For more on the etiology of this term, see footnote 69. 
7 
central government is locked in a war of economies with groups who strive to assert 
authority over the rural populace in order to induce or compel future opium poppy 
cultivation.  Understanding the full political-economic context, as well as the economic 
consequences of Coalition counter-narcotics policies, is essential to developing a 
successful policy course. 
Chapter III analyzes both the cultivation and trafficking sides of the opiate 
economy.  It shows that cultivation, where practiced, is integral to the political-economic 
units of the rural social structure.  Attacking cultivation through eradication risks 
provoking strong rural backlash based on cultural mores.  Cultivation is often motivated 
by factors beyond individual farmer’s control, and could be greatly expanded beyond 
current levels if the market required (e.g., in response to eradication).  Ultimately the 
cultivation side of the opiate economy contributes negligible funding to anti-government 
interests.  Instead, the trafficking portion of the opiate economy has the overwhelming 
capacity to fund the bifurcated rentier economy.  Non-traditional Commander groups 
(who engage in trafficking) are generally despised by the rural populace, who want the 
government to confront and remove these menaces to Afghan society and government 
stability.   
Much of the cultural analysis in Chapter II, paired with the analysis of the opiate 
economy in Chapter III, demonstrates that the historic political-economic units of rural 
social organization are particularly susceptible to being captured by the opiate economy, 
and are vulnerable to economic exploitation and political hijacking by trafficking groups, 
who are inherently anti-government.  With the advent of parliamentary, provincial and 
eventually district-level elections, anti-government interests now have an unprecedented 
means of infiltrating the government and using corruption to keep the government out of 
the rural affairs which the traffickers wish to control. 
In Chapter IV, the analysis of the counter-narcotics policies of Afghanistan, the 
United Kingdom and the United States indicates a mixed bag of both policy development 
and policy implementation.  Some mistakes were made in early policy decisions, but 
subsequently a multi-faceted, balanced and patient approach was collaboratively 
developed by each of the parties.  Unfortunately, pressure for immediate results and a 
8 
mistaken belief in the efficacy of deterrent eradication have prevented the 
implementation of this patient and coordinated approach.  Pressure built through 2004, 
led by the United States, for pursuing an aggressive attack on cultivation in 2005 that was 
not carefully linked to Alternative Livelihood programs, and to the United States even 
campaigning (fortunately, unsuccessfully) for aerial eradication.  Ultimately, the 
eradication campaign failed in both its short-term goals and in demonstrating that 
deterrence is achievable given the Afghan cultural (and geographical) context.   
Overall, counter-narcotics policies have focused disproportionately on 
eradication, particularly to “deter” future cultivation.  This disproportionate emphasis is 
not justified for a number of reasons.  First, the comparative abilities of the cultivation 
and trafficking sides of the opiate economy for funding anti-government forces clearly 
favor confronting trafficking and its benefactors, as they pose the clearest organized 
threat to government stability.  Second, there is ample opportunity for cultivation to 
expand even further in future years to make up for eradication losses, and the stockpiling 
of opium gum allows the market to bridge short-term losses in production caused by 
whatever eradication is achieved.  Third, market dynamics indicate that reducing demand 
for cultivated product, i.e. removing traffickers, is the only sustainable way to suppress 
the high profitability of opium poppy cultivation.  Fourth, attacking cultivation means 
attacking and imposing rapid change on the rural social structure which we are trying to 
link to a democratic central government; attempts at rapid social engineering produce 
revolt against Afghan governments, not positive change.  Fifth, the “rapid-collapse-
through-deterrence” approach wholly ignores the fact that the licit Afghan economy is 
currently dependent on the illicit funding generated by opiates, and—if successful—the 
deterrence goal of a rapid collapse of the opiate economy would also collapse the licit 
Afghan economy.  Finally, the quest for achieving cultivation deterrence naturally 
focused attention on the major-cultivation provinces.  This is problematic given that just 
six of 34 provinces are major producers, but trafficking interests are present to influence 
election outcomes in all 34 provinces, and the minor-production provinces provide the 
natural opportunity for increasing cultivation as it is squeezed in the major-cultivation 
areas.   
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The arguments developed through the thesis result in the following policy 
recommendations, which are presented in Chapter V.  First, all parties of the Coalition 
should move to implement the patient and balanced approach developed in several policy 
documents adopted by each of the major counter-narcotics contributors.  Second, the 
overall approach to confronting the opiate economy should start by “rolling back” opium 
poppy cultivation from the provinces where it has only recently taken hold to prevent it 
from becoming deeply entrenched in the rural political-economic social structures, and to 
limit traffickers’ ability to influence a much broader array of elected public offices.  
Major-cultivation areas can be addressed as the government gains political and 
infrastructural strength, in terms of ability to enforce laws and prosecute offenders.  
Third, there should be a much greater focus on attacking the trafficking portion of the 
opiate economy, to support both the roll-back strategy and to engage in country-wide 
interdiction operations.  Additional specific recommendations are developed, but are 
reserved for the conclusion as the context for understanding these cannot be succinctly 
presented here. 
D. SOURCES 
Two primary sources were used in this thesis, including an interview with a policy 
official in the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and an interview 
with and access to e-mail discussions from a British citizen working in the Afghanistan 
Ministry of Counter-Narcotics.  Secondary sources used for this thesis include many 
scholarly works on Afghan culture and history, other academic works, reports from the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the World Bank, the Brookings Institute, the 
Central Intelligence Agency, The Afghanistan Counter-Narcotics Ministry, the 
Congressional Research Service, various Afghan cultural organizations, contemporary 
surveys of Afghan voters, and press reports.  The policy analysis in Chapter IV relied 
first on primary source material, consisting of the policy documents and on-the-record 
statements by policy officials of Afghanistan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  
Documents and information were taken from official government websites, U.S. 
Congressional Testimony, U.S. Public Laws, the Congressional Research Service, 
statements by U.S. legislators, U.K. Select Committee on Foreign Affairs documents, 
books written by former government officials, interviews with mid-level policy officials 
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in the State Department, communications with Coalition officials working in the Afghan 
Ministry of Counter-Narcotics, news reports from U.S., British, and various Central 
Asian publications translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. 
More than one source for information on the Afghan opiate economy was 
available for analysis, however data from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 



















II. THE AFGHANISTAN CULTURAL CONTEXT 
This chapter will review the essential Afghan social structure and history relevant 
to understanding the modern role of the opiate economy, that economy’s social potential, 
and the context in which counter-narcotic policies must function.  The first section of this 
chapter, titled Essential Afghan Social Structure and History, discusses four topics.  The 
first is the nature of ethnic identity in Afghanistan and the characteristics of the four 
largest ethnic groups, including their relationship to the opiate economy.  It shows that, 
with the exception of the Pashtuns, ethnic identity is not the most relevant social group 
for most Afghans.  Instead, Afghans most identify with their qawm, an often fluid social 
grouping that poses particular challenges for governance and counter-narcotics efforts 
(topic two).  Third, the history and changing character of relations between the central 
government and rural society are discussed.  Finally, the section presents the recent 
history of Afghanistan’s status as a rentier state, a characteristic that has removed 
incentives for the central government to engage rural society.  This review builds the case 
for what is argued in the second part of this chapter, which is that a distinctly non-
traditional understanding of the threat posed by the opiate economy is needed to 
formulate effective policy.  The broad conclusions of the second half of this chapter are 
that the opiate economy is:  a foundation for a bifurcated rentier-state system, with 
international aid going to the central government and narcotics revenue funding rural-
based power centers in a manner functionally similar to patterns seen during the Soviet-
Afghan war; an economy that harnesses historic rural patronage networks and both 
eclipses and corrupts central government distributive networks; a force which exacerbates 
rural-state social tensions.  Once framed in cultural-historic terms, the opiate economy 
can be effectively understood and confronted, and this confrontation may in fact point the 
way to understanding how best to ease Afghanistan forward into an emerging era of 
Asian economic revival as a functioning democratic state suited to Afghan society. 
A. ESSENTIAL AFGHAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND HISTORY 
Afghan society is richly varied.  This review is not comprehensive; it presents the 
Afghan societal structures and patterns of power that illuminate essential broad 
constraints, within which we must develop our counter-narcotics policies.  Liken this 
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summary to describing the hills and valleys (constraints)within which a river flows—as 
we guide ourselves downstream we must still mind the submerged rocks and swirling 
eddies (nuanced societal and contemporary power structure details, many of which are 
not presented here) that could prevent us from successfully reaching the sea.  However, if 
we ignore these broad constraints, by merely transplanting policy choices applied in other 
contexts, we may find ourselves river-rafting in the forest.   
1. Afghanistan’s Ethnic Structure 
Afghan ethnic groups will be discussed as if they are distinct sets for simplicity 
sake, but clear distinctions do not reflect historic reality.  As will be presented later, self-
identity for nearly all people in Afghanistan is primarily driven by affiliation with one or 
more qawm, not with broad ethnic groupings or even (in general) with a tribe or 
confederation of tribes.6  The one sustained historic deviation from this is the Durrani 
Pashtun, whose self-identity as an ethnic tribal confederation was driven by their close 
political relationship to the central government.  Among the Ghilzai Pashtun there exists 
an ethnic Pashtun identity, but their tribal confederation identity eroded due to a lack of 
political involvement.  For the remaining groups ethnic identity is weak, and the extent to 
which it exists, it is a fairly recent development, spurred by the political imperatives of 
recent Afghan experience.   
Two noted Afghanistan scholars observe that ethnic consciousness can be 
manipulated by a politically dominant external group—a point discussed by Olivier Roy 
(French pronunciation, “Waugh”) but overtly stressed by Barnett Rubin, especially with 
respect to government action (repression or favoritism).7  Both authors observe that 
ethnically-based self-identity is strengthened when it is politically expedient or 
imperative for the emerging self-identity group.  Such was the case during the Soviet war, 
which  
accelerated [the] process of ethnic crystallization, and brought about a sort 
of political awareness of ethnic identity….  The [Communist] regime 
                                                 
6   Barnett Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan:  State Formation and Collapse in the 
International System, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002),  25. 
7   Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 
1990), 224; Rubin, Fragmentation, 26, 302. 
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propaganda coined the word melliat (a translation for the Soviet concept 
of “nationality”) to give political expression to the non-Pashtun groups. 8   
In addition to Soviet influence, the foreign military aid extended to the Mujahidin via the 
famed Peshawar Seven political groups forced local qawm seeking support to identify 
more closely with macro-ethnic parties.  These parties were in turn to a large degree 
reinforced by the Pakistani ISI (Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence) as a simplified 
means of distributing military aid and exerting political influence.   
Whether the emerging ethnic identities will solidify into lasting factors of self-
identity remains to be seen, and will largely depend on the political context created by the 
Afghan central government, or by outside spoilers.  Roy discusses and Rubin founds his 
entire book, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, on the fact that Afghan governments 
(almost exclusively Durrani Pashtun) have historically pursued a policy of segmenting 
the governed population into small units to prevent the rise of a politically powerful 
group which could challenge a weak central government.  The units utilized for 
segmentation have been the qawm, a unit inherently acceptable to the population, and the 
result has been a lack of ethnic identity among non-Pashtun peoples.  The 2004 
subdivision of two Afghan provinces to create 34 from 32, and the highly adept political 
maneuverings demonstrated by President Karzai may well be evidence of political 
stabilization via careful segmenting, i.e. governance Afghan (or Durrani) style. 
a. The Pashtun Peoples 
The preeminent ethnic group in Afghanistan is that of the Pashtun which is 
politically centered around a collection of tribal confederations established in the 1740’s 
to assert control over land holdings which have expanded and contracted through 
conquest and confrontation.  Modern Afghanistan’s borders were determined to a large 
degree by British and Tsarist Russian on-and-off competition (known as the “Great 
Game”) as they each attempted to co-opt (but occasionally clashed with) Pashtun 
ambitions and interests.  The Pashtuns developed “a profound sense of cultural identity,”9 
but it was based on a simultaneous ideology and tribal code of conduct called 
pashtunwali, not on ethnicity in the western understanding.  According to Roy, “[o]nes 
                                                 
8  Roy, Islam and Resistance, 224. 
9  Roy, Islam and Resistance, 13. 
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allegiance belonged to the restricted group and the tribal code… to exercise pashtu (to 
identify oneself with values) was more important in the context of tribe than “to be a 
Pashtun” (to be identified with an ethnic community or a nation).”10  So Pashto identity 
has historically not been tied to a macro-ethnicity, rather to a restricted social group 
(qawm, discussed later in detail) which practices pashtunwali. 
A brief summary of pashtunwali is essential; the most important tenet of 
this tribal code is maintain and defending one’s nang, or honor.  Failure to do so inflicts 
self-ostracism, to no longer be Pashtun.  Vengeance for setting right major transgressions 
is the second tenet (badal), and will surely follow any event which attacks one’s namus, 
(land, wealth and women), protection of which is the third tenet.  Long-established social 
rules govern the distribution, use and transfer of land, lending and payments of debt, and 
treatment of women.  Fourth is a requirement to extend generous hospitality, or nemasta, 
to visitors, to the point of jeopardizing one’s own well-being.  Finally, pashtunwali 
demands that one give refuge, or nanwati, to all fugitives, and is closely related to 
nemasta.  Pashtunwali provides a tendency towards social equilibrium among a small, 
close-knit group, which has been the prevailing level of social organization, embedded 
within a village-centric context.11  Such a code is necessary among a highly egalitarian 
society, as it is the only means of finding justice for grievous wrongs where there is no 
recognized hierarchy to enforce law or to appeal for adjudication.  Those who self-
identify with pashtunwali are eternally resisting central government encroachment, which 
imposes a hierarchy inimical to the egalitarian ethic.  That the Pashtun peoples have 
historically dominated central governance in Afghanistan is made consistent with 
pashtunwali by maintaining the understanding that central governance is necessary to 
maintain order and authority in the non-Pashtun areas seized through conquest, so that 
the benefits of expansion could be shared by all Pashtuns.  Government within the 
Pashtun lands is redundant and unnecessary, according to pashtunwali.12  This poses 
obvious problems for counter-narcotics policy, especially since the bulk of opium poppy 
cultivation occurs in Pashtun areas.  Improperly-conducted counter-narcotics operations 
                                                 
10   Roy, Islam and Resistance, 13.  Quotation marks inside the quote carried from Roy’s text. 
11   Thomas Johnson, class notes from Contemporary Afghanistan Politics, Naval Postgraduate 
School,  Monterey, California, Spring 2005. 
12   Roy, Islam and Resistance, 14. 
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could clash with protection of namus via destroying the means for wealth creation and 
maintenance, and searches of homes violate the privacy required for women.  Such an 
affront is a challenge to nang (honor) and would inspire a quest for bidal (vengeance) 
that would not end after adjudication in a courtroom or the release of a convict. 
Barnett Rubin describes the Pashtun peoples as belonging to three tribal 
groups, and refers to the two most prominent groups, the Durranis and the Ghilzais, as 
each being a tribal confederation which can be subdivided into tribes, clans and 
lineages.13  The Durranis and Ghilzais share an historic legacy in that they were 
colonized by the Safavids, who controlled the central and western areas of modern 
Afghan territory before 1749; this is important because the Safavids inculcated 
“chieftain” leadership roles in their subject tribes, an act which recognized/created ruling 
lineages and recognized hierarchies in each group.  Once the Pashtuns established 
independence, the Durranis immediately rose to prominence in central governance and 
have generally maintained dominance since.  President Karzai, for example, is the head 
of the Popolzai tribe of the Durrani Confederation.  Two very significant and recent 
deviations from this pattern include the Ghilzai tribes’ primacy during the period of anti-
Soviet Jihad,14 and during the Taliban era the Mullahs took over.  Even though the 
Mullahs were mostly from Durrani Pashtun areas, they are socially distinguished as their 
own qawm and oriented to their interpretation of Islam and shari’a, as opposed to 
pashtunwali, and therefore not Pashtun in the sense of qawm (discussed below).15  
Through exercise of centralized power, and access to it through aristocratic (formalized) 
patronage networks which included gifts of land from the Monarchy (the jagir system)16, 
the Durrani have maintained a strong hierarchical tradition, although they still 
romanticize some aspects of tribal Pashtun structure such as the jirga, and nang is still a 
central theme of life.  Although pashtunwali has decayed among the Durrani, they still 
fully self-identify as Pashtun and are accepted as such by other Pashtun; this distinction 
hints at a self-acknowledged division within the ethnicity, discussed below.  A portion of 
                                                 
13   Rubin, Fragmentation, 26 – 28.   
14   Roy, Islam and Resistance, 225. 
15   Roy, Islam and Resistance, 35. 
16   Roy, Islam and Resistance, 12 
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the Durrani Confederation has, by dint of establishing itself as aristocracy, largely 
abandoned pashtunwali, Pashto as a language, and other sociological aspects of what it is 
to be Pashtun,17 and may refer to these as ‘dead tribalisms,’ but they still draw on the 
historic legacy and patrimony which legitimized their aristocratic standing.18  
Conversely, the Ghilzai’s formal hierarchy has atrophied, their identity as a confederation 
has weakened, and they have returned to the more egalitarian structure embodied in 
pashtunwali and in the jirga; Rubin notes that this development owes as much to the 
tribal relationship to the central government as to autonomous social tradition.19        
The third major Pashtun group comprises those tribes historically 
colonized by the Mughals, and who reside in the mountainous areas straddling the eastern 
border shared by Afghanistan and Pakistan, and in the Pakistan lowlands descending east 
towards the Indus River.  Among these Eastern Pashtun tribes no broad political 
confederation ever formed, pashtunwali is still very strong,20 and recognition of central 
governance (and “national” borders) is very weak; this is formally epitomized in the 
existence of the Pakistan Tribal zones.  These cross-border tribal relations are significant 
in terms of the opiates trafficking into Pakistan.  Especially since these tribes lost much 
of their access to their traditional market-day city of Peshawar as a result of British 
territorial demarcations during the Great Game, these tribes have taken to all forms of 
“smuggling” (trade via relatives and qawm who happen to live on both sides of an 
“artificial” border, from their perspective). Families within the hill tribes are prominent in 
the regional trucking companies who service licit (and other?) markets, and it is the hill 
tribes which are familiar with and monitor/control access to the traditional cross-border 
footpaths through the mountains. 21 
The distinctions between the Durrani and the Ghilzai and Eastern tribes 
follows to some degree a sharp division which is central to the self-conception of the 
Pashtun peoples, that between the plains Pashtun and the hills or mountain Pashtun.  The 
                                                 
17   Roy, Islam and Resistance, 15. 
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lowland Pashtuns are historically much more closely bound to central government 
jurisdiction, and tribal life is hierarchically structured through Khan patronage networks 
revolving around controlled access to land.  The mountain tribes have largely been free 
from government interference, and male tribal members are largely equal among their 
peers as demonstrated in the construct of the jirga (circle), where consensus decisions are 
made by all male members of the group.  One Pashtun folk saying captures the 
lowland/highland distinction wonderfully, in noting “taxes (including rent) eat up the 
plains, and honor eats up the mountains.”22  The second half refers to blood feuds 
spawned by families defending or recovering their nang, or honor, through vengeance.   
Rubin notes that Pashtuns include peasants, nomads and city dwellers, and 
as such many Pashtuns do not fit neatly into the tribal and/or aristocratic structures 
mentioned above.  Over the past century, through the process of urbanization, relocation 
(occasionally forced) and pastoralization of nomads, many Pashtuns have been 
“detribalized.”  Even still, many of these people still retain their tribal self-identity. 23  A 
new and radically different detribalization resulted from the Soviet war and the 
subsequent unrest, as an entire generation of Afghan youth was raised in refugee camps 
or in urban settings abroad as people fled the fighting.  Even in the refugee camps, life for 
Pashtuns was, at best, semi-tribal; patronage networks developed more along political 
faction lines than via qawm affiliation.24  The little education available to youth raised in 
such camps was largely provided by madrassas, many of which espoused a modern and 
radical form of Diobandi Islam,25 a form influenced by and similar to Salafi and Wahhabi 
Islam, and very different from the Hanafi tradition practiced by most Sunnis in 
Afghanistan.26   
The Pashtun people are Sunni Muslim, but their relationship to Islam is 
complex.  Among the four sources of legitimacy for Afghan centralized power given by 
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Roy, Islam is listed third, after tribal legitimacy (pashtunwali and the jirga), the mere 
possession and exercise of power which is not questioned (second), and just above the 
legitimacy drawn from a sense of nationhood as a people, which is held only by the 
historically detribalized Pashtun.27 (It is highly unlikely that this sense of nationalism is 
shared among the youth raised in refugee camps and educated in the Diobandi 
madrassas.)  Among the hill tribes, where pashtunwali is the primary social construct, 
there is the saying “Mullah go back to the mosque,” which is to say ‘stay out of our 
business.’28  The religious authorities are socially ascribed into a separate qawm, and as 
such have diminished authority to influence behavior within a Pashtun qawm structure 
centered on pashtunwali.  For the Durrani, among whom pashtunwali plays a diminished 
role, the Mullah has somewhat higher standing and influence; President Karzai includes 
as part of The 1384 (2005) Counter-Narcotics Implementation Plan posting a fatwa 
prohibiting cultivation of opium poppy in every mosque.29  Islam is, however, the one 
feature shared by essentially all Afghan peoples, and serves to unite all peoples in 
Afghanistan during periods of crisis such as attack by foreigners.  During these times, the 
standing of religious authorities rises, but usually not enough to challenge the Durrani 
Khans and royalty for ruling status.  The case of the Taliban is really a cultural 
aberration, the causes of which are complex, and beyond the scope of this paper.  It is 
clear at this point, that although the underlying social causes for the rise of the Taliban 
have not entirely been expunged, Afghanistan is returning to more traditional modes of 
power, albeit with a new democratic construct which selected a (Durrani) President via 
popular election instead of selecting a Durrani King via consensus of the Loya Jirga or a 
resort to armed conflict. 
Apparently, the Pashtuns have never constituted a majority within the area 
that is now Afghanistan.30  Establishing a reliable percentage for each ethnic group has 
been highly problematic, primarily for reasons of amorphous and context-driven self-
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identity (discussed in Qawm, below), and since 1979 due to nearly constant armed 
conflict through much of the country.  These factors have made survey/census tools 
difficult to construct and implement.  Prior to the Soviet invasion Pashtuns were 46 
percent of the population,31 and current estimates placing them at 42 percent.32  The 
Pashtuns are concentrated in the provinces surrounding the southern arc of the ring road 
from Herat to Kabul, but are found in much of the northern areas of the country as well.  
This southern arc is also where opium poppy cultivation is most prevalent and most 
entrenched into the rural social fabric.  The expansion of opium into all Afghan provinces 
has proceeded to a large degree through ethnic connections.33  
b. The Tajik Peoples 
The Tajiks comprise the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, 23 
percent in 1979 and 27 percent estimated today.34  Among the Tajiks, the qawm identity 
is founded on kinship, and on the geographical area surrounding the rural village.  
Writers disagree as to whether the hierarchical Khan structure prevails; this may well 
depend on the extent to which these peoples were colonized by the Safavid empire, which 
extended to the east of Herat covering areas presently inhabited by only some of the 
Tajiks in Afghanistan.  Much of the present-day Tajik areas extend through the north of 
Afghanistan, especially into the mountainous Hindu Kush areas, and into Tajikistan.   
In terms of contemporary Afghan politics, one of the most important of 
the Peshawar Seven political parties, Jamiat-i Islami, is primarily a Tajik party.  It was 
founded by Burhannudin Rabbani, who served as Afghan president from 1992 – 1996, 
when he was run out of Kabul by the Taliban.  As a significant political player in the 
Northern Alliance, he proclaimed himself leader of Afghanistan when Northern Alliance 
forces re-entered Kabul after the fall of the Taliban, but handed power over to (then) 
Interim President Hamid Karzai on 22 December 2001.  He has not been given a political 
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role in post-Taliban Afghan government, and as a result he is an outspoken critic of the 
Karzai government, albeit a politically weakened one.   
Ismail Khan is another prominent Tajik warlord and politician, and 
effectively ruled Herat and the surrounding region as his personal khanate essentially 
independently from the central government, until he was forced to step down in August 
2004.  However, in December 2004, Ismail Khan was appointed the Minister of Energy 
in President Karzai’s cabinet. 
c. The Hazara Peoples 
The next largest group consists of the Hazara, who comprised 10 percent 
of the population in 1979 and are estimated at 9 percent today.35  The Hazara are mostly 
concentrated in the central region of Afghanistan historically known as Hazarajat, which 
now comprises the provinces of Bamiyan, Uruzgan and Ghor, and parts of Herat, Farah 
Kandahar, Ghazni, Parwan, Baghlan, Balkh and Badghis.  Ethnically they are believed to 
be a mixture of Mongol and Turkoman warrior settlers, Tajiks and perhaps other Afghan 
peoples. 36  Many Hazara retain strong mongoloid features, setting them apart in physical 
appearance from the other ethnic derivations present in Afghanistan.  Additionally, most 
Hazara are Shi’a, which further distinguishes them from the rest of the Afghanistan 
population.  Whether due to the physical or sectarian differences, the Hazara have 
traditionally been considered the lowest class in Afghanistan; a position formally 
established as government policy as recently as the late 1800s.37  Socially, Hazara have 
been held as slaves and as servants in Pashtun areas, and were the subject of genocidal 
attacks by the Taliban in 1996 in the city of Mazar-i-Sharif.  In terms of the opium 
economy, Hazara villages accounted for only .1 percent of the total number of opium 
producing villages in 1994, the only year that UNODC collected ethnic identity as part of 
their annual Afghanistan Opium Survey.  Other ethnic groups, primarily Pashtuns and 
Tajiks, living in the Hazarajat region were responsible for opium poppy cultivation 
within those provinces, and the spread of poppy cultivation since has followed ethnic 
                                                 
35  Rubin, Fragmentation, 26; and CIA, World Fact Book 2005, Afghanistan. 
36  Ismaili Heritage Society, Ismailis in Hazarajat,  http://ismaili.net/Source/mumtaz/behsud/ 
ismailis.html, (accessed 17 Jun 2005).  
37  Johnson, class notes. 
21 
connections.  Based on this information, it is highly unlikely that the Hazara are 
significant contributors to the opiate economy today. 38 
d. The Uzbek Peoples 
The last major ethnic group in Afghanistan comprises the Uzbeks, 
accounting for 8 percent of the 1978 census and estimated at 9 percent today.39  They are 
concentrated primarily in the north of Afghanistan, in highly fertile farmland along the 
Amu Darya river system.  Traditionally, cotton has been a primary agricultural product 
for the Uzbeks.  Politically, the Uzbek peoples have tended to have little contact with the 
central government, and village life is dominated by strongmen with large land holdings, 
who enforce a serfdom-like relationship with peasant farmers through a rigid hierarchical 
structure.  Some of these landlords were Durrani Pashtun who were supported by the 
government in Kabul until the 1978 coup, apparently part of the jagir system.40  The 
Uzbek’s most important political figure is that of Abdul Rashid Dostum, who 
commanded the largest and most effective militia fighting on behalf of the Communist 
government of Najibullah.  Although this was a regionally-drawn multi-ethnic force 
(almost uniquely among militias, this one did not correspond to a qawm), the majority 
were Uzbek and there was a strong element of hatred for the Pashtun in recruiting 
members.41  Initially, Dostum was responsible for guarding the northern natural gas 
fields, but eventually developed his militia into a division-size force capable of mobile 
operations and was deployed south to the Kandahar (Durrani Pashtun) area.  He married 
the daughter of a khan from the Popolzai tribe of the Durrani confederation, the same 
tribe of President Karzai.  He has been noted for changing allegiance on many occasions, 
often at a particularly opportune time to preserve his standing.  Eventually he ended up 
joining the Northern Alliance, and re-took from the Taliban his historic stronghold of 
Mazar-i-Sharif.  He is also noted for his ruthless battle tactics, and his forces have been 
accused of wartime atrocities.  In the post-Taliban era, he has held the position of Deputy 
Defense Minister, established himself as a special advisor for military affairs responsible 
for security in much of northern Afghanistan (running it as a fiefdom), a position which 
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he was forced to relinquish in May 2003.  Cut loose from the Karzai interim 
administration, he established himself as an opposition Presidential candidate.42  
However, in March 2005 he was appointed be the Chief of Staff to the Commander of the 
Afghan National Army; it is unclear what his responsibilities or authority will be.43  
There are several ethnic groups represented in small percentages of the whole, 
including the Aimek, Turkmen, and Baluch.  Since they play such a minor role in the 
governance of Afghanistan, and by all indications in the opiate economy, they do not 
require elaboration here. 
2. The Importance of Qawm as a Social Identity Reference 
Roy introduces the idea of qawm by stating:  
Every Afghan is linked to the past by a line of ancestors traced back 
through his father.  He is also conscious of belonging to a larger entity 
which takes the form of a more or less endogenous community (the 
qawm), whether its sociological basis is tribe, clan, professional group 
(qawm of the mullahs…), caste, religious group, ethnic group, village 
community or simply an extended family.  [Some parenthetical examples 
omitted for brevity.]44 
Rubin notes that qawm refers to any form of solidarity group, and as a construct 
of personal identity can be somewhat fluid based on what form or level of identity is 
relevant to a particular setting.45  The importance of qawm to counter-narcotics policy 
stems from the function of qawm in the rural setting, where there is competition to 
become recognized as the qawm’s headman, or the khan.  Roy presents a brilliant 
characterization of the qawm/khan relationship: 
Power in Afghan peasant society resides neither in a specific locality nor 
in a person, but in an elusive network, which needs constant maintenance 
and reconstruction.  It is a network which depends upon patronage, where 
one’s degree of prestige is proportionate to the largesse distributed.  Power 
is granted by consensus and is not necessarily given to a man for life…. 
Afghan society is not feudal….  A khan depends for his power on the 
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43  British Broadcasting Company, Concern over Dostum Appointment, 03 March 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4314261.stm, (accessed 17 June 2005). 
44   Roy, Islam and Resistance, 12. 
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consensus of his qawm, except when his authority has been superseded by 
a state nominee, which has been the case amongst the Durrani since the 
eighteenth century through the institution of the jagir [land grants by the 
monarchy]….  The khan must always show, by his generosity and his 
availability to those who need him, that he is the only person worthy 
fulfilling this function:  “there is no khan without dastakhan” (without “a 
tablecloth,” that is, without keeping open table.)46 
In addition to building ties through the community via patronage, the khan also 
strives to be the judge in local disputes and to extend their family relations through 
marriage.47  So, in the rural setting, often (although not exclusively) a village and a qawm 
are highly synonymous.48  The political structure of the group is really an extension of 
the economic model and family relations of the group; it is an amorphous network which 
changes with time and with personal fortune.  For the rural individual then, identity is 
tied tightly to the social microcosm which provides for his physical needs and the 
reasonably stable social context in which he contributes directly to providing for his own 
needs. 
The resilience and relative fluidity of the qawm networked political and economic 
model has served the Afghan peoples very well:  whoever can manage resources and 
relationships the most efficiently and effectively becomes the de facto leader of the 
qawm.  This produces a social structure which is highly adept at dealing with 
environmental survival challenges such as drought, but also political survival challenges 
such as the invasions by the British during the Great Game and that of the Soviets in the 
1980s, each of which was successfully resisted.  The networked and fluid structure makes 
it very hard for an outside political authority to harness local groups for political 
purposes.  This flexible method of economic and political arrangement at the local level, 
while highly valuable at preventing total societal collapse even in the face of extreme 
challenge, is a complication to governance that extends to most of the ethnic groups in 
Afghanistan, and exacerbates the governance problems presented by pashtunwali among 
much of the Pashtun peoples. 
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Roy observes that in Muslim countries where there is not a tradition that strongly 
emphasizes the role of the state, which is the case in Afghanistan, individual’s loyalties 
are divided between the localized community, or qawm, and the Umma, which is the 
world-wide Muslim community.49  Absent is a sense of patriotism (for a centrally-
governed unit) in the western sense, which leads us to the rural-state relationship in 
Afghanistan.  It is in the rural-state interaction, which must engage the qawm as a 
political unit, where the importance of the qawm structure to counter-narcotics policy 
becomes clear and operates through several mechanisms. 
3. The History and Changing Character of Rural/Central Government 
Relations 
The following discussion will progress through three aspects of rural-state 
relations:  the historic purpose of the central government; the nature of the government’s 
attempts to relate to qawm; and the qawm’s infiltration of the state.  From this discussion 
several constraints for counter-narcotics policy will be drawn. 
a. The Historic Purpose of the State 
We noted earlier that the Afghan central government was founded and 
sustained by Durrani Pashtuns, and instituted within the context of controlling lands 
gained through conquest.  As such, the raison’d’etre for the central government is 
captured in Roy’s description: 
The Afghan tribes (especially the Durrani, but also the Ghilzay) see the 
central power as their representative; it manages on their behalf the 
conquests that they have made together….  The tribes see the state as 
existing on the periphery, responsible for administering [conquered 
land]…, in respect of which the state is no more than the means of 
continuity.  As far as their own territory is concerned, the presence of the 
state would seem to be redundant and totally unnecessary.  The historical 
mission of the Afghan state may be summarised as an attempt to reverse 
this relationship in order to pass from the periphery to the centre.  But the 
state was never to escape the implications of the original principle which 
gave it legitimacy…50 
The power of the state is intended to be used in relation to non-Pashtuns.  However, non-
Pashtuns are naturally are inclined to resist, evade, or seek exemption from government 
                                                 
49   Roy, Islam and Resistance, 8.  Closely paraphrased. 
50   Roy, Islam and Resistance, 14. 
25 
oversight.  In fact, Roy notes that “an Afghan will never define himself as an Afghan if 
he is not a Pashtun as well.”51  It may be equally stated that for self-identified Afghans 
and non-Afghans, the state has virtually no role to play in interfering with their daily life 
experience other than to provide protection from outside interference, and to serve as a 
source of wealth which the qawm can tap into (a point to be discussed below). 
b. The Government’s Attempt to Relate to Qawm 
It is no wonder then that the rural peasantry and the state officials regard 
each other with “profound and mutual contempt.”52  The separation between the two is 
part and parcel of daily experience, where the government building in a village is set 
apart from the area of residences, and patterns of behavior, clothing and speech also 
differentiate the official from the peasant.53  It is also founded in the fact that the 
administrative official typically is not part of the local peasant’s qawm; they are distinctly 
outsiders, and especially in areas where pashtunwali is strong the sense of hierarchy, 
wealth extraction, and interference in local affairs embodied by the state official is 
particularly resented. 
For the state to assert its authority, this is a challenging (if not debilitating) 
environment; but the constraints on state interaction are complicated by more than mere 
enmity.  The qawm political-economic model also creates significant obstacles for the 
state to extend state jurisdiction into the affairs of the qawm (e.g., to enforce counter-
narcotics laws).  A village-qawm must be somewhat economically self-sufficient, and 
wealth creation does not rise much above sustaining the community and improving its 
means of production for sustenance (e.g. irrigation networks, etc.).  The competition for 
who can best operate a patronage network to meet people’s needs (the fight to be khan) 
results in a stable economic model for distributing limited resources, but it has the 
potential for political volatility because the khan may be changed out if he does not 
perform.  Qawm power structures are networks, and as such are hard to harness or 
penetrate by the government; if the government were to latch onto one personality in the 
qawm, succeed in focusing that person’s attention on the government in order to extract 
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resources (taxes) or enforce laws (which interfere with pashtunwali and/or qawm 
productivity for the qawm’s sake), then that personality would very quickly be replaced 
as khan, and would no longer have the authority to fulfill the state’s mandate. 54     
To get around this problem, the state has utilized the position of the malik, 
but this is only a partial solution.  The malik is a person of the local village, considered by 
the peasants to be one of their own, who is selected by the head family of the qawm to act 
as an intermediary between the qawm and the government.  In some (e.g. multi-ethnic) 
villages there will be more than one malik, as there are more than one qawm, although 
this is not typical.   Maliks are people of standing in their community, but usually not of 
equal standing with the khan.   Khan wield greater (although informal) power than the 
malik based on their personal wealth, the strength of the qawm and its loyalty to the khan, 
and on the fact that the families served by the malik pay his salary (sometimes malik have 
been paid by the state as well).55  The malik represents the state to the qawm and the 
qawm to the state, and as such is inevitably bound into a conflict of interests where he 
gets to decide what information is passed in both directions. 
This raises the issue of corruption.  Roy states “[c]orruption, if it is done at 
a reasonable price and kept within acceptable limits, is not wrong as far as the peasant is 
concerned:  it makes it possible for him to resist regimentation, and to avoid dealing with 
issues which he does not understand and whose purpose is, in any case, beyond him….”56  
In essence, corruption is the price of freedom, a marginal cost to exempt the qawm from 
government interference. 
Why should the state be content to accept such an inefficient and 
corruptible model of relating to its people?  First, the model has been sufficient to provide 
the state with what it needs from these relatively poor rural communities which have little 
wealth to be taxed.  The relationship has historically been strong enough to secure taxes 
for local infrastructure projects (e.g., nearby roads, school or government buildings) and 
to extract recruits for a national army.  The historic pattern of Afghanistan being 
externally supported, often to the degree of becoming a rentier state (discussed below), 
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also alleviated the need to extract wealth from the populace.  However, the primary 
reason is that given the insular politics of the qawm, the motivations and aspirations of 
the khan are not oriented towards changing or challenging the state’s existence or its 
limited centralized political system and social structure, which is clearly in the interest of 
the state.57  When the extractive relationship of the qawm to the central government 
(discussed below) is added, the state is given a powerful tool to fragment society into 
manageable (or at least ineffective) political entities in terms of challenging state 
existence, a point noted by Roy and thoroughly discussed by Rubin. 
In spite of the fact that the model of state-qawm relations above has 
managed to meet the most basic needs of the state, the state has tried to achieve some 
degree of societal engineering (primarily an attempt to bring modernity) and to change 
the fundamental nature of the state-qawm relationship by moving the state from the 
periphery of society to the middle, as mentioned above.  Generally, the attempts to bring 
change have been very gradual, avoiding radical or rapid change.  Two notable 
exceptions are the attempts at cultural revolution from above instigated by King 
Amanullah (1924 – 1928) and by the Khalq regime (Communist, 1978 – 1979).58  Both 
attempts were taken as unwarranted attacks on the qawm social structure by outsiders, 
and provoked a crisis in which the unifying force of Islam was harnessed to unite many 
qawm in jihad against the oppressors.  Rubin describes the reforms attempted by Khalq, 
stating they  
would have destroyed the economic and social basis of the [qawm] 
exchanges—marriage prestations, loans, mortgages, tenancy, hospitality—
that enabled khans to “tie the knot of the tribe.”  The network of 
clientelism that held extended families together and knitted them into a 
qawm would have been replaced by a direct dependence of nuclear 
families on the [communist] party and government bureaucracy.59 
Roy’s comment “[if] the state sets about imposing its own norms, then the state is 
considered to be no more than the instrument of sectional interests”60 warns us that 
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counter-narcotics activity cannot be pursued such that it appears to be an imposition of 
external norms (or one that violates qawm norms); instead, we must find ways to work 
with the qawm social structure to advance counter-narcotics interests.  Radical 
destabilization of existing qawm economic-political structures, which exist at the 
local/village level, through an all-out eradication campaign will certainly result in 
localized violent resistance.  But it also has the potential to spawn a wide-spread jihad 
against what would be perceived as a Coalition effort to change Afghan society. 
c. The Qawm’s Infiltration of the State 
The final aspect of rural-state relations lies in the qawm’s attempt to 
infiltrate the state.  This game is pursued for two reasons:  to extract wealth for the qawm, 
and to ensure that rural politics can continue unabated without interference from the 
government; qawm do not pursue access in order to seize power or upset the political 
order at the national level:61  instead they attempt to infiltrate the state bureaucracy at 
whatever level is appropriate to meet their extraction and non-interference needs, from 
the district up to the ministerial levels.  By Roy’s estimation, the qawm’s strategy was 
successful, at least from the period of 1933 – 1978.  Even during the constitutional period 
of 1963 – 1973, in which a parliament was formed, national political parties failed to 
coalesce.  While some political scientists determine this as the cause of the failure of that 
constitutional experiment, Roy attributes the failure as a symptom of the underlying 
qawm system, where 
The deputies from the provinces came as representatives of their local 
qawm to obtain subsidies and privileges, for the state was seen by them 
merely as a powerful and external agent at whose expense they should 
profit as much as possible….  The selection of political appointees clearly 
reflected the divisions within a society where primary allegiance was to 
the family and patronage was still a major factor:  ultimate loyalties were 
not centred upon the state.62 
Roy characterizes the resulting parliamentary politics as all form and no substance, a 
political theater which devolved into political comedy mocked by school children on the 
playground as they listened to debates on the radio.63  The emotional and patriotic 
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connection between state and society was a dead circuit:  the state was merely an entity to 
be looted to the extent possible, and to be infiltrated to prevent interference in local qawm 
politics.  Rubin discusses at length the state’s efforts to fragment the society; it is equally 
valid to view the result of the collective qawm activities of extraction and emasculation as 
a fragmentation of the state.   
In a very broad summary to this point, our counter-narcotics policies must 
recognize that the tribal and qawm structures of society cannot be abruptly challenged in 
a manner which is interpreted as a violation of pashtunwali or local qawm prerogative, 
lest we risk an acute local reaction.  Nor can counter-narcotics policies be used in a broad 
attempt to socially re-engineer society – an action which would prompt a more or less 
unified jihad.  Instead, we must engage the qawm structures and work with their 
patronage systems to bring about gradual change to achieve effective jurisdiction of the 
state, or at least the exercise of locally-held jurisdiction to function in compliance with 
state goals.  [Evidence presented in Chapter IV will show that gradual change can be 
accelerated, if international assistance is properly targeted to ameliorate the economic 
impact of changes required of the qawm.]  We must also strive to link rural and state 
political interests such that parliamentary and electoral politics achieve a character of 
substance and consequence.  While some viewpoints see the Afghan opiate economy as a 
drug war problem with a weak government complication, others see Afghanistan as a 
weak government problem that we are attempting to stabilize while dealing with an 
additional drug war complication.  The first viewpoint fails to correctly prioritize the 
problem set, while the second viewpoint, if not developed further, fails to recognize the 
underlying system which is operating:  the true strategic battleground, where both the 
governance and drug problems will be won or lost, is found in the in the role of external 
subsidies pouring into the Afghan society, creating a bifurcated rentier state where the 
central government and non-traditional commanders who capture rural society are 
economically driven into mutual confrontation.  This is precisely the unstable governance 





4. Afghanistan’s History as a Rentier State 
A rentier state is one which receives 40 percent of its government revenue from 
sources other than engaging its society for resources through taxation.64  Non-constituent 
revenue streams which make up the 40 percent or more may include foreign aid, or 
nationalization of commodities such as oil, or in the case of Afghanistan, natural gas.  
There are consequences for governance and for state-society relations when states 
achieve (and maintain) rentier status.  Typically, the state can be much more autonomous 
in its policy towards the society, but long-term disengagement with society can result in 
its not having a “differentiated apparatus capable of penetrating civil society” to enforce 
policy, and in “a non-capitalist or non-monetized society may pose costly obstacles to 
monitoring and information gathering.”65  This situation describes present-day 
Afghanistan fairly well, as the central government does not have an effective engagement 
with society.  Monetary institutions such as banking and rural credit have only just 
recently begun to be re-instituted, and payment in-kind as opposed to in cash is observed.   
Rubin presents information to show that Afghanistan achieved a weak rentier 
status (just clearing the 40 percent threshold) during the period of 1958-1968, maintained 
it in the 1970s, and increased it during the period of Soviet invasion.66  It is in this period 
that a bifurcated rentier economy developed in terms of the war effort:  in one revenue 
stream the Soviets provided more than 40 percent of the Afghan government 
expenditures, and in a second revenue stream international sources poured money into 
well-organized although segmented Mujahidin (a non-traditional fighting organization 
conjured from the ruins of rural society) at rates which must have exceeded 40 percent of 
the resistance’s economic capacity.67  In The Other Side of the Mountain:  Mujahideen 
Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War, Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau state that  
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[t]he strategic struggle for Afghanistan was a fight to strangle the other’s 
logistics….  From 1980 until 1985, the Soviets sought to eliminate 
Mujahideen support in the rural countryside.  They bombed granaries and 
rural villages, destroyed crops and irrigation systems, mined pastures and 
fields [and] destroyed herds….  This Soviet effort denied rural support to 
the Mujahedeen, since the villagers had left and most of the food now had 
to be carried along with weapons and ammunition and materials of war.  
The Mujahideen responded by establishing logistics bases inside 
Afghanistan.  The Soviet fight from 1985 to withdrawal was to find and 
destroy these bases.68 
Essentially, this is a battle of economies.  The Mujahidin would have failed 
except for functioning under supremely “rentier” economic conditions in terms of their 
own financial structuring; they depended to a very high degree on outside sponsorship.  
This is the sense in which I present the model of a bifurcated rentier economic system; 
one branch funds the central government and fulfills the rentier economic model for 
states, and a second branch of international funding sustains a rural-located (although not 
necessarily rural-supported in terms of traditional qawm political-economic structures) 
anti-government power structure.69  In the current context, the opiate economy has 
become the foundation for funding a rural power base which will inherently oppose 
central governance. 
B. BUILDING THE CASE FOR THE TRUE OPIATE ECONOMY THREAT 
Drawing on the discussion above, the next three parts will build the case that the 
opiate economy is or has the potential to become:  a foundation for a bifurcated rentier 
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system, with international aid going to the central government and narcotics revenue 
funding rural non-traditional anti-government power centers; an economy that harnesses 
historic rural patronage networks and both eclipses and corrupts central government 
distributive networks; and a force which exacerbates tensions between rural society and 
the central government.    
1. The Opiate Economy as a Foundation for a Bifurcated Rentier System   
The parallels between the conditions present during the Soviet counter-insurgency 
and the current situation with respect to confronting the opiate economy are 
unmistakable.  The Afghan government is and will be for some time be a rentier state, 
based on the external reconstruction, investment, humanitarian and financial aid, capacity 
building and military support it does and will receive.  On the rural branch of the 
bifurcated rentier economy, the 2004 valuation of the opiate economy equaled 60 percent 
of the entire 2003 licit economy in Afghanistan.  The opiate economy largely underpins 
the rural economy (as well as the entire country economy), is inherently in opposition to 
the central government, and is linked to non-traditional armed factions which are 
remnants of the anti-Soviet Mujahidin, as well as international crime syndicates which 
are already involved in trafficking arms and are more than willing to challenge 
governments to protect their business.   
The bifurcated rentier model includes but significantly goes beyond the 
understanding conveyed in typical presentations of the threat to Afghan stability.  The 
World Bank developed the following model of the interaction between what it terms 
“warlords,” the opium economy, and the government: 
The opium economy has profound adverse implications for security, 
politics, and state-building in Afghanistan.  It contributes to a vicious 
circle whereby the drug industry financially supports warlords and their 
militias, who in turn undermine the Government - which is also corrupted 
and captured at different levels by bribes from the drug industry. As a 
result the state remains ineffective and security weak, thereby perpetuating 
an environment in which the drug industry can continue to thrive.70 
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Figure 1.   The Cycle of Insecurity (From:  World Bank, p. 87) 
 
The significance of the bifurcated rentier economy goes beyond what the World 
Bank description and diagram alludes to, however.  While the portrayal of opiate 
economy funding to warlords is accurate, as is the way in which the warlords can 
undermine or capture parts of government through corruption, what is not diagrammed or 
described here is the way in which warlords and the opiate economy can capture and 
control portions of rural society and reinforce rural vs. central government tensions.  
Examples of this include:  warlords and trafficker’s ability to corrupt the workings of the 
qawm political-economic model and the competition for who will be khan by providing 
non-qawm funding to supportive or compliant khan aspirants; the function of salaam-
structured loans which trap farmers into opium production; and by creating rural vs. 
central governance confrontation which runs afoul of qawm autonomy and risks 
offending pashtunwali among the Pashtun who cultivate a very large portion of the 
opium  poppy crop.  Also obscured by the World Bank’s presentation is the 
differentiation as to who should and should not be considered a warlord, and the fact that 
it becomes easy to focus on the warlords instead of the opiate economy, so much so that 
the World Bank placed them at the top of the diagram.  To understand why the opiate 




bifurcated rentier economy, we need to demand that our policy discussion deal with the 
cultural realities and nuances and not settle for broad, imprecise and misleading 
terminology.   
a. The Importance of Specific Policy Terminology 
The World Bank refers to “warlords and their militias” in the diagram 
above, and other analytical works on Afghanistan use “militia commanders” as an 
interchangeable term with “warlord.”   One would presume these to be bad people who 
must be confronted.   But the language of policy discussion does not satisfy the cultural 
nuances present in Afghanistan which must be taken into account.   
For example, the truest manifestation of the “militia” in Afghan society is 
the lashkar, which is the group of armed men numbering in the few-dozens range called 
up by the qawm to defend qawm interests—this is very similar to the American 
Revolution notion of the minute-man.  The lashkar is an essential element of the qawm 
social structure, and if the central government intends to engage society it should not 
receive international pressure to fight the essential elements of its society.  Although 
reports do not specify, evidence (expounded below) indicates that the violent resistance 
to eradication experienced by the Central Poppy Eradication Force in Kandahar province 
in the spring of 2005 was in part a lashkar response to offenses against pashtunwali, in 
particular the violation of the qawm’s namus (land and wealth certainly, perhaps not a 
violation of the qawm’s women unless entry of homes accompanied the eradication).  The 
fundamental problem, beyond the confrontation, is that the activity and the reports do not 
account for this essential cultural detail—our inarticulate policy parlance would lump this 
resistance in with “warlordism” connected to the opium economy.  The result of this 
confrontation which must concern policy-makers is that a portion of the rural population 
is now violently angry at central government interference, and eradication efforts in 
Kandahar province were cancelled by the Karzai government.  No significant gain was 
achieved and a significant cost was paid.  The decision to end the confrontation is not a 
sign of Afghan government weakness:  President Karzai has, since July of 2004, 
successfully challenged several prominent regional leaders who commanded thousands of 
anti-Soviet fighters and had maintained their forces through the Taliban period.  If the 
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resistance to eradication had been part of a warlord’s army instead of lashkars and 
average villagers it is unlikely that he would have ordered an end to the confrontation. 
b. Traditional versus Non-Traditional Social Structures 
During the anti-Soviet jihad many armed groups developed who did not 
draw on traditional qawm resources.  Rather, they were funded from and became wholly 
reliant upon non-qawm international economic sources.  Many of these non-traditional 
groups survived the loss of international funding to the anti-Soviet jihad when the Soviets 
withdrew, relying alternatively (or more exclusively) on opiate economy and tariff-
evasion smuggling revenues, as described by the World Bank.  These armed factions are 
not integral to the long-established social structures of Afghanistan, and manage to 
aggregate and sustain hundreds or in some cases many thousands of men under arms.  
These non-traditional groups are the target of President Karzai, and significantly these 
groups do not enjoy widespread support among the rural population. 
On October 9th, 2004, during the Afghan Presidential Election, over 
17,000 Afghan citizens were polled and provided the following responses:  50 percent 
stated the first priority of the government should be to disarm “warlords and militia 
commanders,” as translated in the English version of the poll.  The same poll showed 
fully 65 percent see the “warlords and commanders” as a source of instability in their 
community.71  When asked in June-July 2004 “what is the most powerful position in your 
province,” overall response (polled in six provinces, in both urban and rural 
communities) listed the Governor, 38 percent; Militia Commanders, 32 percent; and head 
of army or police 20 percent.72  Over 52 percent of respondents in each of three provinces 
cited militia commanders as the most powerful.73  This same survey asked “Do you think 
the government should do more, the same, or less to reduce the powers of commanders in 
Afghanistan?”  An overall average of 88 percent said more should be done, with no 
                                                 
71  International Republican Institute, “Afghans Most Concerned About Security” (Media Release 27 
July 2004), www.iri.org/7-27-04-afghans.asp, (accessed 03 December 2004). 
72  Michael O’Hanlon and Nina Kamp (Brookings Institution), Afghanistan Index,  Brookings cites the 
“Afghans on Security and Elections” (sic) poll, conducted by the Human Rights Research and Advocacy 
Consortium (HRRAC), June-July 2004, with 763 respondents from six provincial capitals and rural 
surrounds.   The actual survey is titled Take the Guns Away:  Afghan Voices on Security and Elections and 
may be accessed on the Care USA website (an HRRAC member) 
http://www.careusa.org/newsroom/specialreports/afghanistan/gunsaway2.pdf, accessed 03 December 2004.  
73  HRRAC, Take the Guns Away, 19. 
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provincial average less than 76 percent.  However, we must be absolutely clear as to what 
these polls are actually measuring; the respondents are not overwhelmingly calling for the 
disruption of the qawm social structure, nor government interference in qawm affairs.  
The khan, as leader of a qawm, is in the truest sense of the word a “militia commander” 
in charge of a few dozen men, much the same as Captain John Parker who dispersed his 
small formation in the face of 650-900 British troops on the Lexington Green early the 
morning of 19 April, 1775.74  The qawm-based militia are not equal to or surpassing the 
provincial governor in power, nor do rural qawm wish for the government to disarm the 
only real security these village communities have.  So again, we see critically valuable 
information obscured by inaccurate terminology, which leads us to accept policy 
implementation which ends in violent confrontation with the very social structure we 
wish to link with a democratic central government.   
c. The True Implications of the Bifurcated Rentier System 
One additional note on the non-traditional armed groups is required.  The 
first phase of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program was 
completed on July 8, 2005, in which 60,000 armed fighters belonging to recognized 
regional armed factions were submitted by regional leaders for processing.  It is estimated 
that an additional 80,000 – 100,000 fighters belonging to illegal armed groups, i.e. those 
not belonging to recognized local forces, remain to be disarmed.75  Disarming these non-
traditional forces is essential in dismantling a near-term danger to the Afghan central 
government.  However, the illicit economy which funds their extended mobilization is of 
greater long-term concern.  For as long as that illicit economy exists, these forces could 
be rapidly rearmed and reorganized by the monied interests which siphon illegal profits 
to fund their illegal armies.  We have shown that very little of the small slice of opiate 
economy which goes to opium poppy cultivators could be used for anti-government 
activity—however there is likely substantial room in the $2.2 billion dollar trafficking 
portion of the opiate economy to:  (1) subvert traditional rural qawm politics and 
economics to induce or force opium poppy cultivation and buy anti-government loyalty; 
                                                 
74  Worchester Polytechnic Institute Army Reserve Officer Training Corps Department of Military 
Science, Background:  A Brief History, http://www.wpi.edu/Academics/Depts/MilSci/BTSI/Lexcon/, 
(accessed 29 August 2005).  
75  Congressional Research Service, Afghanistan:  Narcotics and U.S. Policy, 26 May 2005, 15. 
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(2) infiltrate district and provincial election politics to buy or place narco-friendly 
politicians within the emerging democratic political structures; (3) continue funding or 
re-establish illegal armed factions capable of directly confronting the central 
government.76  It is not hard to imagine that several hundred million dollars per year 
could be drawn from the $2.2 billion trafficking endeavor to be allocated to these efforts.  
We must recall that with several hundred million dollars per year, Saudi Arabia, the 
United States, China and Iran funded a fragmented rural anti-central-government militia 
campaign which in a thirteen year period exhausted and defeated the Soviet military and 
caused the Communist Afghan central government to collapse in April 1992.  What we 
are facing an historic parallel—nothing short of a war of economies—pitting a rentier 
state government economic system against an illicit rentier rural economy.  Both sides are 
fighting to engage a rural social structure which historically has resisted government 
engagement, but currently despises the commanders of non-traditional armed factions 
funded by the illicit economy.  This time, however, the rural opponent has the advantage 
of potentially infiltrating and turning the government to its own purposes through 
democratic mechanisms.  Clearly, the opiate economy is the foundation for the greatest 
threat to stable Afghan governance; counter-narcotics objectives deserve to be treated at 
least as an equal if not a greater priority than counter-terror objectives. 
Like the Soviet-Afghan war, the counter-narcotics war in Afghanistan is a 
fight to preserve the stability of a chosen governmental system.  The strategic fight for 
each side is a model of strangle and drown:  the government must strangle the opiate 
economy logistics (interdiction of trafficking) and drown its monetary subversion of the 
rural economy through rural economic development; the opiate traffickers can succeed if 
they strangle the government’s ability to enforce law by corrupting the populace and the 
government, and they can drown interdiction efforts through overproduction, especially if 
the opiate economy becomes cartelized.    
2. The Opiate Economy Harnesses Historic Rural Patronage Networks      
While only an estimated U.S. $600 million in opiate revenues stays with farmers, 
and therefore within the traditional village-qawm structure, U.S. $2.2 billion goes to 
                                                 
76  CRS, Afghanistan:  Narcotics and U.S. Policy.  26 May 2005, 16.  Two such threatening groups are 
specifically cited as present dangers to the Afghan government. 
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traffickers.77  Certainly a significant amount of these funds go to established political 
operatives, although their individual identities are beyond the scope of this paper 
(extending the analogy offered at the beginning, liken them to dangerous rocks in the 
river which can be removed (note that they may also be replaced, after removal, by drug 
networks!), not to hills and mountains which fundamentally change the social structure).  
The fact that drug revenue creates newly powerful people, i.e. persons who gain financial 
resources (useful for economic patronage) derived from outside the qawm structure, does 
not create concern for applying the social lessons learned above.  This situation is not 
new, as many of the mujahidin commanders in the Soviet-Afghan war were not 
necessarily khan, but rose to prominence through funding received via the Peshawar 
Seven political parties.  What is important is that these new “leaders” operated as if they 
were khan, and in many cases the non-qawm groups they led were transformed into self-
sustaining qawm units via practices which were identical to the traditional patronage 
system.78  Roy states in the case of these new leaders, “[t]here is a definite change in 
leadership, but not so great a change in leadership patterns.”79  The critical lesson for 
understanding how the opiate economy threatens central governance is this:  based on 
recent and historic social practice, the $600 million entering rural farming qawm and the 
$2.2 billion going to qawm and qawm-like trafficking groups does not mysteriously 
disappear from the Afghan rural economy into Swiss bank accounts.  Much of it becomes 
part of the Afghan rural economic/political system and will function to undermine central 
government authority in the rural areas, not just among “criminals,” but across a broad 
swath of rural society.   
There are many paths through which the opium economy can insinuate itself into 
the qawm economic/political framework.  Khans have some say in what their families 
will cultivate within the qawm area.  Traffickers may approach khan to establish opium 
poppy supply.  Or, they may buy into the ongoing competition to be khan, and pay khan 
aspirants to promote opium production; those purchased aspirants may have a larger 
                                                 
77  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004, (UNODC, Vienna:  
November 2004), http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/afghanistan_opium_survey_2004.pdf, 71, (accessed 30 
November 2004). 
78   Roy, Islam and Resistance,216 – 217. 
79   Roy, Islam and Resistance,217. 
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capacity to distribute patronage among their relatives, and thereby usurp the khan 
position by harnessing funding that originates external to the qawm.  Conversely, 
enterprising khan may seek out access to the opiate economy through their own initiative, 
or harness the initiative of a farmer who has gained opium cultivation expertise through 
work as an itinerant laborer.  Ultimately, a primary function of the khan is to increase the 
economic wherewithal of his qawm; if a khan accedes to poppy eradication and cannot 
show a corresponding economic substitute to recover the lost opportunity, there is every 
motivation for a khan aspirant to try to usurp the leadership position by pursuing poppy 
cultivation independently.  There is also an inherent motivation for a khan or khan-
aspirant to cheat any agreement with the government in which economic development aid 
is offered on the condition that poppy cultivation cease, so long as the punishment for 
cheating (let’s presume a withdrawal of development aid) could be either postponed or 
caused to go un-enforced through payments (bribes) to officials responsible for oversight.  
President Karzai’s government is establishing provincial and district-level development 
councils who are responsible, via provincial governors, for ensuring eradication 
compliance.80  Especially in the social context of qawm, let us not forget Tip O’neil’s 
admonition “All Politics is Local.”  Over the long term, if local qawm can earn 
significant income from supplying opium gum to traffickers, we should expect opium 
production to continue regardless of eradication efforts or development aid availability.   
Based on the paragraph above, it should be clear that the facts of this social 
context work inherently in the favor of the trafficker’s imperatives in this struggle, which 
are to drown counter-narcotic efforts with overproduction and to strangle government 
policy through corruption.  The facts of the social context are also the foundation for why 
the Afghan central government’s and the international community’s approach must exert 
maximal effort in strangling the trafficking network, which is the only way to remove the 
opium economy funding stream which permeates that broad swath of the rural qawm 
economic/political structure.   The discussion above should not discourage support for an 
aggressive, sustained, and well-funded rural development and alternative livelihood 
campaign.  The illicit opiate economy:  
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has produced a significant increase in rural wages… [is] a significant 
source of credit for low income and rural households… [functions such 
that its] profits fuel consumption of domestic products and support imports 
of high value goods such as automobiles and appliances… [is] a major 
source of investment for infrastructure development projects….81 
Successfully suppressing trafficking activity, and thereby removing (or greatly reducing) 
opiate economy funds without concurrently building licit economic capacity in the rural 
setting would devastate the Afghan people and the country’s economy; it is easy to 
imagine that the government which undertook such activity to the detriment of its people 
would not last. 
The prospect that rural individuals gain independent wealth is not a hypothetical.  
Economically, the system of competition among potential khans to gain stature by 
(re)distributing intra-qawm wealth has come under attack in recent decades, as some rural 
individuals have achieved concentration of wealth by tapping into extra-rural sources of 
income while still meeting the needs of their qawm.  This development has allowed these 
‘rural rich’ to direct more attention to, and seek or extract favor from, the central 
government, as compared to khans who extracted and distributed wealth exclusively 
within the intra-qawm’s economic product.82   
This recent trend becomes highly significant when one considers the potential for 
narcotics traffickers (or those who “tax” them) to amass wealth which is disproportionate 
and distorting to the traditional licit economy and therefore to traditional rural political 
networks.  The problem comes in the form of corruption, through buying access to either 
maliks or state officials themselves to constrain information or defer enforcement of 
counter-narcotics laws.  Alternatively, traffickers can pursue the traditional route to 
prevent government interference in rural affairs; they can join the bureaucracy 
themselves, or send their designated representative to protect their ‘qawm’ interests. 
Corruption can and currently is also working ‘downwards’ when farmers are 
given advance loans in cash (salaam) in order to cover their expenses through the 
winter/spring until harvest time, and then are required to repay these loans in opium gum 
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at harvest time.  This, as one mechanism among many, traps farmers into cultivating 
opium poppy.83  (Detailed discussion of the opium economy is reserved for Chapter III). 
3. The Opiate Economy Exacerbates Rural-State Tensions 
The central government cannot return to historic patterns of leaving the rural 
social structures to themselves, or merely subdividing them into manageable or 
ineffective units, so long as terrorist and narcotics interests are intent on using rural 
Afghanistan for their purposes.  Additionally, more qawm or qawm-like structures are 
gaining the wherewithal and motivation to more actively engage the government in order 
to protect or advance their group interests.  These developments force the central 
government to confront at least some rural qawm structures and, to the extent qawm 
interests run counter to government policy, this confrontation will increase tensions.  The 
degree to which tensions rise will be a function of the policies pursued.  This conclusion 
is rather banal, so an elaboration of policy recommendations will not be given here to 
justify what is obvious; broad policy constraints imposed by the cultural context will be 
summarized below, and a detailed policy discussion is reserved for Chapter IV. 
Three outcomes could result from these increased tensions.  One path is towards 
rural penetration of the government to blunt or deflect the counter-narcotics efforts, 
which is a strategy consistent with historic qawm approaches to reducing government 
interference in qawm affairs.  Outside observers would (rightly) describe this outcome as 
a narco-state, and may call this outcome obvious as well, but it is important to note that in 
essence it would be a continuation of normal state-society relations which are merely 
applied to a new economic endeavor.  The timeframe for a narco-state outcome could be 
measured in a few years from the present time.   
A second potential outcome develops from an inappropriately structured counter-
narcotics effort.  An aggressive counter-narcotics policy which is perceived as an attack 
on the traditional qawm social structure would at best be ineffective and at worst result in 
rural revolt.  Social revolt could emerge fairly abruptly, with the key question being how 
wide-spread and coordinated the revolt would be.  The breadth of revolt would be a 
function of how widely the central government policies were perceived as having a 
generalized negative impact on all qawm and their way of life, or alternatively perceived                                                  
83   UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004, 73 
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as having a narrow impact only on opiate-producing qawm.  Many localized “brushfires” 
would present a serious challenge to central government stability.  But widespread and 
semi-coordinated revolt which takes on the nature of the jihad patterns witnessed in the 
uprisings against Amanullah and against the communist Khalq regime would almost 
certainly be beyond the government’s capacity to handle.  Government failure is likely 
even with significant foreign support, as was the case for both Amanullah and the Khalq.   
The third potential outcome is to achieve government penetration of the rural 
qawm via a reciprocal political relationship, not just one which is primarily extractive for 
each side.  This model is essentially political engagement, which would allow the 
government to exchange investment and services for compliance with law and extension 
of jurisdiction.  One potential mechanism for this will be the parliament, although this has 
a poor historic precedent.  Another mechanism is the Provincial Shuras and District 
Development Councils formed under the auspices of the Afghanistan 1384 (2005) 
Counter-Narcotics Implementation Plan, which are responsible for enforcing eradication 
and also identifying development projects; this allows a kind of quid pro quo system, and 
there is a nominal check in that a separate entity, the Provincial Development 
committees, are the final approval authority for selecting development projects.84  The 
success or failure of this particular mechanism will depend on how it is implemented 
(note the discussion on potential corruption of such institutions, above), and additionally 
many other mechanisms to link the government and society will be needed.  This 
development goes far beyond (mere) state-building into all-out civil-society-building, 
which is an endeavor that primarily the Afghans must undertake for themselves.  This 
third path is essential to developing a truly functioning democracy, albeit one tailored to 
the Afghan society and qawm structures, and will be measured in decades, not years. 
4. Effectively Confronting the Opiate Economy 
While a more complete policy prescription is presented in Chapter V, the broad 
outlines of a policy which can ‘successfully navigate the river valley’ based on cultural 
lessons can be presented here. 
First, an all-out drug war using aerial eradication (recommended by some, and 
opposed by President Karzai and virtually all Afghanistanis who have commented) is                                                  
84  Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 1384 (2005) Counter-Narcotics Implementation Plan.  
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highly likely to produce jihad; this is an unworkable approach, and this policy appears to 
be the (proposed) application of measures used elsewhere in the world which are 
culturally incompatible with Afghanistan.   
Eradication as a primary approach to the problem does not fit well with the 
cultural context, especially if one is trying to build popular tolerance (or even acceptance) 
of the new government system.  First, eradication in general, and especially if it is done 
inappropriately, runs a strong risk provoking a violent response based on pashtunwali; 
this is highly significant in that Pashtuns cultivate the vast majority of poppy, and a very 
large percentage of the production occurs in Pashtun areas where pashtunwali is strong.  
Second, based on the khan system of economic/political arrangement within qawm 
structures, there is every motivation to continue production in spite of eradication efforts.  
Where eradication has been in practice, there is now evidence that producers are moving 
their cultivation into harder-to-reach areas, not merely abandoning production.  Thirdly, 
for many reasons (discussed in Chapter III) many rural farmers are trapped into 
producing opium poppy, and the remaining farmers choose to cultivate poppy because 
the income possible from poppy greatly exceeds that available from licit crops.  Fourthly, 
the economics of the opiate trade militate against focusing our efforts on production (via 
eradication) if our chief concern is government stability.  Farmers are estimated to gain 
only 27 percent of the opium economy proceeds, and much of that goes to pay for 
production costs (detailed in Chapter III), which leaves a comparatively small amount of 
funds available for qawms to use to engage the state political system, especially since 
funding local qawm interests must come first.   Traffickers take in the remaining $2.2 
Billion (73 percent), and likely have a higher percentage of disposable income after 
expenses, which leaves a much larger potential for buying government influence or 
corruption.  Finally, in addition to having a lower impact on illicit funding, focusing on 
eradication runs the risk of turning a much larger portion of the population against the 
government, as there are far more farmers and itinerant field laborers than there are 
traffickers.  Five cultural-economic reasons build a powerful argument against focusing 
on counter-production efforts such as eradication. 
Government’s historic approach to engaging society has been to fragment it; this 
has been necessary because the state was weak.  That is still the case today.  It does not 
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make sense in a cultural-political context to confront the opium economy everywhere at 
once (treating it as a unified challenge); instead it should be confronted in a piecemeal 
(fragmented) manner [unfortunately, this does not match well with the CN desires of 
major external supporters] which matches the ability of the Afghan government to extend 
both its jurisdiction and its ability to provide alternative livelihood, reconstruction, and 
other aid to the provinces.  The means to increase the size of the fragments which can be 
challenged will be determined by the level of external financial and counter-narcotic 
support within the context of the Afghan Government’s 1384 Counter-Narcotics plan. 
Beyond these two major points, far more extensive and nuanced policy 
recommendations are provided in Chapter V of this thesis.   
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter has attempted to present information which analyses the essential 
Afghan social structure and history relevant to understanding the modern role and 
potential of the opiate economy, and the context in which counter-narcotic policies must 
function.  We have seen how the Afghan opiate economy is or has the potential to 
become:  a foundation for a bifurcated rentier system, with international aid going to the 
central government and narcotics revenue funding rural-based power centers; an 
economy that harnesses historic rural patronage networks and both eclipses and corrupts 
central government distributive networks; and a force which exacerbates rural-state social 
tensions.  With detailed and careful consideration of the historic and cultural context in 
which we are operating, we can develop polices to effectively confront the Afghan 
narcotics industry, without merely resorting to simply running the same counter-narcotics 
treadmill we have run elsewhere.  As significant as any point made in this paper is the 
one quietly woven through its pages:  winning the war on drugs in Afghanistan will not 
occur by myopically focusing on arresting individuals (who will be replaced) or on 
destroying a poppy field (only to have it moved into harder areas to access).  It will be 
won or lost (and I argue the Afghan government will be won or lost) by expanding our 
vision to take in the entire social and economic context in which it operates, and learning 
how to navigate our policy through this river valley to successfully reach the sea. 
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE OPIATE ECONOMY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
America’s strategic goal in Afghanistan is to stabilize and strengthen the Afghan 
central government; all counter-drug efforts within Afghanistan must support this larger 
strategic goal.  This chapter will focus primarily on what we know and don’t know about 
the burgeoning opium production and trafficking within Afghanistan and place those 
activities within their appropriate cultural context, which will inform policy 
recommendations consistent with that knowledge base and with our strategic goals.   
In terms of developing counter-narcotic policies consistent with our primary 
objective—stabilizing the central government—the lessons taken from this chapter fall 
into two broad categories.  One, we must consider the economic impact our efforts will 
have on subverting the rural rentier economy.  Evidence will show that the trafficking 
portion of the opiate economy contributes the most to anti-government interests, and 
therefore merits priority in counter-narcotics policy.  Next, the policy prescriptions to 
confront the opiate economy will impact two distinct constituent groups:  farmers and 
traditional qawm who serve primarily as cultivators, and non-traditional commanders and 
their armed factions who benefit the most from trafficking.  Challenging these different 
constituencies will have separate feedback implications on central government stability, 
which above all else must be our central organizing principle for policy.  This chapter 
will evaluate the opiate economy according to its two aspects—the cultivation side and 
the trafficking and refining side of the opiate economy.   
In both the cultivation and trafficking discussions, the most recent aggregate data 
available will be presented in its historic context to establish the trends of the opiate 
economy, and a critique of the data collection methods will be offered in order to 
highlight potential gaps in our understanding which could negatively impact our ability to 
formulate a sound policy approach.  The data will be analyzed through the lens of 
Chapter II lessons, which include a cultural understanding of the groups involved in the 
opiate economy and the insight that the opiate economy contributes to the rural portion of  
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the bifurcated rentier economy.  At the end of the chapter, what information is available 
about the 2005 crop will be presented, with some preliminary assessment as to lessons to 
be learned. 
Several key observations will be developed which will improve our ability to 
formulate sound policy in Chapter V.  On the cultivation side, four observations are 
important.  First, cultivation has become deeply entrenched in the economies—and 
therefore political-economic qawm structure—of just a few provinces, but has recently 
spread to at least have a marginal presence in every province of Afghanistan.  This has 
profound negative implications for provincial and parliamentary elections, as well as for 
the sequencing of the international Coalition’s fight against the opiate economy.  Second, 
many farmers are trapped into opium poppy cultivation for economic reasons (in terms of 
income and market capacity for licit alternatives), financial reasons (in terms of lending 
practices and credit availability), and cultural reasons, each of which must be addressed 
in policy.  Third, the patterns of opium poppy cultivation strongly contribute to the fact 
that Afghanistan has lost the ability to feed itself.  This is critical beyond the normal 
humanitarian concerns:  extreme scarcity introduces strong tensions into the political 
aspects of qawm structure, and international food assistance—when improperly 
distributed—also places severe strain on both the political and economic aspects of qawm 
structure.  We must be extremely careful not to aid and abet societal and economic 
breakdown, and we must address the situation that introduces this risk.  Fourth and finally 
in terms of cultivation lessons, we will show that only a small portion of the overall 
opiate economy (read, the drug-related portion of the rural rentier economy) ends up in 
the hands of cultivators, and much of that small slice is consumed by costs.  This means 
that in terms of monies available for challenging government stability, only a tiny amount 
can be proscribed by going after cultivators. 
Four observations developed from the trafficking portion of the opiate economy 
are important for policy makers to consider.  First, although data on the economics of 
trafficking is much less certain than that for the cultivation portion of the economy, we 
know that the market value is absolutely huge and it is growing.  Second, trafficking 
price structures are segmented by geographic area across the country, and these 
geographic breakdowns largely mirror ethnic divisions within the country—this should 
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not be surprising, as trafficking patterns are globally observed to follow and operate 
through ethnic connections.  The segmented price structures also indicate that the market 
is not cartelized, at least in terms of cartels operating across all of Afghanistan.  Third, it 
is worth emphasizing that trafficking obeys the economic laws of supply and demand, 
which is essential to consider when formulating policy responses to this part of the 
problem.  Finally, the fundamental lesson of the trafficking portion of the opiate economy 
is found when we consider the contribution it can make to anti-government interests 
which thrive on the rural portion of the bifurcated rentier economy.     
B. OPIUM POPPY CULTIVATION 
Opium poppy is a flowering plant that thrives in dry warm climates, and has 
higher drought-resistance than most crops.  Plants require a six to seven month growing 
period; in Afghanistan, this equates to planting in October through February in order to 
harvest April through August, depending on latitude and local elevation.    After 
flowering, the petals fall away to expose a large bulbous capsule, which is scored with 
shallow incisions.  The incisions allow sap to ooze out and dry into a brownish-black 
gum.  Scoring and oozing is usually done more than once over a few weeks.  The opium 
gum is then scraped and collected. Opium gum can be dried, cooked and chemically 
treated to form morphine base, and then heroin.  Poppy cultivation is highly labor-
intensive:  this includes right after planting (aggressive weeding required) but especially 
during the scoring and scraping required during harvest.   
Key lessons for policy include the fact that opium poppy is planted and begins to 
develop long before licit crops need to be planted.  This provides a (fairly narrow) 
window of opportunity for eradicating opium poppy such that farmers could re-cultivate 
the same farmland with licit crops and still earn some income.  Opium poppy can grow in 
non-irrigated areas, which means any eradication effort may push cultivation into non-
traditional arable lands which are much harder to access—this creates an opportunity for 
a balloon effect within the Afghan cultivation market, meaning that eradication may not 
be a solution, it may merely shift production practices into areas which prove much more 
difficult and costly to project law enforcement efforts.  Additionally, the high labor 
requirements have policy implications, several of which are discussed below. 
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1. Trends in Poppy Cultivation by Province 
To estimate the land area under poppy cultivation, the UNODC Afghanistan 
Opium Survey uses a sampling methodology which combines field surveys (asking the 
farmers) and partial satellite imagery coverage of arable land.  Satellite coverage is used 
in the ten largest producing provinces representing 88 percent of the poppy cultivation 
area found in 2003, with field surveys used in the remaining provinces.85  The aggregate 
data shows that in 2004, 131,000 hectares were planted with poppy (range 109,000 – 
152,000 ha, with 90 percent confidence).  This is up from 80,000 hectares estimated in 
2003, or a 64 percent increase, compared to an 8 percent increase in 2003 from 2002 
levels.86   
This 131,000 hectares represents only 2.9 percent of the area in active agricultural 
use, and just 1.8 percent of all arable land in Afghanistan, which indicates a tremendous 
potential for increased opium cultivation, or in the face of eradication efforts, the capacity 
to shift cultivation to areas which are not as easily reached for eradication efforts, noted 
above.  It is estimated that 10 – 12 percent of all land in Afghanistan is arable.   
Table 1 shows cultivation areas for the six largest cultivating provinces plus the 
“rest of the country.”  Hilmand has consistently been the largest producer since 1994; it 
was only in 2003 that Nangarhar took the lead.    
Table 1. Largest Opium Poppy Cultivation Provinces 2002-2004 (From:  
Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004) 87 
 
                                                 
85  UNODC, Opium Survey 2004, 80, 93.  Afghanistan re-organized from 32 provinces to 34 provinces 
in 2004; however, the data is presented using the 32 provinces, since that is how the data was collected.  All 
but one province was surveyed; Paktika province was not included due to security concerns.  Satellite 
coverage used sampling methodology in 9 of 10 provinces; Nangahar’s arable land was imaged in its 
entirety to validate the satellite data methodology. 
86  UNODC, Opium Survey 2004, 21. 
87  UNODC, Opium Survey 2004, 24 
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In ethnic terms, Hilmand and Kandahar are largely Durrani Pashtun (with some 
Tajik areas), while Nangarhar is virtually entirely Eastern hill-tribe Pashtun.  In all 
Pashtun areas, recall that the idea of central governance is that it exists to govern the non-
Pashtun areas.  In Nangarhar, pashtunwali and the qawm political-economic structure are 
major complicating factors for counter-narcotic efforts.  In Hilmand and Kandahar, qawm 
and the historically close ties of the Durrani to central governance likely will be a 
heavily-complicating factor.  It would be historically consistent to see the Durrani 
Pashtuns use their government connections to keep governance out of their qawm affairs.   
Ghor province is largely Tajik; these peoples along with those Tajiks in Hilmand 
and Kandahar were influenced by the Safavids, and are more prone to having a 
hierarchical Khan leadership structure which may give the government a more stable 
access point to effect provincial and central government enforcement.  This would not be 
expected in Badakshan, which is primarily Tajik along with Ismaili groups.  Here, the 
Tajik peoples should organize more along the non-hierarchical qawm structure, although 
there is economic evidence (presented below) that strongmen may in fact be heavily 
influencing opiate production and trafficking in this area.  This is an issue that requires 
further study.   
Uruzgan is predominantly Hazara with some Pashtun presence.  As noted in 
Chapter II, the UNODC does not believe that the Hazara peoples participate strongly in 
the opiate economy.  We should recall that the entire Hazarajat region was subjected to 
the Jagir system where ethnic Durrani Pashtuns were appointed to administer land 
holdings.  Given this historic fact, and the presence of some Pashtun “civilian” populace 
in Uruzgan, it may be the case that Pashtuns are responsible for production here.  The 
best remedy to this confusion is to have the UNODC resume reporting the ethnic makeup 
of the villages that they survey, which they did only on the first Afghanistan opium 
survey in 1994, so that policy-makers have a better sense of the local political dynamics 
which they must confront to develop counter-narcotic strategies.88   
The trends of the Afghan opium poppy production will be discussed momentarily, 
but we must note here that production is spreading throughout Afghanistan.  The primary 
                                                 
88   The UNODC reported village ethnicity only in their first Afghanistan survey in 1994.   
50 
known means of spread has an ethnic component:  itinerant labor in Afghanistan has 
traditionally worked within ethnically similar villages, and itinerant labor has been a key 
factor in the spread of opium poppy cultivation throughout Afghanistan.  It turns out that, 
in 1999, one third of itinerant workers were landless.  Of the remaining two-thirds, some 
had insufficient land area to be self-sufficient producing licit crops, and as a group they 
had less than half of the land area of the opium farmers on whose land they worked.  
Expertise gained through itinerant labor inspired many workers to return to their 
smallholding plots, which could be profitable via poppy cultivation, and thereby 
introduce the opium economy to their home provinces.89  Others returned to their larger 
holdings and applied their new skills as well. 
The trends in provinces under cultivation are one of the most disturbing areas of 
the Afghan opiate economy.  Each year has seen an increase in the number of producing 
provinces:  18 in 1999, 23 in 2000, 24 in 2002, 28 in 2003 and all 32 provinces in 2004.90  
Twenty-one provinces achieved record levels of area under poppy cultivation in 2004.  
While the area under cultivation in the top six provinces increased by 54 percent in 2004, 
it increased by 87 percent in 2004 for the rest of the country.  This is important not just in 
the net change in total poppy cultivation, but in the change in behavior of farmers who 
did not traditionally participate heavily in this activity but now are showing much 
stronger interest.   
However, this picture is not without hope.  The top three provinces account for 56 
percent of the land area cultivated in poppy in 2004, and the top six account for 72 
percent.  The remaining 26 provinces cultivate only 28 percent of the area dedicated to 
poppy, and most of them are very new to poppy cultivation, so it is not entrenched in the 
political-economic qawm structure.  It is possible to exterminate the business from many 
provinces in the next few years.  In fact, cultivation in Wardak province voluntarily 
declined from 2,735 hectares (ha) in 2003 (or 3.7 percent of the total that year) to 1,017 
ha in 2004.91  This 63 percent reduction is cause for optimism, as farmers attributed their 
                                                 
89  UNODC, Opium Survey 2004, 107. 
90  UNODC, Opium Survey 2004, 23.  In 2004, Afghanistan subdivided two provinces to create 34 in 
total:  UNODC analysis for 2004 was begun with 32 and is reported using the boundaries as established 
under the 32 province map. 
91   A hectare is equal to 2.47 acres. 
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reduced participation to lower-than-expected yields in their 2003 crops and limited 
poppy-growing experience.92  All of the “newcomer” producers in 2004 have limited 
growing experience, and lower-than-expected yields characterize the 2004 harvest across 
most of the country as well, as discussed next. 
In spite of a dramatic increase in the land area dedicated to poppies, there was a 
comparatively small increase in the estimated total opium produced as compared to 2003, 
which means the kg/ha yield fell significantly.  Reasons for this include drought in much 
of Afghanistan, crop disease, and attempts at harvesting early to avoid eradication, which 
produced a lower yield.   
Opium production for 2004 is estimated to be 4,200 metric tons, a 17 percent 
increase over 2003’s estimate of 3600 metric tons, substantially smaller than the 64 
percent increase in hectares dedicated to poppy production.  Afghanistan’s 2004 product 
is 87 percent of the world opium supply.  While the UNODC did change its methodology 
in 2004 with respect to how much opium gum is produced per hectare, this 
methodological change is assessed to produce estimates equivalent to those produced 
using the old methodology. Farmers also reported poor soil conditions (specifically, lack 
of quality fertilizers; surveyors also noted poor awareness of the need for crop rotation), 
early harvest due to announced eradication efforts, and a lack of experience with poppy 
cultivation as factors.  Farmers expected their yields per hectare to drop by 40 percent 
based on these factors, and the actual drop was about 30 percent as indicated by the new 
methodology. 
Based on Wardak’s voluntarily reduced poppy cultivated in 2004, motivated 
largely by a lower-than-expected yield in 2003, it is worth noting that Wardak, Parwan, 
Kabul, Logar, Paktya and Khost, collectively termed the “Central” region in UNODC 
analyses, had the lowest aggregate yield of all of the regional blocks used in the Survey; 
yield was only 17.5 kg/ha (+/- 4.7).  Farmers in Parwan, Paktya and Khost experimented 
with greatly increased poppy cultivation in 2004,93 so their disappointing yield offered a  
 
                                                 
92  UNODC, Opium Survey 2004, 43.  The data cited was originally published in the UNODC’s 
Farmer’s Intentions Survey, October 2003. 
93  UNODC, Opium Survey 2004, 14 
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policy opportunity to motivate reduced participation for the 2005 growing season.  We 
will have to see what their response in 2005 has been when the UNODC publishes its 
survey this fall.   
2. Extent of Social Participation in Cultivation 
Developing viable policy options is impossible if we do not consider opium 
production in terms of the farmers involved.  In 2004, UNODC Survey data indicate that 
356,000 families (range between 320,000 – 393,000 families) participated, a 35 percent 
increase over 2003’s level of 264,000 families.  This translates into about 2.3 million 
persons, which is 10 percent of the total Afghan population, or 14 percent of the rural 
population.  These data do not include the large numbers of itinerant workers who are 
critical during labor-intensive periods, estimated in the late 1990s at 480,000 and 
believed to be slightly higher in 2004.  On average throughout Afghanistan, 33 percent of 
families in villages where opium poppies are grown participate, but fully 80 percent of 
those families in producing villages participate in Nangarhar.  In Hilmand, 65 percent of 
families participate, and in Badakshan the rate is 47 percent.94  It is clear that in the 
highest-production provinces, the practice is deeply entrenched in the social fabric.  
However, in the Central region, where yield in 2004 was particularly low, only 19 
percent of families participate, potentially indicating a much more permissive 
environment to advance policies which make poppy cultivation socially and 
economically less acceptable.  The cultural discussion in Chapter II should make it clear 
that the extent of family participation will directly influence the political-economic 
dynamics of the qawms which choose to produce. 
One critical aspect of the social participation in opium poppy cultivation is how 
large an area the typical farmer dedicates to opium cultivation.  The average plot size, per 
family, is .37 hectares.  In terms more familiar to Americans, this is .9 acre.  Provinces 
where production is deeply entrenched in the social fabric plot sizes are typically larger 
(.44 ha) and smaller in areas where opium poppy cultivation is new (.21 ha).  
Photographs of vast poppy fields, which occasionally appear in the press and on some 
publication covers, offer a patently unrepresentative image of reality.  Poppy cultivation 
areas do not usually comprise the entire parcel of land allotted to a family for agricultural 
                                                 
94   UNODC, Opium Survey 2004, 62:  applies to all data in this paragraph 
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use:  they usually will have licit crops, essential to their financial and caloric well-being, 
growing immediately adjacent to their opium poppy.  These cultivation areas, controlled 
by the qawm, are in very close proximity to living areas and sources of water. This is a 
fundamental complication when it comes to eradication policy, particularly proposals to 
conduct aerial eradication using chemical sprays.  Within the cultural context of Afghan 
experience, one of the most dreaded means of attack used by the Soviets on Afghan rural 
society involved gunship helicopters.  Aerial eradication in any form will naturally be 
directly associated with this Soviet example of attack on rural infrastructure because the 
average Afghan simply does not experience aviation in all of its forms on a daily basis.  
The political backlash against the government for either conducting or allowing such 
activity is predictable, and would pose a serious challenge to government stability. 
3. Surveyed Motivations for Poppy Cultivation 
A final set of data on the production side is derived from the Afghan Farmers’ 
Intentions Survey for 2003 – 2004.  As in past reports, farmers were asked what 
motivated them to participate in the opium poppy economy, and this year for the first 
time responses were also rank ordered and collated in terms of the frequency of response 
for each reason given.   
Table 2. Main Reasons for Cultivating Opium Poppy in 2004.  95 
 
                                                 
95  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan Farmers’ Intention Survey 2003/2004, 
(Vienna:  UNODC, 2004), 17, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/afghanistan_opium_survey_2004.pdf, 
(accessed 29 November 2004). 
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The data presented in Table 2 indicate that the primary motivations for planting 
poppy involve meeting basic economic needs.  Where the perceived lucrative 
expectations in cultivation were not met, poppy will lose some of its future cache as a 
get-rich-quick (or, attain-survivability-quick) scheme, especially if farmers know that 
they will not be compensated for eradicated poppies.  Also, many farmers wish to use 
opium production as a ticket to accessing informal credit, since formal credit systems are 
not functioning in the country.  These overall assessments should be used to inform 
policy development for the production side of the opium economy in Afghanistan. 
4. Farming Economics:  The Basic Commodity Prices 
Farmgate prices, i.e. the payments to farmers, are critical to the economic 
calculations which motivate cultivation.  We should note up front that prices vary by the 
type of opium gum (freshly harvested is “wet” opium; “dry” opium is that which has been 
naturally or oven-dried to reduce its water content), by the region in which it was grown 
(due to both variations in morphine content and in economic factors), and by the time at 
which harvest occurs (due to larger economic forces of supply and demand).  Price data 
are collected by interviewing farmers throughout the country.   
For fresh (wet) opium gum at time of harvest in 2004, the aggregate (country-
wide) price averaged U.S. $86/kg.  When weighted by regional production levels (useful 
for calculating total market value) the average price was slightly higher at $92/kg (+/- 
$3).  Dry opium prices averaged $138/kg, with a regionally weighted price of $142/kg 
(+/-$4).96  Prices for fresh opium are down 75 percent from their peak of $350/kg in the 
2002 harvest season, and are 67 percent lower than the 2003 price of $283/kg.  This is an 
important shift, except that prices are still two to three times as high as the $23 - $40 
range typical during the second half of the 1990’s.97  Additionally, it offers a larger dollar 
income per hectare than other alternative farming products; specific comparisons will 
follow the opium market discussion. 
An interesting opium pricing trend is that prices declined in 2004 as the summer 
progressed, as seen in Table 3.  This can be read as a market reaction to overproduction, 
and this will have influenced decisions on whether and how much to plant for the 2005 
                                                 
96  UNODC, Farmers’ Intention Survey 2003/2004, 65. 
97  UNODC, Farmers’ Intention Survey 2003/2004, 65. 
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season, or taken with an alternative spin, to what extent it is desirable to comply with the 
government ban on cultivation.  This summer-long decline held almost absolutely true for 
dry opium prices (a slight increase for Western prices, three days after the average for 
Southern provinces), and the only exception for fresh opium was the farm-gate price for 
the Eastern provinces.   

















Interval    
(α =0.05) 
Eastern:  Nangarhar, Kunar, Laghman, 
Nuristan, Kapisa 26 Apr 94 +/- 2.9 192 +/- 5.7 
Southern:  Hilmand, Uruzgan, Kandahar, 
Zabul, Ghazni, Paktika  13 May 123 +/- 2.8 150 +/- 2.9 
Western:  Ghor, Herat, Farah, Nimroz 16 May 106 +/- 2.8 158 +/- 4.4 
Central:  Parwan, Paktya, Wardak, Khost, 
Kabul, Logar  26 May 97 +/- 3.8 133 +/- 9.8 
Northern:  Bamiyan, Jawzjan, Sari Pul, 
Baghlan, Faryab, Balkh, Samangan, 
Badghis, Kunduz 
26 May 66 +/- 1.4 109 +/- 3.3 
North-Eastern:  Badakshan, Takhar  27 Jun 42 +/- 2.3 65 +/- 3.8 
Unweighted Avg. 21 May 86 +/- .8 138 +/- 2.7 
National Avg. Weighted by Production --- 92 +/- 2.5 142 +/- 3.8 
 
Regional production and economic factors also impact the price of opium gum 
observed.  Several noteworthy price factors are given in the Survey for the Northeastern 
provinces, as they have had consistently lower prices than other regions in the 2002, 
2003, and 2004 Surveys.  One reason is that irrigation is heavily used in the Northeastern 
provinces, which may dilute the morphine content of the opium gum when it is harvested.  
Next, opium prices in Tajikistan are lower than those in Iran, which impacts trafficker’s 
ability to pay farmers a higher price.  Additionally, farmers in southern and eastern 
Afghanistan are generally free to pick their trafficker, while in Badakshan (the primary 
northeastern production area) some local leaders control trafficker access to farmers.  
This allows the traffickers to offer lower prices since the farmer has fewer outlets to sell 
their opium.  Often, at least part of the trafficker’s savings is kicked back to the local 
leader to pay for the reduced competition.  Finally, the Northeastern provinces have seen                                                  
98  UNODC, Farmers’ Intention Survey 2003/2004, 66. 
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some of the fastest growth in production over the last few years, which may indicate that 
their market is saturated.99  There are two implications for policy based on this 
information.  First is that the opium economy is segmented geographically; it is not 
cartelized across the entire country.  This pattern follows the ethnically-based trafficking 
patterns, discussed below.  Confronting a segmented economy will require coordinating 
efforts to reduce cultivation and trafficking simultaneously within a particular 
geographic/ethnic segment so that supply (cultivation) and demand (traffickers 
purchasing) are reduced together.  Second, within at least some segments of the 
cultivation side of the economy, there is some coordinated behavior which suppresses 
farmer incomes.  This may allow higher incomes for the trafficking side of the economy, 
which is where the majority of funding for anti-government interests is found (discussed 
below). 
5. Farming Economics:  Cultivator Profits 
By combining the estimated production levels and the surveyed farmgate prices, it 
is possible to estimate the income Afghan farmers receive from participating in opium 
poppy production.  For 2004, farmers earned $600 Million (range:  $540 - $665 Million), 
down 41 percent from the 2003 level of $1,020 Million and half of the 2002 total of 
$1,200 Million.   
Table 4. Farm-gate Value of Opium Production in 2004  100 
 
Table 4 demonstrates how uncertainty within each portion of the analysis 
compounds to produce significant levels of potential variation in what the actual (real-
                                                 
99   UNODC, Farmers’ Intention Survey 2003/2004, 66.  Closely paraphrased. 
100   UNODC, Farmers’ Intention Survey 2003/2004,  71. 
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world) numbers may be versus the simplified representative estimates that are published 
and widely used (see the Confidence intervals and Range).  However, using the 
simplified number, the $600 Million figure for 2004 represents 13 percent of 
Afghanistan’s licit 2003 Gross Domestic Product of $4.6 Billion, down from 2003’s level 
of 22 percent of GDP.  Average per-farm-family income from opium was just $1700 in 
2004, down from $3900 for 2003, and per-capita opium income for farmers was $260, 
down from $600; this is a 56 percent drop in per-capita income from opium poppy, which 
is a huge decline.  Keep in mind that these are gross income levels, before farmers pay 
for expenses.   
The UNODC 2003 Farmer’s Intentions survey found that approximately 46 
percent of gross opium income was consumed by labor costs, fertilizer, seed, and 
payments to local leaders, given 2003 price and income structures.101  Considering that 
farmers likely did not fully anticipate the 56 percent drop in income due to falling opium 
prices, then something more than 46 percent of the 2004 harvest income would be 
consumed by the input costs if those costs remained fixed.  One cost which would not be 
fixed is the fairly standard payment of 10 percent of gross income to local leaders 
(although in some districts payments range as high as 40 percent), and this would have 
fallen with gross income as well.   The important lesson here for promoting government 
stability by strangling the rural portion of the bifurcated rentier economy is that, given the 
$600 million going to cultivators, only about $60 million (or slightly more, depending on 
the prevalence higher tax rates) would end up funding local leaders.  Of that $60 million, 
some significant portion must be spent on taking care of qawm needs; otherwise new 
potential khans would have a chance to take over.  So realistically, although a hard dollar 
figure is impossible to derive from the available data, only an extremely small fraction of 
the estimated $2.8 billion dollar opiate economy ends up in a position, via the cultivation 
side of the opiate economy, to either fund counter-government activity directly or to 
subvert it indirectly through corruption.  On a cost-benefit basis, there is an extremely 
limited potential direct impact on strangling counter-government funding through anti-
cultivation efforts.   
                                                 
101   UNODC, Farmers’ Intention Survey 2003/2004, 72.   
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Some counter-narcotics policy advisors choose to focus on the indirect impact of 
targeting cultivation and claim that they are beneficial to counter-narcotics efforts.  Two 
indirect impacts that are often noted as positive are that there is a reduction in the 
available opium product for traffickers, and traffickers are forced to pay more to peasant 
farmers for a scarce product.  This line of argument ignores several key factors.  First, 
within Afghanistan any reduction will be temporary so long as demand for cultivated 
product continues.  With only 1.8 percent of arable land being dedicated to poppy, there 
is plenty of room for cultivators to expand (exponentially) the area they dedicate to 
poppy.  Other production constraints can be met as well.  Migrant labor from neighboring 
countries could fill the field preparation and harvesting labor requirements.  Opium 
poppy does not require irrigation.  Creating a shortage for fresh opium will drive up 
prices which motivates higher future production levels.  So any shortage produced will be 
temporary because the market has the capacity to produce even more than the record 
levels recently seen.  Second, opium gum can be stored for years, and this is commonly 
practiced in Afghanistan.  Traffickers can substitute stockpiled opium gum to absorb 
acute shortages in the market, which gives them time to put pressure on farmers to 
increase production levels.  Stockpiling mitigates some of the upward price pressure for 
fresh opium, but not all of it, and traffickers have other means of influencing farmer, or 
qawm, behavior, as discussed below.  Third, the alleged benefit of increased profits for 
peasant farmers is a fool’s gold analysis; farmers do not truly benefit for several reasons.  
The international community is spending hundreds of millions each year to develop licit 
agricultural and economic alternatives to opium poppy cultivation.  Raising the price of 
fresh opium gum merely undercuts the attractiveness of those alternatives, which 
perpetuates the illicit economy that traps peasant farmers into producing for criminal 
elements in society.  Additionally, farmers are trapped by the informal loan system into 
producing opium gum at fixed price levels; any increased value per unit of opium gum 
will go directly to the informal loan originators, who are often traffickers.  This is the 
next topic of discussion. 
6. Farming Economics:  Informal Opiate-Economy Loans 
Some costs to farmers are understood at the individual level, but the variations are 
not documented in terms of their aggregate prevalence.  One example comes with the 
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informal agricultural loan system.  Approximately 45 percent of the farmers interviewed 
in the Farmer’s Intentions survey intended to take out an agriculture loan in 2004 
(average intended amount was $700) so that they could cover costs and meet living 
expenses in the months before harvest.  Loans may be repaid in cash, or in the form of a 
salaam payment, i.e. with agricultural produce at time of harvest; this distinction is not 
fully documented in terms of aggregate prevalence, and is a key gap in the UNODC 
survey data.   
In opium producing provinces, agriculture loans are often taken from opium 
traffickers, who structure the loan as a salaam payment; the farmer agrees to sell his 
product to the trafficker well before harvest time, and the farmer is paid about 50 - 60 
percent of the opium market prices at the time of the loan.  With a stable farmgate price, 
this amounts to a usury interest rate of 66 – 100 percent for a loan taken out six to seven 
months before harvest.102   
The impacts of a cash-repayment loan and a salaam–repayment loan are given 
here through example.  In 2004 farmgate prices dropped 56 percent from 2003 levels:  if 
a loan was structured to be repaid in cash, the farmer could sell their opium product and 
get cash to repay most or all their loan, depending on how much of the expected value of 
their harvest they borrowed.  For example, if a farmer expects their 2004 harvest to be 
worth $1,000 based on 2003 prices, decides to exchange 80 percent of his expected 
harvest for a loan, he would gets $400 in cash (50 percent of the $800 value expected at 
harvest).  If the farmer produces the amount of opium gum he expected, his crop would 
only be worth $460 dollars gross due to the 56 percent drop in farmgate price, but he can 
repay the trafficker in cash to cover the loan.  Thankfully the farmer only financed 80 
percent of his crop; otherwise he/she (there are female opium farmers) would owe more 
cash than they had income.  The lesson is that farmers who take cash loans have a chance 
to escape indebtedness to traffickers, and can choose to not cultivate opium the next year.  
Such may not be the case with salaam payment loans where the farmer must give a set 
amount of opium gum to the trafficker, especially if the farmer took the loan very early in 
the growing season, before a reduced per-hectare yield could be anticipated.  From 2003 
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to 2004, per-hectare yield dropped from 45 to 32kg/ha.  In this case, farmers would have 
to buy opium on the open market to repay the debt in kind, which they likely do not have 
the cash to do, or else the debt will be carried over to the next year’s production.  Now 
the farmer must cultivate opium next year, perpetuating the opiate economy.  This is 
exactly what is reported to have happened when 1998’s crop was less successful than 
anticipated,103 leading to a dramatic increase in production for 1999.   
This discussion brings out a critical factor in developing counter-narcotic 
policy—farmers get trapped into production merely to fulfill salaam payments because 
legitimate rural credit is not available to help farmers get through tough times.  
Additionally, farmers become beholden to those who have liquid assets, and this often 
means traffickers.  This has inherent political implications, within both traditional qawm 
politics as well as the democratic system which the Coalition is trying to establish.    
7. Impact on Food Production 
Opium poppy income is essential to farmer’s income and well-being, given the 
current cost structures for the Afghan agriculture market.  Across the country, the 
estimated average gross income per hectare for opium was $4,600/ha (92 percent of the 
opium poppy fields were irrigated), as compared to $390/ha for wheat grown in fully 
irrigated fields (UNODC provided only an aggregate average price for all wheat grown, 
on irrigated and rain-fed land, which was $260/ha.; only 45 percent of wheat grown was 
irrigated).104  This amounts to nearly 12 times the gross income per hectare for opium 
production on irrigated land.  Even in light of the significantly higher input costs for 
opium cultivation, the opiate economics almost seem to demand participation.  While 
labor costs for opium harvesting remained fairly stable in 2004 compared to 2003, at $6 
to $7 per day plus three meals for itinerant workers, farmers were able to avoid some cost 
by using less hired labor and enlisting their family members during the harvest, once a 
reduced income was anticipated due to falling opium gum prices.105   
                                                 
103  UNODC, The Role of Opium as a Source of Informal Credit, Strategic Study #3, Preliminary 
Report January 1999, http://www.unodc.org/pakistan/en/report_1999-01-31_1_page007.html, (accessed 30 
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104  UNODC, Opium Survey 2004, 73. 
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Although opium cultivation benefits the individual farmer (and 
employees/family), it has a disproportionately large negative impact on the nation in 
terms of the opportunity costs of land, labor, and economic structure, and in terms of 
reduced caloric production.  Land area dedicated to cultivation of cereal crops dropped 21 
percent from 2,819,000 hectares in 2003 to 2,221,000 hectares in 2004, while opium 
cultivation increased from 80,000 to 131,000 hectares.  This means the approximately 
50,000 hectare increase in opium accompanied a nearly 600,000 hectare drop in cereals 
production.106  The easy economic answer would say the price levels and potential 
incomes drive the choice to opium, and that wheat is not worth the effort.  While this 
accurately conveys part of the picture, it is not the whole story.  In 2003, farmers reported 
an inability to harvest licit crops such as wheat due to constrained farm labor availability: 
itinerant workers chose to harvest opium fields instead because the wages were higher.  
Labor shortages in 2003 convinced farmers to reduce the area under licit cereal 
cultivation in 2004.107   
To add to the deficit in licit consumables production, fully 92 percent of the land 
dedicated to opium cultivation in 2004 was irrigated, while only 45 percent of land 
dedicated to wheat was irrigated.  Yield per hectare for irrigated wheat was 3.6 times that 
of non-irrigated wheat for 2004.  The cost of these choices becomes clear when viewed at 
the bottom line:  due to reduced cultivation of cereals, drought, and priority for irrigation 
going to opium, Afghanistan produced only enough cereals (wheat accounts for 81 
percent of cereal production) to meet 66 percent of its needs in 2004, as compared to 
meeting 97 percent of its needs in 2003.108  Had all of the irrigated poppy land been 
dedicated to wheat instead, Afghanistan would have met an additional 6.7 percent of its 
needs.  Now, if we consider that labor for harvesting wheat would have been perceived to 
be available (because it would not be forecast to be dedicated to poppy), the 600,000 
hectare reduction in cereal production may not have occurred.  If these 600,000 hectares 
were dedicated purely to non-irrigated wheat production (the most conservative  
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assumption) then an additional 9.2 percent of cereal needs would have been met.  All 
tolled, Afghanistan could have met nearly 82 percent of its cereal needs instead of just 66 
percent. 
The impact that this has on central government stability, and therefore being of 
prime concern to us, is two-fold:  first, this would have allowed a shift of limited 
international aid resources to longer-lasting investment other than food aid, and would 
provide more long-term jobs to local Afghan citizens based on the need to transport, store 
and process a larger volume of domestic cereals for local consumption.109   Second, aid 
agencies are beginning to realize that external subsidies of food provides a huge 
disincentive to domestic food production, and external food aid must also be understood 
in terms of the impact it can have on disrupting the local economic relationships 
embodied in the qawm structure.  When the qawm structure is threatened, we are risking 
the breakdown of civil society as it has historically and culturally been constituted in 
Afghanistan, and which has provided the marvelous resiliency of the Afghan peoples. 
C. OPIATE TRAFFICKING 
This section of the paper will discuss the limits of our knowledge about opiate 
trafficking and attempt to draw policy implications from what we do know about the 
topic, keeping in mind that our strategic goal is to strengthen and protect the Afghan 
central government.  This section is organized around the four observations mentioned in 
the introduction to this chapter.  The first observation that although the numbers used to 
calculate the profits earned by traffickers are highly speculative, it is clear that the 
trafficker share of the market dwarfs that earned by cultivators and is increasing with 
time.  The next section discusses the economic segmentation and ethnic nature of the 
trafficking market.  Third, it is worth emphasizing that trafficking obeys the laws of 
supply and demand, which is essential to consider when formulating policy responses to 
this part of the problem.  Finally, the fundamental lesson of the trafficking portion of the 
opiate economy is found when we consider the contribution it can make to anti-
government interests which thrive on the rural portion of the bifurcated rentier economy.  
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1. Challenges of Identifying the Trafficking Market Valuation 
The unclassified body of information on trafficking opium and derivative 
products in Afghanistan is somewhat limited, but the available data does provide some 
very important insights.  Consider the following quote from “The Opium Economy in 
Afghanistan,” a 2003 UNODC publication: 
In short, Afghan groups, in general, do not appear to participate in 
lucrative international drug trafficking operations. The involvement of 
Afghan groups/individuals is basically limited to the opium production, 
the trade of opium within Afghanistan, the transformation of some of the 
opium into morphine and heroin, and to some extent, the trafficking of 
opiates (opium, morphine, heroin) to neighbouring countries (Iran, 
Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan)110 
This observation greatly simplifies estimating the potential scope and profitability of the 
opium and derivative products trade with respect to Afghan trafficking networks.  
However, that calculation is still quite complex, and involves some significant 
uncertainty in the data; therefore a clear answer to who is profiting and to what extent is 
not achievable with the available data.   
Information on trafficking in Afghanistan comes from several sources.  A major 
source of data on what is being trafficked, prices of trafficked goods, and who is 
trafficking is obtained from arrest and seizure records in Afghanistan and neighboring 
countries.  Another source is the use of surveys and observations at of de facto legal 
markets in Afghanistan (many of which have been closed down by the central 
government) as well as in neighboring countries.  Additionally, surveys and observations 
of functioning markets may provide useful price information, but it is difficult to 
accurately assess the volume of trafficked goods through such markets beyond the typical 
and extraordinary transaction sizes.  Therefore our calculation of the overall market value 
and potential profits of the trade suffers.  Four areas of market valuation uncertainty 
deserve further discussion; these are:  variations in opium gum quality and the volume of 
heroin which can be derived from it; the market impacts of stockpiling opium gum; the 
variations in what is actually being trafficked; and the veracity of extrapolating market 
generalizations based on data collected in law enforcement actions. 
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a. Variations in Opium Gum Quality, and in Conversion Rates 
from Opium Gum to Heroin 
Data on opium gum quality and conversion factors have historically been 
done using survey and market pricing information, but laboratory testing efforts in the 
past few years have enabled new methodologies and conversion factors to be developed 
for the 2004 Afghanistan Opium Survey. 
There is significant variation in the quality of opium gum farmers produce, 
based on weather, irrigation, soil quality, crop disease, the plants themselves, and other 
factors.  The morphine content of the opium gum naturally impacts its price.  Morphine 
content also affects the amount of opium gum needed to produce a final heroin product of 
a desired grade.  Quality of a final heroin product is also a variable for processors and 
traders, as they may add adulterants to boost the volume of the powder.  This gives 
traffickers “more” to sell and perhaps larger earnings (our ultimate concern, in terms of 
the bifurcated rentier economy), but this practice also cuts the purity which may lower 
the market price and therefore earnings, depending on competing goods available at the 
time of sale.  The degree these factors off-set may vary by time, region, and traders 
involved—this is a gap in our knowledge which challenges our ability to calculate actual 
market value.   
A fundamentally critical variable for estimating the total market’s worth 
involves determining the actual conversion rate for processing raw opium gum into 
heroin.  For much of the world, it is estimated that 10 kilos of opium gum will yield 1 
kilo of heroin.   Through 2003, this factor was applied to estimates of Afghan production.  
Data in the Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004 are now calculated using 6-to-1 and 7-to-1 
ratios to establish upper and lower limits to heroin-equivalent estimates of “dry” opium 
gum production.  This new conversion factor is based on chemical analysis, not on survey 
data or merely applying the “traditional” conversion rate used for heroin production in 
other parts of the world, where crop quality is different based on local conditions.  At first 
glance, this would indicate that more heroin can be produced from the same amount of 
opium gum.   
The UNODC debates whether more heroin is actually produced, i.e. they 
are arguing their estimates for previous years were valid.  They base this argument on 
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speculation that farmer’s pre-harvest estimates of yield from previous years’ surveys 
actually reported “fresh” or “wet” opium gum yields, with water content constituting 
about 30 - 40 percent of the weight of fresh opium gum.  Once dried, the “new” 6:1 to 7:1 
conversion factor becomes valid,111 and the new yield methodology discussed in the 
cultivation section (directly measuring poppy capsule volumes to estimate yield) is 
calibrated to indicate dry opium yield.   
This logical explanation given by the UNODC does not hold up.  The 
discussion on the new yield methodology instituted in 2004 claimed it produced valid 
estimates because it produced similar results for yield in Badakshan in 2004 as were 
produced in Badakshan in 2003 (both non-drought production years), with the 2003 
estimate using the old survey methodology.  However, the conversion factor discussion 
says that farmers likely gave a “wet” or fresh opium estimate in the surveys, and that the 
new yield methodology is calibrated to produce estimates of dry opium gum volume.  It 
cannot be the case that both the new yield measuring methodology produces kilogram-
per-hectare yield estimates similar to the old methodology of pre-harvest farmer surveys 
(discussed in the Appendix) and that the old 10:1 conversion factor and the new 6.5:1 
(+/- .5) produce similar results.  The result is that, overall, the 2004 results are less 
comparable to previous years results in terms of establishing reliable trend analysis.  If 
the new methodologies continue to be applied, then future years’ estimates may be 
compared with greater confidence to establish aggregate market value trends. 
b. Stockpiling of Opium Gum 
A second difficulty in calculating market value is that some amount of 
opiate product is stockpiled as a means of future security or wealth.  Opium gum stores 
very well without degrading, so it has become a means to store wealth in the absence of a 
rural banking structure.  Stockpiling challenges our market valuation through two 
mechanisms.  First, not all the product is trafficked to the border around the time of 
harvest, but aggregate calculations assume that it is all trafficked because we have no 
way of knowing how much may be stockpiled.  Second, when stockpiling is considered 
in terms of the large price variations seen over the course of any one year, it is very 
difficult to accurately calculate potential incomes for traffickers—they may benefit from 
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holding back product until prices rise, or be forced due to personal finance reasons to 
move product when prices are at their lowest.  Many of the UNODC calculations are 
done using opium gum prices at time of harvest, which is when prices are usually at their 
lowest.112   The extent to which stockpiling (which would reduce the annual value if it is 
held over to the next year) and delayed shipment (which would garner higher trafficking 
prices during non-harvest times) may offset each other in terms of aggregate market 
value is unknown. 
c. What is Being Trafficked, and Where 
Third, uncertain estimates of what is being trafficked (opium gum or 
heroin) and where it is being sold affect calculations of the gross income of traffickers.  
Over the past several years, increasing amounts of opium have been converted into heroin 
before crossing the Afghan border, boosting the value added and potential profits while 
decreasing the likelihood of being caught (due to heroin’s decreased volume and 
elimination of the pungent odor of opium gum).  This assessed change in what is 
smuggled is based on discoveries (and destruction) of heroin processing labs in 
Afghanistan, including 130 “fixed” and 20 “movable” laboratories in 2003 alone,113 and 
an increase in the seizures of heroin, especially in Iran where enforcement tends to be the 
strongest in the region.  Law enforcement in neighboring countries claim that there are no 
heroin processing labs in their respective jurisdictions and the UNODC has no 
information to the contrary, so the presence of heroin in neighboring countries is 
attributed to conversion in Afghan labs.  For 2004, it is assessed that 23 percent of 
seizures of opiates are taken in the form of opium, and 77 percent are in the form of 
heroin or morphine (percentages expressed in terms of opium equivalents using the 6.5:1 
conversion).114  These percentages are deemed to be representative of actual refining 
practices for market value calculation purposes; no attempt is made to assess how much 
more likely opium is to be detected based on its bulk and odor.   
The UNODC acknowledges many of these limitations and their 
implications:  
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About 90% of opium seizures have regularly taken place in Iran in recent 
years, followed by Pakistan. This suggests that the bulk of opium, which 
was not further processed, is trafficked out of Afghanistan via Iran. One 
key question, nonetheless, is whether seizures are an accurate reflection of 
trafficking patterns in the region. Given very strong enforcement efforts 
by the Iranian authorities, there is indeed a certain systematic bias in 
favour of Iran, leading to a possible over-representation of the importance 
of Iran as an outlet of opium produced in Afghanistan. Also, some of the 
opium seized in Iran is actually trafficked via Pakistan to Iran. As opium 
prices in Iran – reflecting strong enforcement efforts – tend to be higher 
than in Pakistan or Tajikistan, the over-representation means that the 
calculated income for Afghan groups from opium trafficking is probably 
an over-estimate.115  
Variations in law enforcement capacity among neighboring countries, 
their aggressiveness, and their accuracy in reporting may skew aggregate pictures of what 
is being trafficked and who is doing it.  Seizure reports are one of the key pieces of 
evidence we have as to what types of illicit drugs are moving (opium gum or heroin) and 
how much of it is moving through particular markets.  Since there are significant price 
differences between opium gum and heroin, and price variations among the different 
countries to which these illicit goods are moved, knowing how much is moving where is 
essential to calculate the aggregate value of the opium economy in Afghanistan.  But law 
enforcement quality varies:  if laws are not enforced, there will be no seizures or arrests 
to report.  Seizure reports may also be exaggerated to create an appearance of effective 
enforcement, especially to meet international pressures.  Additionally, the nature of the 
products themselves provides law enforcement with serious challenges, even when they 
operate with the highest degree of professionalism.  Opium gum is far more bulky and 
often has a very pungent odor, increasing the likelihood of detection and seizure, whereas 
heroin is very amenable to concealment, so estimates of what is being trafficked based on 
what is reported to have been seized may not be as accurate as we truly need them to be.   
d. Border Cost and Price Structures 
Fourth, actual profit for traffickers involves the variable prices paid to 
farmers or to opium bazaar shop-keepers, “transit” taxes paid to local commanders and 
warlords who control shipment routes, prices traffickers are paid when they smuggle the 
goods to neighboring countries and other variables by region.  We have a reasonable 
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assessment as to what farmers are paid, and “transit” taxes to corrupt locals may be more 
of a case-by-case phenomenon than a systemic cost, and therefore introduce a smaller 
amount of uncertainty in total market profits.  However, in addition to the challenges to 
knowing into which country (and therefore into which general price structure) opiates are 
flowing, we also have uncertainty as to the price and cost structures traffickers encounter 
at any given border.  This is an essential systemic variable, because we must reasonably 
determine the actual value of payments to traffickers.  This is difficult to establish for two 
reasons.  First, there have been issues such as variations in black market currency 
exchange rates.116  Second, we don’t how far traffickers smuggle the goods into 
neighboring countries.  We know that average opiate prices deep within neighboring 
countries are higher than what is paid in close proximity to the Afghan border.117  The 
Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004 attempted to account for this by using “border region” 
prices; this is a positive development, but this makes the 2004 data less comparable to 
previous surveys. 
In all, these are just the major complications to calculating aggregate market value 
that we know of, and there are many other small factors and probably other limitations of 
which we are not aware.  However, we must use the information we have available.  The 
only complication discussed above which truly threatens the comparability of 2004 data 
to previous years’ data, in order to establish trends in the market, is the issue of 
conversion rates, albeit a significant threat.  Having made ourselves mindful of these 
complications, we must proceed to an analysis of trends in the trafficking market. 
2. Trends in the Aggregate Market Value 
In spite of the aforementioned limitations, we may calculate an aggregate market 
value.  Using a methodology first developed for use in The Opium Economy in 
Afghanistan, published in 2003, which factors in “production, extent and degree of 
involvement of Afghan traffickers in shipping opiates abroad, proportion of the 
transformation of opium into heroin & morphine in Afghanistan, conversion rate into 
heroin, prices in main export markets etc.,” the UNODC reports that the total potential 
income from opium production (gross income for farmers and traffickers) is $2.8 billion 
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(Range: $2.4 - $3.2 billion) for 2004, up from $2.3 billion in 2003, and $2.5 billion in 
2002.118  In short, the whole opiate economy is quite large.  When we subtract out the 
$600 million gross which we are reasonably certain goes to cultivators, we are left with a 
trafficking gross value of $2.2 billion for 2004. 
Figure 2.   Distribution of Opium Related Income, 2001-2004 (From UNODC Data, 
Graphed and Published in Afghanistan 2005 and Beyond, Prospects for Improved 
Stability Reference Document. 
 
The prevailing trend is that traffickers’ share of the opiate economy dwarfs 
farmers’ income.   The one exception is 2002, when farmer’s income rose precipitously.  
Recall that in 2001, the Taliban banned poppy cultivation, but not trafficking (UNODC 
estimates only 200 MT of opium gum production in 2001).  This had the effect of 
clearing (much of) the stockpiled opium gum from the market.  In the next growing year, 
there was a very high demand for fresh opium gum, presumably to meet consumption and 
stockpile demand.  Farmgate prices for fresh opium gum rose to U.S. $350/kg in 2002, 
whereas in 2000 they were just U.S. $28/kg.  Production in 2002 was 3,400 MT in 2002, 
compared to 3,300 MT in 2000—production was nearly identical, but the value of the 
crop increased dramatically, but only temporarily.  Crop values since 2002 have fallen, 
however, even as overall production has increased (to 4,200 MT in 2004) and the overall 
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value of the opiate economy has continued its rise, to threefold its 2000 valuation.119  The 
market is returning to its typical pattern, which is that traffickers profit heavily from the 
ongoing economy, while farmers earn very little beyond meeting expenses.     
We should note for policy purposes though the following critical observation that 
is often overlooked:  other smuggling activities involving goods imported into 
Afghanistan duty-free via Pakistan in accordance with the 1950 Afghan Transit Trade 
Agreement, and then smuggled back into Pakistan to avoid Pakistan’s tariff rates, has 
historically been more lucrative than the entire opiate economy according to World Bank 
estimates.120  This is critical in terms of understanding the rural portion of the bifurcated 
rentier economy, and what must be done to confront it.  Counter-trafficking efforts, such 
as policing transit routes and strict border controls, will pay dividends not just in terms of 
countering the most lucrative portion of the opiate economy, but also in countering the 
hugely lucrative illicit movement of “licit” goods which circumvent Pakistani tariffs.  In 
contrast, investments in counter-cultivation efforts, such as eradication programs, will 
contribute nothing to strangle this contributor to the rural portion of the bifurcated rentier 
economy.  This issue of smuggling to circumvent tariffs does not get much play because 
it doesn’t put drugs on European, Russian, Central and South Asian streets:  it buys up 
goods produced in developed economies.  Post-9-11, “terrorism” is a key watchword, and 
“narco-terrorism” is an easy extrapolation to accommodate (and, particularly useful when 
arguing to protect access to funding, even though this does not imply a fundamental 
restructuring of counter-narcotic theories, policies or practices).  But “counter-tariff-
evading-terrorism” just doesn’t satisfy the mass consumption sounding board.  We must 
not let this public relations fact take away from our logical analysis of the threats we face 
in Afghanistan—tariff evasion smuggling does contribute to the illicit economy in the 
rural Afghan sector which is part of a bifurcated rentier state economy.  This is a threat to 
stable Afghan central governance, and as such we must take note and confront it. 
Counter-trafficking investment serves to confront both opiate and tariff-evading cargo 
smuggling, and therefore has greater utility in strangling the rural portion of the 
bifurcated rentier economy.  
                                                 
119   UNODC, Opium Survey 2004, 58, 65, 75. 
120   UNODC, Opium Economy in Afghanistan, 12. 
71 
3. A Geographically and Ethnically Segmented Market 
Several important structural aspects of the opiate trafficking practices in 
Afghanistan have been determined with reasonable certainty, and these have policy 
implications.  The first involves the character of the market, which actually functions as 
several sub-markets.  The root causes of this are that Afghanistan’s decrepit 
transportation infrastructure did not make cross-country transport easy, transit taxes and 
seizures by warlords made such trips risky and expensive, and much of the trade is 
conducted within ethnic groups (which reach across borders) due to trust relationships; 
such trust relationships generally are much harder to establish across ethnic groups.  
Consequently,  
Opium markets in southern Afghanistan were oriented towards Iran and 
southern Pakistan (Baluchistan); those in eastern Afghanistan were 
oriented towards northern Pakistan (North-West Frontier Province), and 
those in northern Afghanistan were oriented towards Central Asia, notably 
Tajikistan.121  
Although some of the barriers to cross-Afghanistan transport have been reduced, the 
UNODC still assesses that the market remains fragmented.  It will be interesting to see 
how this may change as the Ring Road is repaired, and as the central government 
institutes its centralized jail system for narcotics offenders.  These two developments may 
lay the groundwork for a more unified drug market, even to the point of cartelization—at 
least within ethnic group structures if not across them.  This complication must be looked 
for and confronted immediately as our policy response to the opiate economy continues. 
The ethnic nature of smuggling in Afghanistan is typical of world-wide 
smuggling patterns, and there are several implications for the opiates production and 
trafficking market which derive from this characteristic.  First, the UNODC asserts that it 
is not typical for Afghans to venture out into the wider smuggling world, where much 
larger potential profits from heroin can be made, unless they follow ethnic enclaves into 
foreign countries.  There are, however, some reported Afghan smuggling rings in Europe 
and Russia, and a prominent Afghan trafficker was arrested in New York in the summer 
of 2005, which may indicate that extra-Afghanistan activity is developing.  Second, while 
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the ethnic distributions of peoples in Afghanistan is highly concentrated regionally, it is 
absolutely the case that there are small enclaves of ethnic groups embedded as ethnic 
minorities in other regions who engage in poppy cultivation and therefore have ties to 
ethnically-related trafficking groups in other regions of Afghanistan.  Two prominent 
examples are the Tajiks in southern and south-western Afghanistan, and the Pashtuns in 
the Hazarajat region.  In order to present the significance of this fact, I must presage a 
potential policy recommendation for the cultivation side of the economy, which would be 
to approach it with a rollback strategy confronting areas where it is relatively new and not 
deeply entrenched instead of trying to eradicate and eliminate it everywhere at once (the 
defense and acknowledged complications of this approach will be discussed at length in 
Chapter V).  If a rollback strategy for cultivation were adopted, we must be highly 
cognizant of the possibility that the rollback could be reversed through ethnically-similar 
itinerant labor whose home is in the entrenched cultivation areas bringing not just 
cultivation and harvesting expertise (which may expire only slowly in areas rolled back) 
but more importantly fresh connections to active trafficking groups who would seek to 
re-establish poppy cultivation. 
Figure 3 is a shorthand way to summarize the ethnic patterns of trafficking:  it is 
taken from the UNODC publication The Opiate Economy of Afghanistan.  (Figure 3 is 














Figure 3.   Afghanistan and Neighboring Countries—Ethnic Distribution and 
Trafficking Routes (From:  UNODC, The Opiate Economy of Afghanistan, 2003) 
 
 
The UNODC generally is mute about who, specifically, is involved in the opiates 
trade, although they do provide a fairly comprehensive analysis by ethnic group and by 
region as to what populations are involved with production, in The Opium Economy in 
Afghanistan.  In an October 2004 article in the Boston Globe, Colonel David Lamm, 
chief of staff for U.S. forces in Afghanistan was quoted as saying “We know where the 
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drug traffic moves, we know who profits, and we are beginning to deal with it.”122  Such 
specific detail was not found while searching unclassified venues, and reproducing such 
information is beyond the scope of this paper.  Not mentioning names intentionally serves 
to reset the theoretical framing of the issue away from traditional law enforcement 
approaches—this is not to say that law enforcement is somehow not important, it is 
actually essential to our efforts.  My point is that the law enforcement framework often 
does not explicitly recognize the functioning of a bifurcated rentier economy or prioritize 
its efforts on strangling that economy’s ability to challenge central governance.  Instead it 
focuses on reducing the amount of available drug product on American, or European, or 
other streets.  This is a very valuable goal, but it does not lend itself to prioritizing law 
enforcement efforts on stabilizing the Afghan government over other countries’ needs. 
4. The Laws of Supply and Demand 
It is important to note that the opiates market in Afghanistan operates much as any 
other commodity market:  price changes tend to be driven by available supply, and those 
prices feed back into future producer and trafficker behaviors.123  When opium 
production rises, prices fall and there is less production in the following year; the obverse 
also holds true.  Some interesting price movements have been noted in the market.  Prices 
spiked in early 2002 when an eradication program was announced by the central 
government.  Prices were also impacted when   
many of the stocks in the Taliban controlled areas of southern and eastern 
Afghanistan were moved to neighbouring countries after September 11 in 
order to avoid destruction in air strikes. This created an opium supply 
shortage for clandestine laboratories and prompted them to pay premium 
prices when the new harvest came on to the market.124 
The implication for policy is that efforts to destroy supply through eradication will drive 
up prices and induce greater future participation in the cultivation side of the market.  
Alternatively, if heroin production labs are destroyed and their operators arrested and 
jailed, demand for farmer’s goods will fall, and farmgate prices will follow until 
production also declines.   
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5. The Bottom Line:  The Opiate Trafficking Contribution to the Rural 
Portion of the Bifurcated Rentier Economy 
A substantial portion of the trafficking discussion has focused on the uncertainty 
about the factors used to calculate the overall $2.8 billion dollar figure for the worth of 
the Afghan opiate economy.  This is not meant to say that the number is wrong, just to 
put it in proper context so that, if in 2005 the number is $2.5 billion we don’t 
immediately proclaim with absolute certainty that substantial progress is being made.   
What must be clearly accepted is that the opiate economy is huge, and that only 
about 21 percent ($600 million out of $2.8 billion) goes to cultivators.  Of that cultivation 
income, an estimated 10 percent (or 2 percent of the overall opiate economy) goes to 
local leaders in the form of qawm payments.  Much of the qawm payments would be 
expected to be used to meet qawm needs.  So, from cultivation, something substantially 
less than 2 percent of the opiate economy (it may be generous to say just .4 percent or 
one fifth of payments to qawm leaders) could be used to support counter-government 
activity.  Given the 79 percent of the opiate economy that goes to traffickers, it would be 
extremely unlikely that the trafficking side of the opiate economy does not contribute (or 
have the capacity to contribute) a far larger sum to counter-government activity in the 
normal course of business.  Trafficking organizations in other regions of the world must 
contend with significant seizure rates, and yet their profit margin on each unit of drug is 
high enough to more than pay for the losses.  It is clear that the trafficking portion of the 
opiate economy has the largest potential to fund activities that threaten the stability of the 
Afghan central government.  This is full justification to consider focusing our counter-
narcotics investment on the trafficking side of the opiate economy. 
D. INFORMATION AVAILABLE IN 2005 
The UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2005 will not be published until the fall 
of 2005, so detailed information as to what happened this year is not yet available.  
However, the UNODC did publish their 2005 Afghanistan Opium Poppy Rapid 
Assessment Survey in February and statements by some officials can give us an insight as 
to what to expect this year.   
According to the Rapid Assessment Survey, there is an overall trend towards 
decreasing cultivation through most of Afghanistan.  Cultivation area is expected to have 
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decreased in 29 provinces, and increased in just 5 (the UNODC is using the 34-province 
map for their 2005 assessments).  The five provinces expected to increase are Kandahar, 
Farah, Baghlan, Sari Pul and Badghis; these five provinces accounted for only 10 percent 
of the total cultivation area in 2004.  Of these, only Kandahar made the list of the top six 
cultivators in 2004, contributing just 4 percent of the total.125  The UNODC notes that at 
the time the survey was conducted (early February) the northern provinces were just 
entering their poppy sowing window. Farmers were closely watching eradication activity 
under way in the south at the same time they were beginning to prepare their fields for 
planting—the threat of eradication is known to discourage some farmers from cultivating, 
so the net impact of this remains to be seen.  The evidence derived from this, as well as 
from the evaluation of the effectiveness of eradication activity itself, will be central to the 
discussion on developing future policy avenues. 
Even though cultivation area is expected to have decreased, yield may not fall in 
conjunction with this decrease.  This will impact the overall value of the opium economy 
in 2005.  Drought is not assessed to be as much of a problem in 2005, so yields per 
hectare will likely go up.  Eradication had very little impact on cultivation this year;  the 
May 26 update of the Congressional Research Service Report, Afghanistan:  Narcotics 
and U.S. Policy, cites a discussion with a U.S. official in Washington D.C. who asserts 
that the CPEF largely failed to meet their eradication targets.126  An e-mail from a retired 
British officer serving the Afghan Government in the Central Eradication Planning Cell 
provides a mixed assessment of CPEF accomplishments.  He cites several cases of 
interference in effective eradication efforts, ranging from delays caused by U.S. military 
forces new to the theater and unfamiliar with CPEF activity, to Afghan villagers 
responding violently to eradication, to intentional interference from Afghan officials, 
stating  
we have been led a merry dance by [name deleted] and his crony [name 
deleted] who stalled our intent to eradicate in our target areas… and 
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insisted on taking the force on 50 km treks each day to second-rate fields 
that had frequently been lanced before!127   
He claims certain successes, however.  The CPEF undertook a coordinated information 
campaign combined with pre-cultivation CPEF visits to the provinces of Nangarhar and 
Laghman, which the CPEF official credits as the source for a significant reduction in 
poppy cultivation in those two provinces.  In Laghman, the official cites an expected drop 
from 2700 hectares in 2004 (UNODC numbers) to just 300 hectares.  We must wait for 
the UNODC report to confirm (or refute) these numbers.  Again, eradication 
effectiveness is a central concern, and fundamental to the current policy approach 
adopted by the United States and Great Britain in 2005.   
In terms of economic evidence towards what is happening in 2005, the Rapid 
Assessment Survey indicates that the market price for opium gum in February was 
essentially unchanged from what it was in 2004, $189/kg.128  (Recall that prices fluctuate 
through the year; the fact that this is roughly double the price for fresh opium at harvest 
time is not in itself highly disturbing.)  This indicates that the market expects supply to be 
balanced with demand equally well in 2005 as it was in 2004.  Possible interpretations 
include:  that demand remains unchanged and the market expects yield to increase even 
though cultivation area is expected to decrease; that demand remains unchanged (or 
increased) and any shortfall due to reduced cultivation can be compensated by stockpiled 
opium gum; or that demand fell commensurate with projected supply.  This author has 
found no reports of a sudden drop in demand for heroin across Europe, Russia, the 
Middle East or Asia.   The bottom line is that the market expects stability; when U.S. and 
international interests require that we decrease the size of this market, this is not good 
news. 
E. CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY 
This chapter set out to discuss the Opiate Economy in Afghanistan, and explore 
the ways in which it fits into the cultural context and the concept of a bifurcated rentier 
economy developed in Chapter II in order to further understand how this economy is a 
threat to central government stability.   
                                                 
127   Author’s access to e-mail sent to Instructor at Naval Postgraduate School, sent 07 June 2005. 
128   UNODC, Rapid Assessment Survey 2005, 6; UNODC, Opium Survey 2004, 68.   
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Four primary lessons were developed through the cultivation discussion and five 
in the trafficking discussion.  These are: 
• Cultivation has become deeply entrenched in the rural economies—and 
therefore political-economic qawm structure—of just a few provinces, but 
has recently spread to at least have a marginal presence in every province 
of Afghanistan. 
• Many farmers are trapped into opium poppy cultivation for economic 
reasons (in terms of income and market capacity for licit alternatives), 
financial reasons (in terms of lending practices and credit availability), and 
cultural reasons, each of which must be addressed in policy. 
• The patterns of opium poppy cultivation strongly contribute to the fact that 
Afghanistan has lost the ability to reliably feed itself.  This is critical 
beyond the normal humanitarian concerns, as it alone and international 
food aid responses can jeopardize the stability of the qawm structure 
which is essential to the stability of the Afghan social fabric. 
• Only a small portion of the overall opiate economy (meaning the drug-
related portion of the rural rentier economy) ends up in the hands of 
cultivators, and much of that small slice is consumed by costs. 
• The trafficking-related data used to produce the aggregate value of the 
opiate economy is not as certain as the cultivation-related data.   
• In spite of the uncertainty in the aggregate valuation, we know that the 
market value is quite large, it is growing, and that trafficker’s share of the 
economy is vastly greater than the cultivator’s share, and that share is 
growing. 
• Trafficking price structures are segmented by geographic area across the 
country, and these geographic breakdowns largely mirror ethnic divisions 
within the country—which follows from the trust relationships developed 
through ethnic connections, typical of smuggling activity world-wide.  
Importantly, the market segmentation indicates cartelization has not set in 
across the country. 
• Trafficking functions as a commodity market, with the inherent policy 
implication that policy impacts on market motivations must be considered.  
• The fundamental lesson of the trafficking portion of the opiate economy is 
the major contribution it has on the rural portion of the bifurcated rentier 
economy.  This is consistent with the fourth lesson of the cultivation 
discussion. 
Additionally we must recall that there is another funding stream to the rural 
rentier economy, which is the illegal smuggling of goods to circumvent Pakistan’s tariff 
structures.  Keeping these lessons in mind, along with the cultural aspects discussed in 
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Chapter II, we are now ready to present and evaluate the policy positions taken and 
advocated by the various parties who are confronting the Afghan opiate economy, which 
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IV. COUNTER-NARCOTICS POLICY ANALYSIS 
Since the fall of the Taliban, many groups have attempted to influence the 
counter-narcotics policies developed for Afghanistan.  This chapter will begin with a 
review of the broader policy environment in which counter-narcotics policies operate, 
namely that the United States and international presence in Afghanistan is there primarily 
to stabilize and strengthen Afghan governance in order to deny sanctuary to terrorist 
organizations.  This policy environment has presented some complications for counter-
narcotics policy, and these overarching complications will be addressed up front.  Next, 
the chapter will review and assess the counter-narcotics policies of Afghanistan, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States (the primary contributors to this policy area) 
using the lessons developed in Chapters II and III.  These critiques will show that there 
are many valuable aspects to the efforts so far, but that there are also some fundamental 
flaws and counter-productive approaches which must be avoided.   
A. THE BROADER POLICY ENVIRONMENT, AND COMPLICATIONS 
FOR COUNTER-NARCOTICS POLICY DEVELOPMENT 
There would not be a significant international counter-narcotics effort within the 
borders of Afghanistan absent the U.S.-led Global War on Terrorism provoked by the 
attacks of 9-11.  For the several European contributors to counter-narcotics enforcement 
and law enforcement training, the mere logistics of projecting their forces into 
Afghanistan would have prevented their presence absent the war on terrorism.  Certainly, 
the United States would not have invested the level of resources it has to confront the 
Afghan opium economy, which accounts for only 7 to 10 percent of the heroin on U.S. 
streets, according to the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Heroin Signature Program 
report of March 2002.129 
As a result of 9-11, the full weight of U.S. and international policy interest did fall 
on the Taliban regime of Afghanistan.  After the Taliban’s removal, the first formally 
written and pronounced policy declaration for post-Taliban Afghanistan came in the form 
of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002, PL-107-327, signed into law on 04 
                                                 
129   CRS, Afghanistan:  Narcotics and U.S. Policy.  26 May 2005, 21. 
82 
December 2002, one day before the Bonn Agreement.  Section 101 of the act, 
Declaration of Policy, established U.S. policy interests for Afghanistan as 
(1) …[S]upport efforts that advance the development of democratic civil 
authorities and institutions in Afghanistan…;  
(2) The United States, in particular, should provide its expertise to… fight 
the production and flow of illicit narcotics, and aid in the reconstruction of 
Afghanistan;  
(3)…ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a source for 
international terrorism.130 
From the very beginning, counter-narcotics was understood to be a fundamental priority 
in the United States response in Afghanistan, and this was seconded for the International 
Community and the Afghan Interim Government in the Bonn Agreement, section V, 
Final Provisions, which states  
The Interim Authority shall cooperate with the international community in 
the fight against terrorism, drugs and organized crime.131 
The United Kingdom was designated the lead Coalition partner responsible for counter-
narcotics policy and assistance; this is a role in keeping with the country’s domestic 
concerns, as up to 95 percent of the heroin sold on British streets comes from 
Afghanistan.132   
In spite of the fact that counter-narcotics was established as a central concern 
from the very beginning, there are several aspects of the broader environment to which 
counter-narcotics policy must adapt, which have served to greatly complicate the 
formulation of a sound counter-narcotics policy.   
1. The Conceptual Framework of Counter-Terror vs. Counter-Narcotics  
U.S. and Coalition forces on the ground fighting the remnants of the Taliban and 
al Qaeda soon came to rely on intelligence information from militia commanders who 
were de facto local and regional powers.  Many of these militia commanders were and are 
                                                 
130   Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002, Public Law 107-327, U.S. Statutes at Large 116 
(2002) 2797. 
131   Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of 
Permanent Government Institutions (The Bonn Agreement), 05 December 2001.   
http://www.afghangovernment.com/AfghanAgreementBonn.htm, (accessed 28 August 2005). 
132   CRS, Afghanistan:  Narcotics and U.S. Policy, 26 May 2005, 22. 
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involved in the narcotics trade, but this involvement was overlooked as a result of their 
assistance on counter-terrorism. 
The first argument to abandon this duality is that there has been evidence since 
early 2004 that “Al Qaeda operatives and sympathizers have been captured trafficking 
large quantities of heroin and hashish and attempting to trade drugs for Stinger 
missiles.”133  This means that the problems are at least connected, if not highly related, 
and that higher priority should be given to counter-narcotics efforts than it has received to 
date.   
This first argument against subordinating counter-narcotics views the problem in 
highly tactical terms, and it does not challenge the assumption that counter-terror and 
counter-narcotics are two separate areas of interest.  When the policy arena is viewed at 
the strategic level, the best counter-terror activities are ones which stabilize the Afghan 
central government, so that it can displace terrorist activities from its territory.  If it can 
be successfully argued that the opiate economy is the foundation for the primary threats 
to stable Afghan governance, then we may assert that robust counter-narcotic activity is 
entirely consistent with and fundamental to counter-terror objectives, and thereby defuse 
the conceptual framework that asserts we must choose between counter-terror and 
counter-narcotic activities.  The next several paragraphs will argue that the opiate 
economy is the foundation for the primary threats to stability, and do so by reviewing and 
linking the other primary complications to developing counter-narcotics policies. 
2. Opium Underpins Afghanistan’s Economic Recovery 
A fundamental complication to implementing counter-narcotics policy in 
Afghanistan is that the opiate economy is essential to the limited economic growth and 
stability witnessed in Afghanistan today—if the opiate economy were rapidly dismantled, 
the licit Afghan economy would collapse as well.  The Congressional Research Service, 
citing the World Bank report referenced above, states the opiate economy: 
• has produced a significant increase in rural wages… 
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• [is] a significant source of credit for low income and rural 
households…  
• [functions such that its] profits fuel consumption of domestic products 
and support imports of high value goods such as automobiles and 
appliances…  
• [is] a major source of investment for infrastructure development 
projects…. 134  
The CRS report also quotes a February 2005 International Monetary Fund report, stating:  
the IMF warned that the new counternarcotics efforts, if successful, “could 
adversely affect GDP growth, the balance of payments, and government 
revenue” by lowering drug income and weakening its support for domestic 
consumption and taxed imports.135 
The fact that drug money is illicit is eclipsed by the fact that it currently is essential to the 
health of Afghanistan.  What is clear is that real economic development and a carefully 
paced dismantling of the opiate economy is required, no matter what the implications for 
continued funding of anti-government interests—it does no good to attack a brain tumor 
by cutting off blood flow to the brain. 
3. Ethnic Crystallization Threatens Traditional Afghan Governance 
Practices 
Chapter II discussed the forces of ethnic crystallization which arose during the 
Soviet occupation, both in the form of communist propaganda which advanced its own 
interpretation of nationality or ethnic identity, as well as the ethnically segmented 
funding streams the Pakistan Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence disbursed to fund 
various mujahidin groups.  In terms of the broader policy arena, ethnic crystallization 
could present a fundamental challenge to the well-honed Afghan governance technique of 
fragmenting opposition groups.  This poses three main concerns, one for the broader 
policy arena and two which relate more directly to counter-narcotics policies. 
In terms of the broader policy arena, one concern raised by ethnic crystallization 
would be ethnically cohesive blocks operating as political parties within the parliament—
this would give ethnic groups access to government services and investment on the basis 
                                                 
134  CRS, Afghanistan:  Narcotics and U.S. Policy, 26 May 2005, 17. 
135  CRS, Afghanistan:  Narcotics and U.S. Policy, 26 May 2005, 17. 
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of ethnicity, a self-reinforcing model to further entrench ethnic identity, and therefore be 
less susceptible to fragmentation into manageable blocks, or at least blocks incapable of 
threatening central governance.  Research soon to be published by Thomas H. Johnson 
will show extremely strong evidence that ethnic identity is a fundamental determinant of 
political preference and expression in post-Taliban Afghanistan, so this complication may 
be a fait accomplis.  If this develops, it could greatly complicate stabilization, and at the 
extreme result in a Balkanization of the Afghan territory. 
The non-traditional commanders and their organizations which developed out of 
the anti-Soviet jihad were largely formed along ethnic lines.  Ethnic crystallization in 
general gives them the same resistance to fragmentation by the central government as 
would apply to ethnically-based political parties.  There are two counter-narcotic specific 
concerns in addition to the general complication.  First, the ethnic aspect of cultivation 
and trafficking indicates that a careless application of counter-narcotics policies could 
reinforce the ethnic crystallization process within these non-traditional commander 
groups, especially if counter-narcotics targeting is perceived to be lenient to some 
ethnicities and harder on others.  Second, there is the possibility that non-qawm 
trafficking revenues flowing through ethnic connections may already be reinforcing 
ethnic identity in a manner similar to the effect of the funding streams given by the 
Pakistani ISI.  Whatever the Afghan government and international community can do to 
prevent the public perception of counter-narcotics enforcement from being characterized 
as being ethnically based or biased may be essential to the long-term stability of 
Afghanistan.  
4. Regional Complications to Counter-Narcotics Policy 
The United States has fairly clear goals in mind for the future of Afghanistan; 
however, these do not always line up with the goals of regional power brokers, who are 
inclined to pursue their own national interests regardless of the fact that they may conflict 
with U.S. interests.  One example is Pakistan, which has since independence held deep 
concerns for the irredentist claims made by Afghan Pashtuns (particularly by the Durrani) 
to reunite with their Pashtun brethren in Pakistan who were separated from the political 
whole of the Pashtun dynasty by the colonially-imposed Durrand line.  Pakistan does 
wish to see a stable Afghanistan, which would allow Pakistan to establish trade routes 
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with and pipelines from central Asia, but does not wish to see an Afghanistan capable of, 
or having a motivation to, challenge established international boundaries.   Especially in 
terms of a democratic Afghanistan, should that be fully achieved, the Pashtuns who 
currently constitute about 42 percent of the Afghan population would have a tremendous 
incentive to bring more of their ethnic brethren into the Afghan political process in order 
to guarantee Pashtun rule via a clear majority status.   
Pakistan has been willing to fund anti-American power centers in Afghanistan in 
order to challenge the historically-strong Durrani Pashtuns, from whom the royal Pashtun 
line is drawn.  During the anti-Soviet jihad, the Pakistani ISI funneled the largest share of 
its funding (most of which was provided by the United States and Saudi Arabia) to 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a Ghilzai Pashtun from the province of Kunduz, who has since his 
earliest political days been staunchly anti-American.136  Hekmatyar’s historic base of 
support during the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan was in the Jalalabad area of 
Nangarhar province137, and the political party he founded, Hizb-i Islami (Gulbuddin) 
(HIG), currently has bases of support in at least Kunduz, Kunar, Logar, Laghman and 
Wardak.138  Nangarhar has typically been the second largest cultivator of opium poppy in 
Afghanistan since the early 1990s, and the remaining provinces have seen increasing 
cultivation (with the exception of Wardak) since Hekmatyar’s return to Afghanistan in 
2002.  Evidence that Hekmatyar continues his connection to the opiate economy comes 
from the September 13, 2004 edition of the Washington Times, which wrote “in a third 
raid in the neighboring Zabul Province, soldiers found opium stockpiles owned by 
renegade warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his Hizb-i Islami terror organization.”139  
Barnett Rubin notes that Hekmatyar was the only mujahidin commander to employ 
systematically opiate economy profits for political and military organization during the 
anti-Soviet jihad.   
                                                 
136  Thomas H. Johnson, Financing Afghan Terrorism:  Thugs, Guns, Drugs, Interlopers, and 
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So we have established that Pakistan is willing to pursue its own interests in 
advance of U.S. interests even during periods of tremendous Pakistan-U.S. cooperation 
(which is pragmatically understandable from a certain perspective), and that they have 
aligned themselves with non-traditional Afghan commanders who systematically employ 
illicit funding mechanisms.  We will further build the case by noting that Pakistan’s ISI 
used Hekmatyar resources to train jihadi fighters who went to the contested border region 
of Kashmir,140 an involvement which Pakistan has denied, succeeding in forcing the 
sustained deployment of 200,000 soldiers of the Indian Army.141  Establishing plausible 
deniability in operations which advance Pakistani political interests, especially when 
overt action is not possible, provides an invaluable opportunity for Pakistan.  
Additionally, these plausibly deniable operations, funded by illicit sources, are the most 
cost-effective way to advance Pakistani interests.  The monetary costs of tying down a 
large portion of the Indian Army using overt, formal institutions would place a far greater 
burden on the treasury of Pakistan.  
Finally, the fact that Pakistan has cooperated on counter-narcotics efforts does not 
indicate that they will prohibit persons who advance their political interests to undertake 
illicit activities, even if those activities nominally appear to counter other portions of 
Pakistan’s interests.  For example, during the period in which Pakistan supported the rise 
of the Taliban (again, to establish a stable government which would facilitate trade but 
would not pursue irredentist claims), Pakistan did very little to control the trafficking of 
tariff-evading goods, which cost Pakistan millions in lost tariff revenue, because the 
Taliban profited from the trade and seemed to be the only game in town to provide 
nominal stability for Pakistan’s wider interests.  In short, even though this cost millions, 
it was the least expensive way to advance Pakistani interests, much in the same way the 
jihadi campaign in Kashmir appeared to be a comparatively inexpensive way to inflict 
great cost on India.   
So Pakistan (or more fairly, portions of the Pakistani government) has a motive to 
allow non-traditional commanders who utilize illicit revenues to continue the opiate 
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trade; their presence will keep the central government of Afghanistan occupied enough in 
the long term to prevent Afghanistan from pursuing an irredentist claim.  They have an 
opportunity, in the forms of the extensive opiate trafficking through Pakistan and non-
traditional commanders such as Hekmatyar who are willing and capable of tapping this 
economy.  Pakistan has a precedent of using Hekmatyar for plausibly deniable operations 
to advance interests which could not be openly pursued without great risk.  Finally, such 
an undertaking is likely to be the least expensive to the Pakistan treasury—much less than 
what would be required to sustain a larger military needed to put down a separatist 
Pashtun insurrection within Pakistan.  
B. POLICIES OF THE MAJOR COUNTER-NARCOTICS CONTRIBUTORS 
From the beginning of the rebuilding process, the opiate economy in Afghanistan 
was a central focus of both the Afghan and international leadership.  The G-8 designated 
the United Kingdom as the lead nation for coordinating the Coalition and Afghan 
counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan, and less than a month after being established, 
the Afghan Interim Authority declared a ban on opium poppy cultivation and trade on 17 
January 2002.142   
Since that time, the major contributors to counter-narcotics policy—the United 
Kingdom, Afghanistan, and the United States—have diverged somewhat in their own 
preferences as to how the opiate economy should be confronted, although there has been 
a continual process of collaboration and attempts to build consensus on what the 
approach should be.  The competing policy approaches have developed into either a 
patient, coordinated and collaborative effort using multiple programs to reduce and 
eventually eliminate cultivation and trafficking, versus a more aggressive attack on 
cultivation which de-links coordinated implementation of supporting programs in order to 
rapidly collapse the opiate economy by deterring future cultivation.  Each approach has 
its own affects on state-society relations, economic stability, and likelihood for long-term 
counter-narcotics success, and the shift towards a more aggressive approach for the 2005 
planting season has had mixed results.  Tracing the policy evolution of the various 
contributors to counter-narcotics policy provides key lessons for future counter-narcotics 
policy development, especially when the course of that evolution is analyzed in terms of 
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its impact on stabilizing the Afghan central government, which must remain the primary 
goal of the Coalition.  This section of the chapter will present the evolution of policy 
emphasis for each of the major policy contributors separately.   
1.  Counter-Narcotic Policy Development for the United Kingdom, the 
Afghan Interim Government and the Afghan Transitional Authority 
The United Kingdom has a strong motivation to reduce the heroin on its streets, 
95 percent of which comes from Afghanistan.  In spite of this strong motivating factor, 
from early 2002 to near the end of 2004, the United Kingdom advocated a very patient 
and balanced approach to confronting the opiate economy.  According to Robert Charles, 
Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs in the U.S. 
State Department, the United Kingdom focus has been drug law enforcement, capacity 
building, and demand reduction.143  Through 2004, the British maintained a significant 
awareness of the Afghan farmer’s economic dependence on opium poppy, and a strong 
willingness to ensure that the basic needs of farmers be considered in counter-narcotics 
policy implementation, even to the point that this consideration led to poor policy 
choices.  As with all of the major contributors, the United Kingdom places a strong 
emphasis on eradication, but the means and prioritization preferred by Britain 
distinguished their preferences from those of the United States.  At the end of 2004, the 
United Kingdom experienced a shift in their policy preferences, brought about by the 
disappointing increase in Afghan opiate economy made known in the 2004 UNODC 
Afghanistan Opium Survey.  Since that time, the United Kingdom has similarly adopted a 
more aggressive approach in confronting the Afghan opiate economy.   
The Afghan Interim Government and Transitional Authority (and later the 
democratically-elected constitutional Government, discussed below) have consistently 
advocated a strong counter-narcotics program, focusing on alternative development, 
engagement and communication with the populace, eradication, and on the 
fundamentally-related issue of confronting non-traditional commanders.  Their vocal 
emphasis on alternative development is out of consideration for the rural populace and 
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what is needed to re-develop the economic fabric of the country, but also the fact that 
they need to canvas the international community for funds to support these programs.   
The joint United Kingdom-Afghan counternarcotics effort got off to an 
inauspicious start in 2002.  Following up on the 17 January ban on cultivation and 
trafficking (which was announced after virtually all of the opium poppy in Afghanistan 
had been planted), the Interim Government announced a limited eradication campaign on 
03 April 2002.  The first eradication teams began operations by April 8th, and eventually 
covered 15,000 hectares.144  By this time, farmers who became the target of eradication 
had no opportunity to replant their fields with licit crops, and were facing economic ruin 
that would result from their first interaction with the Interim Government.  This led to the 
eradication campaign to be designed with at first a $1250 per hectare, and later a $1750 
per hectare compensation package to farmers affected by eradication.145  Compensation 
could not have happened without international funding and U.K. approval.  This sent the 
unfortunate message that even though the new Afghan Interim Authority had banned 
poppy cultivation, farmers who planted poppy could expect to be paid for their crop, 
either from the Interim Government or from traffickers.   
The compensation package was rightly criticized for creating perverse incentives 
for future cultivation.  An additional criticism not widely offered is that farmers trapped 
in salaam payment arrangements now had to use their compensation money to purchase 
fresh opium gum on the market to give to their creditors, which artificially drove up 
demand for fresh opium and therefore also stimulated future cultivation.  The downside 
of compensation was soon realized, and the practice was not repeated in future years.  
The real lesson however is that seeking short-term results and failing to consider the 
second-order effects of counter-narcotics policies runs a high risk of undermining longer 
term counter-narcotics and government stabilization goals. 
Following this initial debacle, the United Kingdom and Afghan authorities 
embarked on developing a systematic approach to countering the opiate economy, along 
with inputs from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, which had studied the 
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Afghan drug problem since 1994.  In August, 2002, the Afghan Transitional Authority 
(which took office in June of 2002) promulgated a new ban on cultivation, processing 
and trafficking which met the requirements of relevant United Nations Drug 
Conventions.146  In October 2002 the Counter-Narcotics Directorate (CND) was 
established, which reported to the National Security Council of the Transitional 
Authority, and it held overall responsibility for drug control policy formulation and 
coordination.147  The Counter-Narcotics Directorate established five functional units to 
analyze and coordinate activities in the areas of:  developing alternative livelihoods for 
opium poppy farmers; drug law enforcement throughout Afghanistan; judicial reform; 
demand reduction, public awareness.   These focus areas would presage the five elements 
of the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy, developed within the CND in 
coordination with U.K., UNODC, and U.S. assistance. 148    
Having laid the groundwork for a coordinated policy direction, the first step 
towards developing a permanent implementation capability came in January 2003, when 
the Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) was established within the Ministry 
of the Interior, which was the selected ministry to take responsibility for all enforcement 
activities.  The central headquarters was founded in Kabul, with satellite offices in 
Jalalabad, Kandahar, Lashkar-Gah, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kunduz, and Faisabad.149  The 
CNPA is divided into investigation and enforcement divisions, and works closely with 
U.K. and U.S. counter-narcotics authorities to develop cases for criminal prosecution.    
Separate from the CNPA but falling under the Afghan Interior Ministry is the 
Afghan Special Narcotics Force (ANSF), a unit developed through British training and 
support to conduct sensitive interdiction operations against high value targets.  The 
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project to establish this unit began in early 2003.150  The focus of the Afghan Special 
Narcotics Force, which is also known as Force 333, is not restricted by a need to develop 
prosecutable cases; rather it focuses on debilitating the trafficking side of the opiate 
economy by destroying processing facilities, seizing opium stockpiles and processing 
chemicals, and detaining (differentiated from arresting) traffickers.  This unit earned 
strong praise from U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement, Robert Charles, in April 2004 for its operational effectiveness since 
January 2004.151  Between the summer of 2004 and March 2005, it seized 81 metric tons 
of opium, 70 heroin labs, and 28 metric tons of precursor chemicals, and detaining 
numerous drug traffickers.152   
Even as the foundations for policy implementation were being instituted, progress 
on policy development continued as well.  In May of 2003, the Transitional Authority 
released the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy (ANDCS).  It aimed to reduce 
cultivation 70 percent by 2008 and eliminate it by 2013.  It established five interrelated 
focus areas, each of which are deemed essential to making sustainable progress in 
removing the opiate economy.  The five areas are:  the provision of alternative 
livelihoods for Afghan poppy farmers; the extension of drug law enforcement throughout 
Afghanistan; the implementation of drug control legislation; the establishment of 
effective institutions; and the introduction of prevention and treatment programs for 
addicts.153   The integrated and coordinated aspects of the Afghan National Drug Control 
Strategy are deemed critical to long-term counter-narcotics success.  The United 
Kingdom position is:  
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Afghanistan has a strategy to tackle drugs and it is through 
implementation of this Afghan National Drug Control Strategy....  Without 
sustained, co-ordinated and considered action by the Afghan government, 
supported by the international community, the illegal drug trade will 
continue to threaten Afghanistan's future. Sustainable elimination of the 
problem requires a broad-based approach which considers all of the 
factors which support the trade: rural poverty, criminality; institutional 
weakness and domestic (and international) demand. And it cannot be 
tackled in isolation. Counter narcotics needs to be a strand fed in to all 
mainstream reconstruction and development work.154  
The integrated aspect of counter-narcotics policy was incorporated into the planning for 
the 2004 growing season.  This was achieved with the creation of the Central Eradication 
Planning Cell in the Ministry of the Interior.  The mission of the planning cell was  
to impartially direct eradication against poppy growing areas where 
farmers can be expected to have access to alternative sources of income, 
and areas where eradication will not upset the security balance. [italics 
added]155   
The cell coordinated provincial governor-led manual eradication with centrally-controlled 
alternative livelihood programs.  The United Kingdom funded the manual eradication 
teams and largely directed the planning cell on behalf of the Transitional Authority.   
This approach had the benefit of exercising healthy relationships between the 
central government’s Interior Ministry and provincial leaders, rewarding cooperation and 
compliance with central authority, and the benefit of using leaders who were more 
closely linked to rural qawm to legitimize eradication activities and avoid areas primed 
for violent reaction.  The United Kingdom appreciated these advantages.  The U.S. State 
Department, however, lamented the restrictive nature of the British-led eradication 
planning and expressed concern that not enough hectares would be eradicated.156  In 
2004, the State Department would push for a centralized eradication team, operating 
under the direct authority of the central government, which would not be as susceptible to 
provincial leadership misdirection about the true extent of eradication undertaken. 
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The high-water mark of the British commitment to the patient, broad-spectrum 
approach to counter-narcotics came with the February 2004 International Counter-
Narcotics Conference in Afghanistan, hosted in Kabul by the Afghan Transitional 
Authority, the UK, and the UNODC.  The character of the conference intentionally 
emphasized Afghan ownership of the problem—in addition to President Karzai and 
several Afghan Transitional Authority ministers, there were 18 provincial Governors, 32 
provincial Police Chiefs, and numerous community leaders from outside Kabul.  This 
was the first large gathering of Afghans to discuss the counter-narcotics issue since the 
Afghan National Drug Control Strategy was released in May of 2003.  The conference 
developed five action plans to advance each of the five focus areas of the ANDCS, with a 
particular emphasis on building coordination between the action plans. 
It is significant to note that the larger implications of the opiate economy were not 
lost on the provincial and local representatives who spoke at the conference.  Governor 
Pashtun of Kandahar province identified the direct implications of illicit opium as (1) a 
decrease in licit agricultural output; (2) the spread of bribery and corruption; and (3) an 
increase in addiction.  He gave the long-term effects as:  (1) the increase in the power of 
warlords who present the main obstacle to developing legitimate government; and (2) the 
absence of the rule of law which creates conditions conducive to the return of 
international terror organizations.157  A tribal elder from Nangarhar province, named 
Ghulam son of Mohammad, focused on the fundamental survival challenges faced by 
Afghan farmers which are complicated by illiteracy, a lack of alternative employment, 
the continuing weakness of agricultural infrastructure (specifically irrigation, electricity, 
and market access), and the trap of salaam loans.  He noted that even opium poppy 
farmers still struggle to feed their families because essentially the entire profit margin is 
taken by traffickers and salaam dealers.  He called for the Transitional Authority and the 
International Community to assist with the infrastructure deficits, to make salaam 
payments illegal, and to establish alternatives to salaam loans for destitute farmers.  
Taken together, these two speakers succinctly demonstrated the need for coordinated 
counter-narcotics policy justified for their impact at both at the macro and micro levels.   
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Following the conference in Kabul, a second conference focusing on regional 
cooperation in counter-narcotics was held in Berlin, concluding with the publication of 
The Berlin Declaration on Counter-Narcotics Within the Framework of the Kabul Good 
Neighborly Relation Declaration on 01 April 2004.  Signatories to the declaration 
included Afghanistan, China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.  
The basic areas of cooperation provided in the declaration include robust border-area 
security and aggressive interdiction of opiate trafficking from Afghanistan, close 
communication and operational cooperation in interdiction activities, to cooperate in 
sharing best practices and through international organizations such as the UNODC.158 
The United Kingdom approach to eradication in 2004 was characterized by a 
carefully targeted eradication program under provincial governor authority, paired with 
alternative livelihood investment.  A change in approach was guaranteed for the 2005 
growing season in some respects—through the summer and fall preparations were made 
for a Central Poppy Eradication Force (CPEF), which was created in April 2004 at the 
request of U.S. policy makers.  Shortly after the election of Hamid Karzai as President 
under the new constitution, a new position of Deputy Minister for Counter-narcotics was 
established in the Interior Ministry to coordinate and oversee counter-narcotic 
enforcement activities.  As the publication of the UNODC 2004 Afghanistan Opium 
Survey neared in November 2004, it became clear that there had been a dramatic increase 
in cultivation of opium poppy in Afghanistan.   This provoked consternation among 
British leaders, who now were concerned that their leadership on the issue was not 
producing the desired results.   
By December 5th, the United Kingdom began to take a harder line on counter-
narcotics, indicating that British ground troops would now be authorized to engage in 
“opportunistic strikes” against drug processing and trafficking infrastructure,159 which 
contrasted sharply with U.S. policy for its troops at the time.  In terms of eradication, the 
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British stepped up their support for the centralized eradication teams, adopting an 
aggressive implementation stance for what had been primarily a U.S. priority.  In the 
course of the 2005 eradication season, British representatives to the Central Eradication 
Planning Cell pushed for strong in-country support from U.S. forces for eradication 
activities, ranging from permission for CPEF teams to operate in U.S.-controlled areas to 
assistance with transporting eradication teams.  This drive for support from U.S. forces 
also included CPEF orientation briefings to U.S. military units, one of which was 
conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, for U.S. Army and 
National Guard units preparing to deploy to southern Afghanistan.  Through the course of 
the eradication season, there were several developments which resulted in the CPEF 
teams not achieving their desired eradication goals, including the violent response to 
eradication in Kandahar province.   
When shortfalls in eradication became clear, the Central Eradication Planning 
Cell, a British policy creation appended under the Interior Ministry and designed to 
coordinate provincial Governor-led eradication efforts, reached outside of the Interior 
Ministry to employ Afghan National Army (ANA) troops in centrally-directed 
eradication efforts under British leadership.160  This is a remarkable deviation from the 
careful, patient and structured approach advocated previously by the British.  The retired 
British officer who reported this development indicated that the ANA troops initially 
performed poorly and unreliably (e.g. accepting bribes to only eradicate only 10 percent 
of a village) but that their performance improved through the season.  This would have 
roughly coincided with June 2005 news reports that British military forces would take 
charge of “search-and-destroy patrols seeking opium crops.”161  The fact that the British 
would commit their own troops to eradication and resort to using non-Interior Ministry 
assets, and ones whose performance proved questionable, to advance counter-narcotic 
efforts indicates the extent to which the British have become much more aggressive on 
the eradication front.   
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The aggressive eradication stance taken by the United Kingdom did not go so far 
as aerial eradication, however.  Following the publication of the 2004 UNODC report in 
November, U.S. advocates for aerial eradication began pushing for operational 
implementation in Afghanistan.  The United Kingdom publicly supported President 
Karzai in his adamant opposition to aerial eradication, especially following reports of 
aircraft spraying chemicals in eastern Nangarhar in mid-November 2004.  The Afghan 
Ministry of Agriculture and Health investigated these incidents, and found unidentified 
chemicals in soil samples, destruction of licit crops, and that related illnesses had 
occurred.162  This event caused serious anti-Coalition sentiment to build in Nangarhar, as 
it was assumed that the United States had control of the airspace, and therefore 
authorized or conducted the spraying.  The United States and Coalition forces denied 
having anything to do with the incident, and U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan (at the 
time) Zalmay Khalilzad suggested the spraying may have been conducted by opiate-
related interests to sow discord among the Coalition.  The incident, however it came 
about, highlighted the controversial nature of the aerial eradication idea, especially within 
Afghanistan.  Although Britain has consistently opposed aerial spraying in its public 
statements, there has been one reporter who has on two occasions cited a U.K. Foreign 
Ministry official who claims that the United Kingdom has been quietly advocating a 
heavier U.S. military engagement in the eradication effort, specifically aerial 
eradication.163  Although this allegation was not found in other news sources, it may 
indicate the extent of policy shift within at least some U.K. policy circles. 
The United Kingdom’s more aggressive eradication stance was matched by 
increased spending on Alternative Livelihood programs.  In fact, for the 2005/2006 
period the United Kingdom doubled its previous spending levels on alternative livelihood 
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programs, to U.S. $125 million.  This is more than the U.S. $100 million of British 
funding allocated to eradication and enforcement.164     
The United Kingdom is leading, coordinating, funding or highly involved with 
several programs which are making significant contributions towards counter-narcotics 
and which were not detailed above.  These include:  developing 9 additional  mobile 
narcotics detection teams for use outside of Kabul, belonging to the Counter-Narcotics 
Police of Afghanistan; the Counter-Narcotics Criminal Justice Task Force; the secure 
prison facility at Pul-e-Charki; being the lead donor to finance (eventually 30) eradication 
verification and assessment teams; and building bureaucratic capacity in key cabinet 
Ministries and Provincial offices.  The United Kingdom has a high degree of dedication 
to its mission, including being willing to put its own troops on the line in interdiction 
missions.  It has unfortunately acquiesced to strong pressures coming from both the rise 
in cultivation area and from diplomatic channels to deviate from the highly coordinated, 
patient, and balanced approach it helped to establish with the Afghan Interim 
Government and Transitional Authority.  The United Kingdom chose to accelerate and 
heighten its emphasis on rapid eradication, even to the point of engaging its troops as 
well as non-Interior Ministry Afghan forces in this mission as well.  These trends, if they 
are sustained, will serve to confuse the placement of authority on counter-narcotics issues 
within the Afghan central government and threaten to increase rural-state tensions 
through the pursuit of ill-considered eradication efforts.   
2. Counter-Narcotic Policy Development for the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan 
President Karzai was elected to office under the new constitution on 09 October 
2004 and sworn in on 07 December 2004.  This period brackets the timeline in which the 
UNODC reported vastly increased cultivation for the 2004 growing season.  Immediately 
upon taking office, President Karzai repeated his commitment and emphasis on counter-
narcotics by hosting the Counter-Narcotics National Conference in Kabul on 9-10 
December.  This conference was designed to get information out to provincial and local 
leaders on what to expect in the coming year in terms of counter-narcotics policy, and to 
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get input and feedback from the leaders outside of Kabul.  Roughly two weeks later, the 
Counter-Narcotics Directorate, which had reported to the National Security Council of 
the Transitional Authority, was elevated to the Cabinet level and the Ministry of Counter-
Narcotics was formed on 27 December, with Habibullah Qaderi as Minister.  During this 
time, President Karzai was strongly advocating against an aerial eradication plan for the 
2005 growing season.  In January 2005, the Karzai administration took a step towards 
more coordinated and effective law enforcement by establishing, with U.K. and other 
support, a Counter-narcotics Intelligence Fusion Cell linked to the CNPA.  Also in 
January, the idea of extending a limited amnesty program to prominent traffickers was 
briefly considered, and then rejected.165 
By 16 February 2005, the Karzai administration had developed the 1384 (2005) 
Counter-Narcotics Implementation Plan, and presented it publicly at the conclusion of a 
visit to Kabul by British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw.  The 1384 plan builds on the 
coordinated action plans developed the previous spring at the International Counter-
Narcotics Convention, focusing on establishing and strengthening the institutional 
mechanisms to achieve a coordinated effort, but it refines the five pillars given previously 
into eight pillars.  The manner of differentiation gives us a valuable insight into the 
conceptual framework which the Karzai administration uses to view the counter-narcotics 
effort, and a side-by-side comparison will assist in making these differences clear.   
Five Action Plans, February 2004166                 1384 (2005) Plan167 
1.  Public Awareness 1.  Building Institutions 
2.  Drug Demand Reduction 2.  Information Campaign 
3.  Law Enforcement 3.  Alternative Livelihood Development 
4.  Judicial Reform 4.  Interdiction and Law Enforcement 
5.  Alternative Livelihood 5.  Criminal Justice 
 6.  Eradication 
 7.  Demand Reduction and Treatment 
 8.  Regional Cooperation 
The lists are given in the order as published on the Afghan Ministry of Counter-Narcotics 
website, and the verbiage used for each item is as it appears in the referenced documents.  
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The change in order and verbiage is not deemed overly significant as the elements of 
each are designed to work integrally with the others.  ‘Building Institutions’ and 
‘Regional Cooperation’ are added as distinct emphasis areas—this reflects the 
understanding that further elaboration was needed in the Plan to build bureaucratic 
mechanisms to facilitate internal and external coordination and cooperation.  What is 
most significant is that ‘Eradication’ is differentiated from ‘Law Enforcement.’  The 
categorical separation reinforces the differentiation between the cultivation and 
trafficking sides of the opiate economy—cultivators are not inherently seen as criminals, 
even though cultivation is banned.  Cultivators are victims of war, of non-traditional 
commanders, of salaam lenders and traffickers.  They need and deserve government 
assistance, which the Afghans previously expressed in terms of pairing alternative 
livelihood investment with eradication programs.  This long-standing implicit 
differentiation between cultivators and traffickers was made more explicit in response to 
shifting U.K. and U.S. emphasis on a much more aggressive eradication program which 
penalizes cultivators.   
In terms of ‘Building Institutions,’ the 1384 Plan discusses developments at both 
the central government level and the provincial level.  At the central government, several 
institutions will contribute.  It declares the Counter-Narcotics Ministry  
will take the lead role in the development, co-ordination, monitoring and 
evaluation of the Afghan Government's counter narcotics strategy.  The 
institutional development of the new Ministry will be supported by the 
UK, US and UNODC.168 
The Counter-Narcotics Minister will chair a new Cabinet Subcommittee on Counter-
narcotics, which will include participation from the Ministers of Finance, Rural 
Development, Agriculture, and Public Works (termed the “key line ministries”).  The 
plan establishes a Counter-narcotics Trust Fund, which can be used to fund any counter-
narcotics policy endeavors.  The Counter-narcotics Ministry will make recommendations 
to the Cabinet Subcommittee on Counter-narcotics as to what areas should receive 
priority, and for 1384 the emphasis will be on Alternative Livelihood programs.  To 
achieve external coordination, the Counter-narcotics Consultative Group will be co-
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chaired by the Minister of Counter-narcotics and the United Kingdom Ambassador, and 
international partners and Afghan ministers will be invited to participate.   
At the provincial and local level, institution building includes establishing District 
Development Councils and Provincial Development Shuras, which will identify district 
and provincial development priorities and ensure compliance with the ban on opium 
poppy cultivation.  Provincial Development Committees will also be established and 
chaired by the governors of each province, with representatives of the key line ministries, 
UN agencies, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and Non-Governmental Organizations.   
The “Information Campaign” began with the National Counter-Narcotics 
Conference in December 2004.  On-going efforts include educating the populace and 
local leaders on the threat to Afghanistan posed by the opiate economy in terms of illicit 
funding going to non-traditional commanders and terrorists, the negative impacts on the 
licit economy, the negative impact on reconstruction activity caused by drug-funded 
insecurity, and the problems of addiction in Afghanistan and neighboring Islamic 
countries.  Also noted is Article 7 of the Constitution, which bans narcotic production and 
smuggling, as is the fatwa issued by the National Council of the Ulema, a copy of which 
is (or should be) posted in every mosque in Afghanistan.  Additionally, the ministries 
responsible for rural development, agriculture, irrigation and the economy will publicize 
Alternative Livelihood opportunities in affected communities.   
In terms of “Alternative Livelihood” investment, the overall goal is that all 34 
provinces will benefit from these programs to the extent international donors contribute 
to the National Development Budget and the Counter-narcotics Trust Fund.  This does 
not mean an equal share for all, however.  Up to seven key provinces will be targeted in 
1384 for Alternative Livelihood investment, with the goal of achieving a substantial 
reduction in poppy cultivation. Hilmand, Kandahar, Nangarhar, and Badakshan are 
specifically listed as possible target areas, provided compliance with non-cultivation and 
eradication is seen.  This aspect of the program received support from the United 
Kingdom and the United States before it was published.  Additionally, there is a desire to 
see these areas develop as economic hubs for their regions.  Research is being conducted 
to develop economically viable and regionally appropriate alternatives to opium poppy.  
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Also, the issue of extending licit rural credit to farmers in order to break the opium 
indebtedness of the salaam system is being addressed this year. 
For “Interdiction and Law Enforcement,” the Afghan Special Narcotics Force will 
expand this year with U.K. funding and advice.  The Counter-Narcotics Police will 
expand to 750 members in 2005 and operate in all major growing regions, with 300 
interdiction officers received training from U.S., U.K., French and UNODC personnel.  A 
new unit within the CNPA, the National Interdiction Unit, was established in November 
2004 with U.S. (DEA) assistance which will mirror the special-tactics aspects of the 
British-led ASNF but will focus on developing prosecutable cases.  The unit had 100 
trained members as of May 2005, with 200 planned by the end of the year.169  The 
Counter-Narcotics Intelligence Fusion Cell opened January 2005, and the Anti-
Corruption Commission is confronting narcotics-related corruption.  The Afghan 
National Police, Border Police, and Highway Police continue to be trained and expanded 
under German guidance as the lead nation, with assistance from other countries including 
the United States. 
The 1384 Plan is building several improvements in the ‘Criminal Justice’ pillar.  
The Counter-narcotics Criminal Justice Task Force opened in February 2005, and thirty-
five Criminal Specialists, 35 prosecutors and 15 judges will be trained by the end of 
2005.  A secure court and prison facility should open this year at Pul-e-Charki for 
prosecuting major drug trafficking cases, along with a special court in Kabul with nation-
wide jurisdiction for narcotics-related cases.  A review of narcotics-related law is 
underway, with a new money-laundering law being passed at the end of 2004 and a 
property seizure law will be promulgated this year. 
The “Eradication” pillar is written with the clearest and most direct language 
contained in the plan.  Eradication is intended to be “credible, targeted and verified” and 
led by the Afghan Government.  The second statement made is that Afghanistan 
maintains a no-aerial eradication policy.  Third is that there will be no compensation for 
farmers.  Fourth, the plan calls for eradication to occur earlier in the growing year so 
farmers have a chance to replant with licit crops which have a shorter growing period.  
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President Karzai and the Interior Minister are named responsible for ensuring governors 
and police chiefs comply with eradication enforcement.  Eradication is conducted along 
two tracks.  For the first time, a Central Poppy Eradication Force would be used under 
direct control of the Afghan government, and a parallel eradication campaign would be 
run as in previous years through the provincial governors.  Monitoring and verification 
was achieved using overhead imagery provided by the United States and United 
Kingdom, as well as 30 (planned) trained verification teams which conduct on-site 
inspections of eradicated poppy fields. 
To advance “Demand Reduction and Treatment of Addicts,” drug addiction 
treatment centers are being established in Herat, Kandahar, Mazar-i-Sharif, and 
Nangarhar in addition to ones in Kabul, Gardez and Faisabad.  Afghanistan is seeking 
international assistance to build six Regional Treatment Centers and 34 Community 
Based Treatment Services, one in each province.  A national survey to assess drug use is 
underway, drug education programs are starting, and World Bank consultation for 
funding will occur in 2005. 
The final pillar of the 1384 plan is ‘Regional Cooperation.’  The extent of the 
Afghan statement on this area is “The Afghan Government seeks full cooperation through 
the Good Neighbourly Relations Regional Declaration on Counter Narcotics.”170   
Additional programs which involve coordinated regional involvement are the U.S. DEA 
Operations Containment and Topaz, which interdict narcotics and precursor materials 
respectively, collaborative and coordinated development programs run by the UNODC, 
and those limited programs coordinated through the Economic Cooperation 
Organization’s Drug Control Coordination Unit (ECO-DCCU).  These efforts are 
producing action—one example of many is that on 15 May, the Tajikistani Drug Agency 
chief, Lt Gen Rustam Nazarov, began a three-day visit to Afghanistan to open a third 
liaison office to coordinate counter-narcotics efforts.  One is established in Kabul, with a 
second in Badakshan province; the third is to be established in Kunduz province.171  This 
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effort follows the hand-over of responsibility for the Tajik-Afghan border from Russian 
troops to Tajik troops, which occurred over several months in 2005.  During that time the 
Tajiks seized 193 kg of heroin and a small number of weapons.172 
When the plan is reviewed as a whole, it is clear that the Afghan government is 
building the tools and bureaucratic infrastructure to truly employ a coordinated and 
balanced attack on the opiate economy, and one which will allow the Afghan economy 
and society recover from its corrosive effects.  Afghan efforts to institutionalize the 
mechanisms required to run a coordinated counter-narcotics effort are beginning to bear 
fruit.  Clearly, these institutions need to be much more robust to confront the opiate 
economy, and international funding and support are required for these institutions to 
mature into stable and permanent government capabilities.  The approach that the Afghan 
government is taking, however, is one which has the capacity to build healthy and active 
relations between a central government and the provincial, district, and local leaders 
based on reciprocity and accountability, which is essential for a healthy democracy to 
take hold.  If a balanced and coordinated counter-narcotics effort is continued, as the licit 
rural economy recovers the central government will have the legitimacy based on its 
performance to begin taxing that rural economic base.  The cycle of reciprocity can be 
cemented into a more modern government-civil society relationship (one which will 
certainly maintain some of its Afghan characteristics) instead of the historically prevalent 
rentier system which allowed the Afghan central government to have minimal interaction 
with its rural populace, and the rural qawm maintaining a deeply suspicious, extractive 
and corruptive approach to interacting with the central government.  The Provincial 
Development Shuras and District Development Councils are an innovative and 
groundbreaking link bridge between the traditional qawm interests and the central 
government (there are 8,600 Community Development Councils below the DDCs173), 
and one which demands reciprocal interaction.  The dual-track eradication approach, 
paired with multiple sources of verification and the opportunity for Alternative 
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Livelihood and infrastructure reconstruction/development programs in exchange for 
compliance go a long way to ensure that the exchange remains reciprocal and not just 
extractive.  The fight against the opiate economy and the non-traditional commanders it 
supports has been characterized by President Karzai as the fight for Afghanistan.  In fact, 
it is actually, quietly, the fight for a modern Afghanistan, one which the Durrani 
confederation has slowly tried to bring about for decades.  The fight against the non-
traditional commanders and the opiate economy which makes them possible is one which 
now has the support of the rural populace, so long as the fight is not seen to attack the 
rural qawm social structures which gives the Afghan society the resilience to endure the 
Soviet occupation, several years of non-traditional commander in-fighting, and the brutal 
rule of the Taliban.   
The province of Nangarhar provides an excellent example from the 2005 growing 
season of the interaction of rural-state relations, cultural imperatives, and attempts at a 
balanced counter-narcotics implementation strategy, and the perils of executing an 
aggressive counter-narcotics agenda which runs afoul of cultural norms as well as 
expectations of reciprocal interaction.  According to a Christian Science Monitor article 
dated 18 May, “Nangrahar [sic] is almost 80 percent free of poppies” as compared to its 
2004 cultivation levels, which amounted to 22 percent of Afghanistan’s total 
cultivation.174  This resulted largely through voluntary non-cultivation, which is 
attributed by UN officials and by the Central Eradication Planning Cell to a vigorous 
information campaign— 
…there has been minimal cultivation in Nangarhar and Laghman this year.  
We invested in a huge info[rmation] op[eration]s campaign coupled with 
multiple visits/scoping studies by the eradication force that started prior to 
planting season last year and the results have been great.  We seem to have 
‘contained’ the main cultivation areas as licit crop areas and forced 
cultivation [of opium poppies] way up into the mountains which [sic] must 
present huge logistic issues for cultivation and, processing.175 
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For the moment, we will assume that the ‘deterrence’ explanation is accurate (two 
alternative explanations, and their implications, will be addressed towards the end of this 
chapter).  In May, interdiction operations using hundreds of Interior Ministry police (the 
article did not specify which organization(s)) were undertaken in Nangarhar against the 
trafficking side of the opiate economy, destroying 14 heroin processing facilities in the 
Achin district.  This was accompanied by a search of the Abdollah Khel bazaar, followed 
by searches of houses in neighboring villages.176  The ACNP, and other counter-narcotic 
forces, are not operating independently; they still require the direction and assistance of 
Coalition mentors during the conduct of operations, and are influenced by the aggressive 
counter-narcotics stance developing within the Coalition.  By 20 May, the Governor of 
Nangarhar issued a strong rebuke of the tactics used by the Interior Ministry police.  He 
stated that the drug enforcement programs in Nangarhar were divided into two phases; 
first, farmers would refrain from cultivation, and second the international community 
would help the farmers (through Alternative Livelihood programs—the promise of 
incentives to change behavior is the second proffered explanation for reduced 
cultivation—as before, this will be explored further towards the end of the chapter).  He 
complained that the promised investment had not yet arrived, and that the interdiction 
operations were harmful to farmers.  Based on this harm to farmers, he threatened to send 
the counter-narcotics police back to Kabul.  Although the article reporting his statements 
did not specify, he the harm to farmers appears to be referring to the searches of village 
homes, which would be a culturally understandable affront to pashtunwali, especially if 
the women in the homes were confronted by non-family members, particularly non-qawm 
outsiders.177  That the Governor was not aiming to protect the traffickers was made clear 
four days later, when it was announced by the Nangarhar Deputy Governor, Mohamed 
Asif Qazizada, that tribal elders in Nangarhar will torch the homes of drug dealers, 
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traffickers, and those who have drug laboratories, and impose a fine of 200,000 Afghanis 
(U.S. $4,000).  Significantly, the Deputy Governor went on to explicitly state that the 
decision had nothing to do with the government; “The government acts according to the 
constitution and other supplementary laws in place for every crime, it [this decision] is 
the tribal decision not the government’s.”178    
From this sequence of events, it is clear that the provincial leaders, both formal 
and tribal, expected a reciprocal relationship based on non-cultivation and international 
investment to help the local qawm.  They were willing to deviate from historic patterns of 
rural-state interaction when they were presented with a plan for a balanced counter-
narcotics effort.  When, from their perspective, interdiction operations against the 
trafficking interests that they themselves want to see destroyed spilled over to harm 
qawm farmers through the violation of their homes, the leaders felt that this reciprocal 
relationship had been abused by the central government—that the balanced counter-
narcotics plan had been trashed.  Under the current level of development of Afghan 
forces, it is the Coalition mentors and directors of these forces who must bear a strong 
responsibility for the actions of the Afghan units under their direction.  The immediate 
response was to reject central government authority and to enforce counter-narcotics 
efforts on the basis of tribal legitimacy, which is precisely the traditional mode of rural 
interaction with the central government which we are trying to displace.  What shifted the 
collaborative behavior was a violation of qawm and pashtunwali.  What remains to be 
seen is whether promises of international investment will be kept, and whether fulfillment 
of those promises and more careful interdiction operations in the future can overcome the 
historic modes of interaction invoked by the violation of qawm.   
3. Counter-Narcotic Policy Development for United States 
That the United States would pursue a counter-narcotics policy in Afghanistan has 
been clear essentially from the beginning of U.S. involvement, that having been stated in 
PL-107-327, the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002.  The debate has centered on 
which federal government agencies would be involved, what their activities should be, 
and the overall character and ultimate intent of the counter-narcotics effort.  The 
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immediate response of the Executive Branch was to establish the Drug Enforcement 
Administration’s (DEA) Operation Containment in early 2002, which is a regional law 
enforcement effort designed to “deprive drug trafficking organizations of their market 
access and international terrorist groups of financial support from drugs, precursor 
chemicals, weapons, ammunition and currency,” drawing on support from 19 countries 
from Central Asia, the Caucasus, Europe, and Russia.179  Since that time, counter-
narcotics activity has moved in-country, and visible contributions to the broader counter-
narcotics effort and policy debate have come from four Executive Branch agencies, and 
also from Congress.   
The State Department was content with early counter-narcotics efforts conducted 
under British leadership.  This began to change in the spring of 2004, when a sense of 
urgency for eradication efforts large enough to “deter” future cultivation began to drive 
State Department thinking.  This focused attention on the large-cultivating provinces 
where poppy cultivation is most entrenched in the social and economic fabric, and also 
led the State Department to advocate deviating from the coordinated and collaborative 
approach developed by the Afghans and British.  The urgency increased throughout 2004, 
and culminated in a determined effort to instigate aerial eradication measures in 
Afghanistan.  Interestingly, from July to November 2004, the State Department was 
working closely to develop a U.S. version of the Five Pillar Plan which mirrored and 
complimented the Afghan and British plans.  This effort to develop a balanced counter-
narcotics approach did not mitigate the urgent advocacy for aggressive eradication.  By 
the summer of 2005, the State Department began to re-assess its approach to eradication, 
although the quest for deterrence is still a factor in the policy approach. 
The USAID approach has worked within the formal plans developed by the State 
Department, and increasingly is coordinated with those of the Afghan and British 
governments as well.  Counter-narcotics is only one of several policy issues addressed by 
USAID, and appropriately their efforts focus on the major-production provinces as the 
goal of their Alternative Livelihood programs is to establish licit economic choices, 
which will take many years.    
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The DEA has consistently pursued interdiction efforts to the maximum extent 
possible, given limited resources and constrained access to the country.  There efforts 
have been very successful in proportion to the access and resources that they have been 
able to bring to bear in Afghanistan. 
The DoD has resisted getting directly involved in counter-narcotics efforts since 
its earliest involvement in Afghanistan.  Indirect involvement has increased significantly 
since the summer of 2004, when the threat posed by the opiate economy began to be 
understood more clearly.    
Congress has also been actively involved in shaping counter-narcotics issues in 
Afghanistan.  While this has not been elevated to major-issue status across the entire 
Congress, several committees and individual legislators have paid close attention and 
applied significant pressure on various Executive Branch agencies to elevate the attention 
and level of effort directed towards counter-narcotics in Afghanistan. 
The following analysis of U.S. roles and policy development will consider the 
State Department, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) belonging to the Justice Department, and the 
Department of Defense, followed by a short review of Congressional action and 
statements.   
a. Roles and Policy Evolution at the State Department 
The U.S. Embassy Kabul Office of Drug Control Policy oversees all U.S. 
counter-narcotics programs in Afghanistan, and advises the Ambassador and the Afghan 
Interior Ministry on drug policy issues.180  The most important U.S. policy document for 
counter-narcotics was developed through this office in coordination with the Transitional 
Authority, Coalition partners, and multiple U.S. agencies and was released on 17 
November 2004.  This is the “Five Pillar Plan” which guides current U.S. policy.  Before 
this plan is discussed here, it is important to look at the State Department’s policy 
emphases and evolution which predate the release of that plan.   
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The most prominent discussant of U.S. policy for Afghan counter-
narcotics advocated by the State Department has been Robert S. Charles, Assistant 
Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.  It is clear 
from Assistant Secretary Charles’ written and verbal statements that he holds very high 
and sincere personal regard for the Afghan Government, its peoples, and their 
commitment to fight against the opiate economy.  The most consistent message he has 
conveyed is that in the end, counter-narcotics policy is set by the Afghan Government 
and that the United States must and will support the Afghans 100 percent in pursuing the 
emphasis areas they select.  This has not, however, prevented the State Department and 
Assistant Secretary Charles as its most prominent spokesperson for advocating a much 
more aggressive policy stance to be adopted by the Afghans or the United Kingdom.    In 
particular, over the course of 2004 the State Department shifts from tolerant support for 
U.K./Afghan eradication plans to pushing an inappropriately aggressive eradication 
campaign.   
On 12 February 2004, Assistant Secretary Charles delivered written and 
verbal testimony to the full House International Relations Committee, having just 
returned from the International Counter-Narcotics Conference in Kabul.  It is in this 
testimony that the tendency towards impatience first appears.  In the written testimony, 
the Assistant Secretary mentions Afghanistan’s National Drug Control Strategy, released 
in May 2003, which set a goal of eliminating opium poppy cultivation and trade in 10 
years.  His assessment of this goal was “we can assist in both supporting and accelerating 
the realization of that goal.”181  His verbal comments reflect a greater sense of urgency 
than the prepared remarks: 
From my perspective, these are the primary needs and they are both 
important and urgent. To some degree, they are already being met, but we 
must accelerate that effort. We must make measurable progress toward 
these goals this year, or we will bear the consequences for decades to 
come.182 
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What was developing was a sense of urgency for producing dramatic results in the near 
term.  At the time of the February 2004 conference, the Afghan and British view of 
eradication was that it must be directly linked with Alternative Livelihood programs to 
assist the farmers (and their qawm) affected by eradication.  Both the written and verbal 
testimony given by Assistant Secretary Charles call for more accelerated and nation-wide 
eradication, but both also agree in principle with the Afghan and British view that 
eradication and Alternative Livelihood programs be linked.  The written testimony reads 
“INL ‘Alternative Livelihood’ projects have had some success, but effective sanctions on 
illicit activity are critical.  The lesson to be drawn is that economic development and drug 
law enforcement must be implemented in parallel” (italics added).  The verbal testimony 
advocates “a nationwide well targeted eradication campaign, one that is credible, one that 
re-enforces the religious undercurrent of disapproval about heroin production, and one 
that is tied to making rapidly available some legitimate alternative income streams” 
(italics added).  These are arguments for granting incentive and punitive approaches 
equal status—they are both deemed to be required.   
This acceptance of requiring Alternative Livelihood investment to be 
paired with eradication is explicitly reversed by April of 2004.  During verbal testimony 
given before the House Committee on Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Assistant Secretary Charles praised many 
aspects of the British counter-narcotics policy and results in Afghanistan, although he 
elaborates some areas of policy disagreement with the United Kingdom  He states  
…we believe that the current set of eradication targeting criteria, while 
designed with the best of intentions, may be overly restrictive.  Criteria 
such as requiring alternative livelihood development to be in place and a 
preoccupation with avoiding any possibility of resistance may restrict our 
ability to collectively reach key eradication goals.183  
The justification for the urgency rests in the stated idea that eradicating 35,000 hectares 
of poppy would “in fact be sufficient to deter future planting across the country.”184  
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Achieving deterrence becomes the key focal point which drives the policy evolution 
through the remainder of 2004.   
In terms of estimating what percentage of the opium crop needs to be 
eradicated to evoke deterrence, we can review the data (likely) available at the beginning 
of April 2004.  The 2003 UNODC estimate for Afghan opium poppy cultivation was 
80,000 hectares, and by April it was clear from the UNODC Afghanistan Farmers’ 
Intentions Survey that the area under cultivation would increase substantially.  The 
UNODC placed 2004 cultivation at 131,000 hectares, and the U.S. at 206,700.  These 
final figures would not be available in early April—not all of the opium poppy in 
Afghanistan would have been mature enough to distinguish it as opium poppy using 
satellite detection means, but a substantial amount of it would have been distinguishable 
in early April, at the time the testimony was given.  Even if early U.S. estimates placed 
the extent of cultivation at “just” 150,000 hectares, an eradication target of 35,000 would 
be about 23 percent of the whole.  It is important to know or roughly estimate the 
standards of achievement deemed necessary to achieve deterrence through eradication in 
order to understand policy positions taken by the State Department later in 2004.  State 
Department policy on eradication is essential, as State is the principle source of funding 
for Afghan and U.S. eradication and voluntary crop reduction programs.185 
The next major development in the U.S. State Department position came 
with the release of the “Five Pillar Plan,” which was announced in Washington D.C. by 
Assistant Secretary Charles on 17 November 2004.  Near the beginning of the On-The-
Record Briefing, Assistant Secretary Charles noted that the new U.S. plan was the result 
of five months of collaborative efforts undertaken with the Afghan Government, the 
British and other Coalition members, and the involved agencies of the United States, and 
he credited the Afghans as being “the primary driver on this.”186  He also characterized 
the plan as being an evolutionary, and not revolutionary, set of thoughts.  A careful 
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reading of previous policy statements bears this out, in that many of the ideas presented 
in the new plan were present before, although they had not been organized within a 
collaborative framework designed to improve interagency and international cooperation 
on counter-narcotics policy implementation, which is a significant improvement to U.S. 
policy found in the new plan.  Another positive development in State Department 
thinking was a return to a strong dedication to linking Alternative Livelihood investment 
to eradication efforts.  Assistant Secretary Charles stated: 
In fact, I think there has to be really a proportionate, and there will be a 
proportionate, increase in the effort dedicated to alternative livelihoods 
that matches the eradication effort that the Afghan Government 
chooses….  When you match eradication efforts directly with alternative 
livelihoods, development in places like the Chapare [Bolivia], it works 
exceedingly well….  [the U.S.] put $26 million in this year, the British put 
$5 million in; it was, again, intended to tie directly to eradication and there 
is more that can be done to tie it ever more tightly to the eradication 
effort.”187   
It was made clear in the briefing that Alternative Livelihood assistance would be targeted 
to help both farmers and non-farmers in rural areas (essentially, addressing the wider 
needs of the qawm) affected by eradication, because the economic impacts go beyond just 
the farm families themselves.   
As before, however, the sense of urgency at achieving a deterrent effect 
through eradication was expressed loud and clear:  “[t]he final factor is eradication, and 
the effort here… [is to have] farmers see the opium crops being destroyed and that they 
think twice about planting into the future.”188  This imperative leads the State 
Department to advocate aerial eradication.  It may be inferred that manual eradication 
was deemed insufficient to destroy the roughly 23 percent of cultivated area thought to be 
required to achieve deterrence, especially with the  major increase in cultivated area in 
the 2004 growing season.  If a similar area were cultivated in the 2005 season, it would 
require roughly 48,000 hectares to be eradicated based on final U.S. estimates of the 2004 
cultivation area.  At the time of the briefing, the State Department had requested $152 
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million for aerial eradication in Afghanistan.  Assistant Secretary Charles mentions the 
State Department’s FY05 – 07 request for $780 million for Afghan counter-narcotics 
spending, but he did not provide the breakout.  Subsequent reporting indicates that $152 
million was slated for aerial eradication and $138 million for manual eradication.189  The 
budget request would have been under development during the same period that the 
United States was coordinating with Afghan and Coalition partners to develop the Five 
Pillar Plan.  In spite of statements during the briefing to the effect that the Afghan 
Government is directing counter-narcotics policy, e.g. “however they [the Afghan 
Government] choose to do it, we are going to be there full-bore, 100 percent to support 
them,” the State Department did not relent in its advocacy for aerial spraying.  In fact, 
Drug Enforcement Administration Director of Operations Michael Braun, in testimony 
before the House Committee on International Relations, stated “The U.S. Government led 
the discussion in 2004, encouraging aerial eradication.”190  The Afghan position has been 
clear that they do not want aerial eradication, and that position became public with the 
un-attributed spraying in eastern Nangarhar in mid-November 2004.  The budget request 
for aerial eradication was not changed until mid-January 2005.191  Even at that time, 
Secretary of State-designee Rice stated in her confirmation hearing that “[a]t this point, 
manual [eradication] is all we can do, but we’ll see whether aerial is needed”192 and 
Assistant Secretary Charles stated that aerial eradication “is not off the table” in 
Afghanistan.193   
The Los Angeles Times reporter who published some of the accounts 
referenced above states that “[t]here was division within the [State] [D]epartment and the 
National Security Council over the wisdom of spraying and whether the United States 
should use its powerful influence to overcome Karzai’s opposition.”194  The issue of 
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influence is critical—the November 2004 to January 2005 time period is merely the 
culmination of a strong State Department expression of dissatisfaction since April 2004 
with the pace of British-led counter-narcotic activity.  That portions of the State 
Department and National Security Council would advocate an aerial destruction of rural 
agricultural capacity which directly supports 14 percent of the rural population (and 
indirectly much more) in a country which experienced an aerial destruction of 
agricultural capacity in the early 1980’s at the hands of the Soviet military illustrates the 
level of urgency which drove and clouded thought processes.   Fortunately, the Afghans 
and British resisted such calls, but the extremity of the United States position combined 
with the UNODC cultivation numbers prompted the British and Afghans to adopt a much 
more aggressive eradication stance during the November ’04 to January ’05 time frame.  
This aggressive approach led to the violent confrontations against eradicators in 
Kandahar Province in early 2005.  Also in 2005 we saw an overly aggressive trafficking 
interdiction in Nangarhar where, following the successful destruction of 14 heroin labs 
and the raid of an opium bazaar, village homes were searched in a manner which 
prompted deep central government resentment and an expression by regional tribal 
leaders that central government jurisdiction was not required or welcome.  A more 
moderate stance from the United States would have relieved some of the pressure on the 
Afghans and British for “rapid” results; the United States developed a comprehensive and 
coordinated approach in the U.S. Five Pillar Plan, but deeds and words did not match the 
negotiated approach.  We must keep in mind that the goal is central government 
stabilization, and building a democracy which links historically separated central 
leadership with rural qawm society.  Confronting the opiate economy is fundamentally 
critical to achieving that goal; how we choose to confront that economy is our path, but 
we should not conflate or confuse the two.  Friedrich Nietzsche is quoted as saying 
“many are stubborn in pursuit of the path they have chosen, few in pursuit of the goal.”  
We must evaluate our policy choices and emphases in terms of their ability to draw us 
closer to our goal, and be willing to make adjustments. 
Another aspect of the British eradication policy approach which has 
become the target of U.S. dissatisfaction is the Provincial-Governor-led eradication 
programs.  Assistant Secretary Charles stated in the November 2004 briefing  
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[the British] worked very hard to try to bring governor-led eradication to 
fruition this year.  I think there were a lot of obstacles to that and they’re 
self-evident…. [later in the briefing]  I think we’ve learned that governor-
led eradication… [and] verification of eradication, when done by 
governors, is very difficult.  Why?  Because poppy, when you eradicate it, 
and the field is all done and carted away, it doesn’t look a whole lot 
different from when it’s been harvested.195 
The intent of the critique is that instead of achieving eradication, governor-led eradication 
may simply result in a sham.  But accountability is precisely the value of governor-led 
eradication programs—as stated by the retired British officer working in the Central 
Eradication Planning Cell “[we] now have the benefit of two UK remote sensing 
platforms that have provided us with some superlative imagery with which to plan and, 
hold the governors accountable if they err.”196  Establishing central government authority 
over the provinces, or ‘moving the government from the periphery to the middle’ in 
Roy’s characterization, is a challenge which historic Afghan culture has resisted, and is 
essential to establishing a stable, democratic central government.  The interaction and 
accountability required of the governor-led eradication program is an excellent 
opportunity to exercise and institutionalize that central authority over and connectedness 
to the periphery.  The U.S. critique of the governor-led eradication is based on a 
dedication to the path, not a focus on the goal.  The officials must ask if this is caused by 
the urgency which permeates the U.S. approach to eradication policy, and which also 
induced a lower-than-required deference for rural sentiment during eradication and 
interdiction activities in 2005.     
Just as there is a division within the State Department on the wisdom of 
aerial eradication policy, there is also a division in the sense of urgency towards the 
overall opiate economy problem.  In fairness to Assistant Secretary Charles, he openly 
discussed the fact that instant results cannot be expected in curbing opium poppy 
cultivation.  In response to a reporter who asked, during the November briefing, “what 
went wrong with the approach” of international programs to confront cultivation in the 
2004 growing season, he likens the expectation that we should see instant reductions in 
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cultivation to expecting that a house could be built in 24 hours—the process of building a 
foundation, framing multiple floors, and adding a roof cannot all be done simultaneously.  
The analogy refers to the need to establish a legitimate government, build institutions, 
pass laws, educate the populace and build expectations of enforcement and prosecute 
offenders—eventually behavior will change.  The 2005 International Narcotics Control 
Strategy Report (INCSR) published by the State Department Bureau for International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs also maintains two states of mind in terms of the 
sense of urgency and of patience for counter-narcotics policy in Afghanistan.  The first 
sentence of the second paragraph assessing Afghanistan precipitously declares 
“Afghanistan is on the verge of becoming a narcotics state,” while the last paragraph on 
Afghanistan quietly states 
Poppy cultivation is likely to continue until responsible governmental 
authority is established throughout the country and until rural poverty 
levels can be reduced via provision of alternative livelihoods and 
increased rural incomes…. Sustained assistance to poppy-growing areas... 
combined with law enforcement, drug education, and eradication 
programs are expected to reduce the amount of opium produced in 
Afghanistan over time….   Political stability and assistance by the donor 
community over many years will be required to help the Afghan 
government succeed.  [italics added]197 
The full understanding that this is not an issue which can be fixed overnight, or in one 
growing season, is resident within the minds of State Department policy makers.  What is 
required now is that the sense of exuberant urgency, which has unfavorably affected U.S. 
policy recommendations and their resulting consequences, be recognized and dropped 
from U.S. policy formulation on the subject. 
Surprisingly, the 2005 INCSR, published in March 2005, does not 
elaborate the Five Pillar Plan presented by Assistant Secretary Charles in November 
2004.  It does mention a “comprehensive and integrated program” developed in 
collaboration with the Government of Afghanistan and the United Kingdom, and it lists 
six aims of the program.   Overall, the best current description of the Five Pillar Plan was 
delivered on 12 July 2005 by Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International 
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Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Nancy Powell, during testimony before the 
House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing and Related Programs.  In her prepared remarks, the five pillars are given (in 
order of presentation) as Law Enforcement, Interdiction, Eradication, Alternative 
Livelihoods, and Public Information.   
Law Enforcement and security throughout the country were characterized 
as “[t]he most immediate concern of the government of Afghanistan.”198  State 
Department initiatives, through the Bureau of International Law Narcotics and 
Enforcement Affairs (INL), included capacity-building and organizational reform in the 
Afghan Interior Ministry, establishing a Central Training Center for Afghan police in 
Kabul, as well as Regional Training Centers in Gardez, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kandahar, 
Kunduz, Jalalabad and Herat.  The goal is to provide training to 50,000 national police, 
including 3,400 highway patrol officers, and 12,000 border police, working closely with 
Germany who has the Coalition lead on police training.  As of June 2005, 40,000 police 
had received basic training, including 2,600 border police and 770 highway police.  
Future training initiatives will go beyond classroom instruction on basic skills to field 
training and mentoring.199  Additionally, criminal justice system and corrections capacity 
building is a key focus.   
In the area of Interdiction, some of the State Department capacity-building 
initiatives within the Afghan Interior Ministry will directly contribute to this pillar.  Also, 
Acting Assistant Secretary Powell noted that tactical airlift support is critical to the 
success of interdiction operations, and INL is coordinating the use of Huey II helicopters 
to provide reconnaissance, medical evacuation, gunship and light logistical support to 
interdiction (and eradication) operations.  Other prime U.S. contributors to the 
interdiction pillar include the Department of Defense, which provides some logistical 
support to the Afghan Special Narcotics Force.  DoD also provides logistics, training and 
some equipment to the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Foreign-deployed Advisory 
                                                 
198  Nancy J. Powell, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs, testimony before the United States House Committee on Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs, 12 July 2005, http://www. 
state.gov/p/inl/rls/rm/51065.htm, (accessed 02 September 2005). 
199  Powell, Testimony, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, July 2005.  Closely paraphrased. 
119 
Support Teams (FAST), which work directly with the Afghan National Interdiction Unit, 
providing training, mentoring, and direct operational support during interdiction 
operations.   
Eradication is the next pillar.  Acting Assistant Secretary Powel stated: 
The credible threat of eradication is a major disincentive to opium poppy 
growers and in our view a necessary component of any successful national 
counternarcotics strategy.  There are some indications that the increased 
perception of risk in growing poppy [due to threatened eradication] was 
one of the factors contributing to reportedly lower poppy cultivation this 
year.200   
The assertion that eradication is a major disincentive is only weakly supported by some 
indications of a perception of risk.  It is further undermined by the fact that four Central 
Poppy Eradication Force teams, comprised of 495 police plus civilian laborers and 
international support staff, managed to destroy only 216 hectares of poppy in the 2005 
growing season, while just two CPEF teams managed to destroy 900 hectares late in the 
2004 growing season.201  If the standard for eradication to induce deterrence was set at 
approximately 23 percent of cultivation for the 2004 season, then eradicating an area in 
2005 equivalent to just .165 percent of the 2004 cultivation area (using UNODC 
estimates; .104 percent using U.S. estimates of 2004 cultivation) does not begin to 
approach the status of being a major deterrent.   
As a result of this performance in 2005, the State Department is pursuing 
what is billed as a new provincially-based Poppy Elimination Program (PEP).  This will 
involve deploying special counter-narcotics teams to provincial governments “in key 
poppy-producing areas” [italics added].202  These teams will consist of eight to ten 
Afghan and international advisors who will monitor cultivation, coordinate alternative 
livelihood programs, report the degree of compliance to the Afghan government and 
request eradication by provincial or national authorities.  Provincial Governors will be 
given technical assistance with eradication “when illicit planting is not deterred.”203  In 
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the event that provincial leadership does not respond appropriately, an air-mobile Rapid 
Reaction Eradication Force (RREF) composed of re-constituted CPEF teams will be 
employed by the central government to effect compliance.  Medium- and heavy-lift 
helicopters will be leased to support these operations.   
Summarizing the new approach to the eradication pillar, Acting Assistant 
Secretary Powell said: 
We believe these programmatic changes offer a realistic possibility of 
creating credible eradication capacity for the Government of Afghanistan 
and will also improve the flow of information concerning opium poppy 
cultivation to senior levels of the Afghan Government.  This revised 
program will also provide the disincentives needed for alternative 
livelihood programs to succeed.204 
The logic, as expressed, is incomplete both in what is present and what is absent from the 
thought process.  What is present in the logic is a continued belief that the deterrence 
created by eradication is the most effective means to reduce cultivation.  Deterrence alone 
cannot take into account opium debt established through the salaam system; once a 
farmer has taken the loan, the risk of not cultivating is much higher and more certain than 
the risk of cultivating and perhaps suffering eradication.  Deterrence also does not 
establish a reciprocal relationship between the government and its people—it is by nature 
extractive (by taking away opportunity) and imposes outside standards on the qawm.  
While ultimately this is necessary in terms of law enforcement, to make this our primary 
focus is to immediately evoke the traditional attitude of the qawm towards the 
government—extreme resentment, mistrust, and evasion of authority.  A more culturally-
productive approach in Afghanistan would be to build trust through reciprocal 
relationships, via Alternative Livelihood programs, or using as a model the program 
undertaken in Peru where a village signs a contract to not cultivate or to self-eradicate in 
exchange for a development program of their choice, which has been described as being 
highly effective.205  Law enforcement must come, but it has to be within the context of a 
reciprocal relationship.  What is absent from the expressed logic is the understanding that 
interaction between the central government and provincial leaders is essential, and it 
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contributes to a necessary change in attitude toward the role of the central government in 
Afghan society.  What is valued in the new program is that it will improve eradication, 
and therefore deterrence, and that it will improve the quality of information at the central-
government level.  While U.S. support for a Governor-led eradication program is a 
welcome development, it should be understood for its full range of benefits, and 
limitations.  Once again, the stated reasoning for support indicates a commitment to a 
path, not a focus on the goal, and it may indicate a failure to fully appreciate the cultural 
context of Afghanistan and harness that context to advance our long-term interests.   
One critically important positive development is that the tendency towards 
exuberant urgency is visibly absent from Acting Assistant Secretary Powell’s statement.  
In fact, her closing remarks on Afghanistan (the testimony covered INL efforts in many 
countries) were an almost verbatim reiteration of the patient mindset presented in the 
closing lines of the Afghanistan section of the 2005 INCSR—“all of the measures that I 
have discussed are an essential beginning to a long process.”206  There were no 
references to Afghanistan being on the verge of becoming a narco-state.  Corruption is 
still a primary concern at the State Department, as it should be, but it is not seen as an 
imminent threat to the central government as it is mainly found at the local and provincial 
levels.207  Corruption at these levels is in many ways business-as-usual in terms of the 
qawm keeping the government out of qawm affairs.  As positive experiences accrue 
through a reciprocal relationship between the central government and the provincial and 
district leaders and qawm in their rural communities, the reflexive use of corruption to 
keep the central government authorities out of qawm and local/regional affairs will abate 
to some degree, and it will establish an environment where law enforcement eventually 
will be able to assert itself to more completely restrict corruption.  While corruption is 
part of the historic rural-state tension which needs to be overcome, the most serious threat 
corruption poses is with respect to provincial and especially district elections.  That 
narcotics trafficking (and perhaps at the most local qawm level, opium cultivating) can 
generate enough income to fund corruptive activities, and that cultivation—and therefore 
trafficking—has extended into every province, should cause significant concern as 
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elections move to the provincial and eventually district level.  A nascent democracy can 
likely overcome limited instances of corrupt elected officials, but having a majority of 
corrupt officials would pose insurmountable problems.  This complication will contribute 
to the policy recommendations presented in Chapter V. 
Alternative Livelihoods is the next pillar in the plan, and the lead agency 
for this pillar is the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).  Their 
programs are discussed separately below, but they fall into a new three-phase approach 
developed within the Alternative Livelihood pillar.  Previous Alternative Livelihood 
programs had focused on developing integrated crop processing facilities, storage areas, 
and market access for wheat and other cereal crops.208  The new phased approach builds 
on those previous activities, and the first phase calls for an acceleration of previous 
programs, coupled with farmer education, rural micro-credit extension (an alternative to 
salaam loans).  Phase one began in early 2005 and should extend through 2006.  The 
second phase is a one-year “Immediate Needs” program designed to provide alternative 
rural employment opportunities on labor-intensive programs to rehabilitate agricultural 
infrastructure such as irrigation systems, beginning in December 2004.  Immediate Needs 
programs are designed with local councils and tribal leaders in areas where crop 
eradication is planned or where voluntary non-cultivation took place in 2005, particularly 
in Nangarhar and Laghman, and will push $20 million in wages into those rural areas by 
November of this year.209  This program may be renewed in 2006.  The third phase, 
termed “Comprehensive Development,” began in mid-2005 and will run through 2009 in 
key poppy-producing areas.210  Projects will include long-term infrastructure 
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services to rural markets, promoting agricultural diversification into licit high-value 
markets in both Afghanistan and internationally, and the removal of administrative 
barriers to efficient business practices.211   
Public Information is the final pillar of the U.S. plan.  Acting Assistant 
Secretary Powell stated that:  “the goal of our public information efforts is to change 
attitudes in an Afghan culture where many people are still unaware poppy cultivation is 
illegal and that illicit drugs pose a major public health threat.”212  The BBC and Voice of 
America are broadcasting anti-drug messages in both Pashto and Dari that link the drug 
trade to conflict, crime, corruption and warlordism.  Also, a local marketing agency is 
being hired to publicize the anti-poppy-planting message at the provincial and district 
level, with an express interest in shaping farmer’s (and qawm’s) views before the planting 
season begins.   A longer-term public information campaign is currently under 
development, and as in all areas of the Five Pillar Plan, this will be closely coordinated 
with the Afghan Government and Coalition allies. 
The particular strengths of the Five Pillar Plan are that it is designed to 
pursue a comprehensive and balanced approach to counter-narcotics, one which mirrors 
and integrates well with the Afghan Eight Pillar Plan.  How well it meshes depends on 
the policy thrust taken by the United States overall and the State Department in 
particular.  It is highly encouraging to see the return to a more patient, long-term 
approach to counter-narcotics, one which hopefully will avoid inducing precipitous 
counter-narcotics behavior which evokes the traditional qawm response to external 
government interference or violates pashtunwali in rural Pashtun villages.  In its 
acceptance of a longer-term view, the State Department should also reassess the 
standards of progress that it adopts to ensure that, as became the case in pursuing 
inappropriately aggressive eradication policies, it does not maintain a dedication to the 
paths it has chosen over and above, and to the detriment of, the goals which it is earnestly 
trying to bring to fruition. 
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b. USAID Contributions to Counter-Narcotics 
The USAID counter-narcotics programs, particularly the Alternative 
Livelihood programs, are part of a much larger constellation of development initiatives 
which USAID is directing and funding in Afghanistan.  This constellation of plans is 
outlined in the USAID/Afghanistan Strategic Plan 2005 – 2010 (USAID Strategic Plan), 
which dovetails with the Joint USAID-State Department Strategic Plan.  The Joint Plan 
calls for development in four areas, three of which the USAID Strategic Plan supports 
directly:  economic reconstruction; rebuilding a legitimate and capable state governed by 
rule of law; and social reconstruction, which involves health and education services and 
the renewal of a strong civil society.  The fourth Joint Plan area is security, to which the 
USAID does not directly contribute.213  The USAID Strategic Plan does see itself as 
intentionally contributing to security through indirect means, and particularly through 
support of the United States government’s counter-terrorism and international crime and 
drugs program.214  With respect to counter-narcotics, USAID intends to assist 
Afghanistan in  
[t]ransform[ing] a rapidly growing illicit economy based on poppy 
cultivation into a diverse and formal economy, led by the private sector, 
that raises incomes of most people, creates opportunity, and reduces 
poverty.215 
This is an excellent and succinct mission statement for Alternative Livelihood programs 
with respect to counter-narcotics.   
The USAID Strategic plan states that it is targeting its Alternative 
Livelihood investment to create viable options to poppy cultivation in 10 priority 
provinces.  It is initially focusing on Nangarhar, Kandahar, Hilmand, and Badakshan, but 
it does not name the additional provinces.  It envisions a multi-year effort to establish 
viable licit economic options by developing economic and social stability which will 
eventually replace the opium-poppy dominance in the rural economies where it is deeply 
entrenched.   
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Currently, the plan calls for roughly $120 million in 2005 for Alternative 
Livelihood investment to assist counter-narcotic policies, followed by a large increase to 
$200 million in 2006, and then a significant drop to $75 million per year for the period 
2007 – 2010.   
USAID supports the Immediate Needs and Comprehensive Development 
programs mentioned in the Alternative Livelihoods portion of the Five Pillar Plan 
discussed above.  In addition, the USAID Good Performers Fund supports highly visible 
and sustainable economic development initiatives in provinces where there is a 
commitment to discourage poppy cultivation and to maintain a poppy-free province.216  
One example is the July 2005 delivery of 41 tons of corn seed and 232 tons of fertilizer to 
3,000 farmers in Uruzgan province.  Kunar Province also earned a Good Performers 
Fund distribution in the form of a $5 million cash-for-work program which was 
scheduled to start in August 2005.217 
The USAID counter-narcotics mission is complicated by the security 
environment.  As part of the Immediate Needs program, USAID signed contracts with 
Chemonics and DAI corporations on 15 February 2005.  Both contracts entered into 
operation, but activity in Hilmand and Kandahar provinces were suspended when seven 
Chemonics employees were killed in Hilmand on 18 – 19 May.  As of the second half of 
July, operations in these areas were still on hold pending improvements to security 
arrangements by the contractors.218 
The USAID Strategic Plan does not discuss specifically assisting counter-
narcotics policy advancement in confronting the widely distributed but comparatively 
small cultivation areas which are scattered across every non-major-cultivation province in 
Afghanistan.  In one sense this is perfectly understandable, in that USAID assistance for 
counter-narcotics is intended to entirely re-orient the local economies where opium 
poppy is entrenched, and that is inherently a high-investment, multi-year endeavor.  
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Qawm who produce in areas where opium production does not form the foundation of the 
local economy likely have other economic options available, and may well be served by 
other USAID development programs.  The caution for USAID policy (and warning for 
other counter-narcotics policy-makers) is that by focusing on the large-producer areas 
first (which makes sense for the USAID as their economic redirection will take years) is 
that as production is squeezed in the traditional large-cultivation areas, traffickers will 
attempt to induce greater cultivation in areas where cultivation is present but not 
currently prevalent or deeply entrenched.  Additionally, local leaders in low-cultivation 
areas may see expanded cultivation as the ticket to greater local investment through 
USAID programs.  The result is that the USAID may face the prospect of having to 
greatly expand its areas of high investment economic re-direction if the opiate economy 
is not first completely driven out of areas where it is presently only a minor contributor to 
the local economy.  Using a medical analogy, preventive medicine is much less 
expensive than trauma/emergency medical intervention, and the USAID should explicitly 
consider addressing small-cultivation areas early rather than later. 
c. Drug Enforcement Administration Contributions to Counter-
Narcotics 
The Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA) purpose in Afghanistan is 
to support the Interdiction pillar of the 5-pillar plan.  Within the environmental 
constraints of security and poor transportation access, the DEA has done an outstanding 
job in its mission.  Initial DEA efforts were constrained to Operation Containment, a 
highly successful 19-nation cooperative interdiction plan to secure the border regions of 
nations neighboring Afghanistan, as well as down-stream trafficking destinations, from 
opiate traffic departing Afghanistan.  The operation netted 17.3 metric tons (MT) of 
heroin, 7.7 MT of morphine base, 8.9 MT of opium, 230 MT of cannabis, 11 heroin labs, 
and made 693 arrests between the first quarter, FY 2002 and the end of the first quarter, 
FY 2005.  Of those amounts, 2.4 MT of heroin, 985 kilograms of morphine base, 3 MT of 
opium gum, 153 MT cannabis and 195 arrests were netted in just the first quarter of 
Fiscal Year 2005.219  The preponderance of success accrued recently is testimony to the 
difficult operational circumstances which DEA faces, which are only recently improving. 
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The DEA re-opened its Kabul Country Office in February 2003 and 
initially was essentially proscribed from conducting traditional drug enforcement 
operations due to security concerns.  DEA is now allowed to leave Kabul if specific 
security criteria are met; these criteria are strict and unfortunately rarely can be met.  As 
of March 2005, DEA has 12 permanent and temporary-duty staff in country who conduct 
investigations into trafficking networks and coordinate DEA activities with the Combined 
Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) Intelligence Fusion Center, and the Combined 
Joint Task Force – 76 (CJTF-76).  Significantly, the DEA Assistant Administrator for 
Intelligence is leading the U.S. Embassy Kabul’s Office of Drug Control Policy.   
DEA in-country personnel also provide training and mentoring to the 
Afghan National Interdiction Unit (NIU), a division of the Counter-Narcotics Police of 
Afghanistan created with DEA assistance.  Training for CNPA officers to bring them into 
the NIU began in October 2004.  As of March 2005, 77 officers had received training, 
and significantly 6 of these officers are female.  This is essential to conducting 
interdiction operations in areas where cultural sensitivities (e.g. pashtunwali) prohibit 
men from questioning, touching, searching or arresting female suspects.  The unit had 
expanded to 100 trained members as of May with 200 expected by the end of the year.  
DEA training and mentorship should allow independent NIU operations within two 
years.220   
A critical element of the DEA training and mentoring for the NIU is its 
Foreign-deployed Advisory Support Teams (FAST).  Primarily with Department of 
Defense funding and support, the DEA has established five FAST teams, each consisting 
of six specialists.  Two teams are deployed for 120-day rotations into Afghanistan, while 
the remaining three conduct training and off-site operational support for the deployed 
teams from their training location at the DEA Academy in Quantico, Virginia.221  The 
first operational interdiction came on 15 March 2005.  With DoD support, a DEA FAST 
team accompanied 36 NIU officers on a mission against three heroin processing labs in 
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Nangarhar.  The DEA agents collected highly valuable evidence and the combined teams 
destroyed just over 2 MT of opium in addition to the processing labs.222   
The DEA is deeply committed to building a professional counter-narcotics 
law enforcement capability within the Afghan CNPA and NIU.  Given the scale of the 
interdiction challenges posed by the Afghan opiate economy, it is unfortunate that the 
DEA is limited in its presence in Afghanistan to, typically at most, 24 agents.  The case 
load these officers and their CNPA and NIU counterparts generate is likely proportionate 
to the capabilities of the fledgling Special Counter-narcotics Court being developed 
through the Afghan Eight Pillar Plan, and the capacity of both law-enforcement-based 
interdiction and prosecution will grow over time.   In the near term of the next few years, 
however, given the limited law-enforcement-based interdiction capability (even including 
the British-led ASNF and the Afghan Border and Highway Police) and the limited 
prosecutorial capability, policy-makers should carefully consider alternative means to 
confront and debilitate the trafficking side of the economy.   
d. Department of Defense Contributions to Counter-Narcotics 
The Department of Defense has been one of the strongest proponents of 
maintaining the artificial distinction between counter-terror and counter-narcotics 
priorities, particularly with respect to its own activities in Afghanistan.  This point of 
view has begun to evolve as there is an increasing awareness that the opiate economy is a 
fundamental threat to stability in Afghanistan.  While the DoD has staunchly avoided 
intentionally-targeted counter-narcotic activity, it has been willing to provide substantial 
indirect support to counter-narcotics efforts, and this support is on-going.  To date, it 
appears that the levels of indirect support have served to deflect criticism of the 
Department’s reluctance to get directly involved in counter-narcotics.  There is still 
pressure from the State Department and Congress for the DoD to take a more active, 
direct role in counter-narcotics, and this has been echoed even within some policy circles 
in the Department itself.  The following paragraphs will outline the basic policy evolution 
to counter-narcotics in Afghanistan, as well as the highlights of the indirect support 
which the U.S. military has provided to counter-narcotic efforts in Afghanistan.    
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Counter-terror activities have been DoD’s top priority from the beginning 
of Operation Enduring Freedom, as Deputy Secretary of Defense for Counter-narcotics 
Mary Beth Long noted in March 2005 Congressional testimony: 
As you know, since Coalition forces evicted the Taliban in December 
2001, the primary mission of U.S. military forces in Afghanistan has been 
to defeat terrorists and an insurgency—being waged by Al Qaeda, the 
Taliban leadership, Hezb-i Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), and other anti-
coalition and anti-government forces.223 
The expansion of DoD’s mission to include a more formal counter-insurgency apparently 
developed during the summer of 2004.  A senior European diplomat in Kabul stated in 
October 2004  
It is only since July that Americans have begun to see the importance of 
dealing with warlords…  One reason why I’m slightly optimistic about 
Afghanistan is that the American government appears to have woken up in 
the last few months to the problem of drugs and the relations of drugs to 
the power of warlords and commanders.224 
In August 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said during a visit to Kabul that 
the opium trade was a problem “too serious to be ignored”225 and “[i]t threatens the 
democratic system in Afghanistan, to the extent that many millions (of dollars) are 
available to people who are not democratic and (that) puts at risk that entire system."226   
By October 2004, the senior American commander in Afghanistan, Army Lt General 
David Barno stated “[w]e’re assessing exactly how the military’s role may be reshaped as 
we go into this coming year, given the significant threat that drugs is making to the future 
of Afghanistan.”227   
Deputy Secretary Long stated that the any DoD plan to confront drug 
trafficking and the drug trade networks (her verbiage, which importantly excludes using 
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DoD assets to confront the cultivation side of the economy) must meet two standards.  
First, the plan must be endorsed by the Afghan government, and second the plan must fit  
within the USG’s overall strategic goals in that it recognizes the impact 
the drug trade has on our other policy objectives, while complimenting 
(and not competing with) our other efforts in furtherance of those 
objectives.228 
This clearly indicates that the distinction between counter-narcotics and other objectives 
such as counter-terror and government stabilization is still shaping the DoD policy 
framework, and the caveat “and not competing with” declares a continued priority 
structure which places counter-narcotics efforts below other efforts.  If DoD policy is 
designed to stabilize the Afghan government, then it must take note that President Karzai 
has stated “the fight against drugs is the fight for Afghanistan.”229   
In terms of direct action, U.S. troops in Afghanistan may take action 
against drug trafficking targets  
when those military operations support our stability mission in 
Afghanistan.  If our troops come across drugs or drug producing 
equipment during the conduct of other military operations, they are 
authorized to take action against these targets and report all drug related 
discoveries.230 
Once again this highlights the Defense Department perception that counter-narcotic 
operations are distinct and separate from what is required to stabilize the Afghan 
government.  In spite of declarations that there is a new understanding of the threat posed 
by the opiate economy, that understanding has yet to change how the Department is 
willing to employ U.S. troops.   
According to the testimony, the Department’s focus is on building Afghan 
capacity to confront the problem themselves, and in general DoD support goes most 
heavily to developing a law enforcement and institutional approach to the problem.  This 
is philosophically consistent with one of the Department’s strongest positions as to why it 
should not engage in direct action—“interdiction without authority and the means by 
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which to prosecute drug offenders [is among several reasons which are] potential 
destabilizing factors to a newly democratic nation.”231  Concurrent with this view is that 
the U.S. military is not trained to do law enforcement work.  Through this reasoning, the 
Defense Department builds a logical and coherent argument in support of its preference, 
which is to minimize its direct involvement with counter-narcotic activity.  This position 
builds on a long-standing approach towards (or rather, distancing from) counter-narcotics 
in other parts of the world.   
The generalized reluctance to avoid counter-narcotics involvement should 
not be carried over into Afghanistan.  President Karzai, European leaders, and many U.S. 
leaders understand that the opiate economy, the anti-government non-traditional 
commanders it funds, and the rural society/central government separation it helps to 
perpetuate are all fundamental threats to the new Afghan government.  The trafficking 
portion of the opiate economy generates enough annual funds to equal the funding 
provided to the mujahidin who succeeded in the anti-Soviet jihad.  We know the opiate 
economy funds groups who participated in that anti-central-government battle, and that it 
could fund other anti-government groups if it is left in place.  U.S. military counter-
insurgency doctrine does not begin with sending in the prosecutors and evidence 
collectors.  Failing to destroy the opiate economy, or leaving it to others to confront, is 
equivalent to not taking the fight to the enemy.  The Department of Defense can adopt a 
Lend-Lease approach only for so long, and although that program was critical to the 
overall Allied success of WWII, Lend-Lease did not produce the battle of Midway, the 
invasion of Normandy, the reach of long-range strategic bombing, or the fall of Berlin 
and the Japanese surrender on the USS Missouri.   
To the extent the Defense Department has provided indirect counter-
narcotic support, it has done so reasonably well in 2004-2005, and across many areas.  
Support is structured to advance three of the pillars of the U.S. Five Pillar Plan, plus one 
of the Afghan eight pillars.   
The Department of Defense is supporting the Law Enforcement pillar by 
providing facilities, equipment and training to improve the operations of the Afghan 
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Border and Highway Police organizations.  For the Border Police, DoD is emphasizing 
support for the Pakistan border areas, and constructed two facilities in FY 2004, one each 
in Kandahar and Paktika provinces.  In FY 2005, they are building eleven additional 
facilities in the Pakistan border areas.  These facilities will be helpful against both 
counter-narcotic and tariff-evading smuggling activities.  Elsewhere, one facility was 
constructed at Spin Boldak in FY 2004 and eight more are being built in FY 2005 to 
support border operations along Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.  DoD is 
also providing equipment to the Border Police, including drug detection equipment, 
cold/wet weather gear, and boots.  Significantly, the Defense Department is building a 
communications system which will link Border Police forces with the National Police 
communications system, and they are providing small-unit and tactical training to 
improve the effectiveness and survivability of these units.  For the Highway Police, the 
DoD began construction on multiple facilities along the Ring Road between Kabul and 
Kandahar during FY 2004.  This year, ten more facilities will be added from Kabul to 
Herat, in addition to facilities along the route east from Kabul to the border checkpoint at 
Torkham.232   
For the Interdiction Pillar, the Defense Department is providing 
equipment, training and logistics support on several fronts.  Notably, Deputy Secretary 
Long reiterated the law-enforcement emphasis for interdiction operations, stating in the 
opening sentence on this topic “[e]xpanding Afghan interdiction capabilities so that its 
operations can result in criminal prosecutions is vital to a successful program.”233  
Previously discussed were the DEA FAST teams, which are largely funded by DoD 
accounts.234  DoD provides training and equipment for the National Interdiction Unit.  
Training includes self defense, searches and entry into defended buildings, evidence 
handling, small unit tactics, marksmanship, close quarters combat, and human rights.  No 
explanation is provided as to why DoD is qualified to train and model these skills while 
not possessing them in sufficient quantities to undertake interdiction operations.  
Logistics support is critical, both for the FAST team deployments to Afghanistan and for 
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actual interdiction operations.  U.S. Central Command indicates that it can support up to 
four interdiction operations per month using Blackhawk and leased MI-8 helicopters.  
Finally, DoD is helping to establish Intelligence Fusion Cells to handle counter-narcotic 
information sharing between the Combined Forces Coalition-Afghanistan and the Afghan 
Ministry of the Interior. 
In terms of Public Information, the Department of Defense is providing 
public affairs training to the Ministry of the Interior.  This training was instrumental in 
preparing messages for President Karzai’s National Conference on Counter-narcotics, 
held shortly after his inauguration in December 2004.   
Finally, DoD is supporting the Regional Cooperation pillar of the Afghan 
Eight Pillar Plan.  In Uzbekistan, the Department has helped construct three maritime 
patrol bases on the Amu Darya River bordering Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, as well as 
constructing a Special Investigative Unit police headquarters, an Uzbek unit which will 
work closely with the DEA.  Additionally, the Department is pursuing several tracks to 
improve maritime interdiction operations in the seas between Pakistan and the Middle 
East. 
e. A Survey of Key Congressional Positions on Afghan Counter-
narcotics 
Congress plays a very important role in the policy formation of the United 
States through the budget, laws, hearings and statements.  Within Congress, there have 
been several individuals who have followed the counter-narcotics issues within 
Afghanistan assiduously, and who have helped to shape the overall policy environment.  
The following paragraphs offer a survey of the available opinions of some key legislators 
and committees.  Proponents of a more aggressive U.S. counter-narcotics policy have 
been vocal, and their views are easily found.  Interestingly, (potential) opponents to a 
more active role have remained silent, in certain respects opposing by not granting 
“issue” status via engaging in active debate in Congress. 
The most recent general Congressional statement on Afghan counter-
narcotics policy was made in P.L. 108-458, signed into law on 17 December 2004, which 
was the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004—legislation which 
resulted from the 9/11 Commission recommendations.  The Act included a Sense of the 
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Congress statement which read “the President should make the substantial reduction of 
illegal drug production and trafficking in Afghanistan a priority in the Global War on 
Terrorism” and this statement also reflects the recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission.235   
Congress also entered into the specifics of the debate.  The CRS estimates 
that debate on aerial eradication, one area in particular for which some lawmakers have 
clearly expressed support, will continue.  For the funds approved in the FY2005 
supplemental appropriations bill, which became P.L. 109-13 on 11 May 2005, the Senate 
report specifies that “none of the funds recommended by the [Senate Appropriations] 
Committee may be available for aerial eradication programs within Afghanistan absent 
formal request by the President of Afghanistan seeking such support.”236  Although the 
committee reports are not actually part of the law itself, the appropriations committees 
treat the guidance they write in their reports as binding, and vigorously challenge any 
spending which is made in contradiction to the reports.   
In addition to the laws and budgets passed by Congress, there is 
substantial room for committees, subcommittees and individual congressmen to advocate 
for policy change using hearings and formal statements.  Several of the most prominent 
and significant committees and individuals who have actively attempted to influence U.S. 
counter-narcotic policy in Afghanistan are presented below.  Additionally, one outside 
group of 182 aggregated Non-Governmental Organizations has vocally lobbied Congress 
and the Administration on the issue, and their position is included as an additional input 
to the overall policy environment.   
• The House International Relations Committee:  Has held Afghan counter-
narcotics policy hearings before the full committee on 12 Feb 2004, 02 June 2004, 
23 September 2004, and 17 March 2005.  There is strong bi-partisan support to 
push for aggressive direct and indirect counter-narcotics activities.  
 
• Congressman Henry Hyde (R-IL), Chairman of the House International 
Relations Committee, has been the one of the most vocal advocates for increased 
counter-narcotics action by the U.S.  He supports greater direct U.S. military 
action against processing labs and drug stockpiles, and has expressed support for 
aerial eradication.  During the 17 March 2005 hearing before the IR Committee, 
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he stated during his opening remarks  “the U.S. government has been AWOL too 
long in the fight against illicit drugs in Afghanistan” 237 
 
• Congressman Tom Lantos (D-CA), ranking House International Relations 
Committee Democrat, also strongly supports increased counter-narcotics action.  
In a 25 April 2005 press statement, he said:  
 
[quote] We have been saying for years that strong counter-narcotics 
programs are also strong counter-terrorism programs. Unfortunately, the 
United States hesitated, while the growth of opium cultivation and heroin 
trafficking has exploded…. Finally, the Departments of Defense and State 
seem to be heeding our call…238   
 
• Congressman Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA), member of the International 
Relations Committee, is a Central and South Asia expert, who has long paid 
attention to Afghanistan.  He sponsors H.R. 1437, a bill “To eradicate the poppy 
plant in Afghanistan,” using a $1 Billion USAID cash-for-work manual 
eradication program paying $10 per day per worker.  The bill is currently referred 
to the International Relations Committee. 
 
• The House Committee on Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources has held numerous hearings on 
counter-narcotics in Afghanistan, and urges the DoD to more actively confront the 
issue.  If DoD will not take more aggressive action, the committee supports re-
directing funds to other willing and capable agencies.239 
 
• Congressman Mark Souder (R-IN), Chairman of the House Government 
Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 
strongly favors increased direct action by DoD against stockpiled drugs, 
processing facilities, and precursor chemicals.  He also raises the possibility of 
aerial as well as manual eradication.  His subcommittee has oversight jurisdiction 
for all U.S. government drug control efforts, including international and 
interdiction programs.   
 
                                                 
237   Henry Hyde, Chairman, House Committee on International Relations, Full Committee Opening 
Remarks, “U.S. Counternarcotics Policy in Afghanistan:  Time for Leadership,” 17 March 2005,  
http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/109/ hyde031705.htm, (accessed 05 Apr 05). 
238   Tom Lantos, Ranking Democrat, House Committee on International Relations Democratic Office, 
Press Release, 25 April 2005,   http://www.house.gov/international_relations_democratic/ 
press_050425_Afghanistan_Narcotics.html, (accessed 27 May 2005). 
239   United States House of Representatives Committee on Government Relations Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Afghanistan Opium and Heroin Production 
Backgrounder.  Updated 18 May 2005.  http://reform.house.gov/GovReform/News/DocumentSingle.aspx? 
DocumentID=20305, (accessed 22 September 2005). 
136 
• Congressman Mark Kirk (R-IL), member of the House Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs, 
(which has jurisdiction over DoS international narcotics control programs) 
assiduously follows counter-narcotics issues in Afghanistan, and has advocated 
for a stronger DoD role since at least January 2004.  He has also spoken in 
support of aerial eradication as recently as January 2005. 
 
• Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), Chairman of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, held hearings in 2004 with numerous witnesses who warn of a 
possible Afghan narco-state.  He has made joint statements with Senator Biden 
dating from October 2003 expressing concern over an Afghan narco-state 
[Reuters:  web file] but has been silent since the summer, 2004. 
 
• Senator Joseph Biden, Jr. (D-DE), Ranking Member of the Foreign 
Relations Committee and a co-Chair of the Senate Caucus on International 
Narcotics Control, expressed in a May ’04 Foreign Relations hearing his desire to 
see a stronger focus on events in Afghanistan, specifically citing the risk of an 
Afghan narco-state.  He also looked forward to having another Foreign Relations 
Committee on the subject, which never occurred.  Senator Biden has been silent 
on the Afghan counter-narcotics issue since, including during Secretary Rice’s 
confirmation. 
 
• Outside Interest Groups:  Twenty-nine individual NGOs plus two NGO 
associations (182 total), including CARE, Catholic Relief Services, the 
International Crisis Group, the Open Society Policy Center (George Soros), and 
Oxfam International, wrote to Secretary Rice in January 2005 to advocate 
prioritizing alternative livelihood and interdiction efforts over eradication.  Copies 
were sent to Secretary Rumsfeld, Congressmen Hyde and Lantos, and others.240 
As can be seen from this sampling, there are many powerful inputs and 
constraints on the counter-narcotics policy environment concerning Afghanistan, which is 
exactly as it should be under the Constitution.  Quite often legislators frame the 
discussion in terms of the synergy between counter-terror and counter-narcotics efforts, 
which is an improvement over placing those two conceptual frameworks in opposition or 
as competing agendas.  This policy framework could evolve further to more fully capture 
the understanding that the opiate economy funds a latent insurgency—latent in that the 
non-traditional commanders are not in fully violent opposition to the central government 
but that they are opposed to and do conduct small-scale violence against the central 
government, and they are through the opiate economy attempting to perpetuate the rural-
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state division which gives them the opportunity to exist.  The illicit international funding 
of non-traditional groups needs to be understood as the foundation of a bifurcated rentier 
economy, similar in its functional effects to the funding which supported the ultimately 
successful anti-Soviet mujahidin groups. 
C. SUMMARY OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT 
Essentially at the time of the fall of the Taliban, the United States, the soon-to-be 
Afghan Interim Government and international community all declared that confronting 
the Afghan opiate economy would be a priority during the re-establishment and 
reconstitution of the Afghan government and economy.  Within the Coalition, the United 
States was content to delegate the leadership for this task to the United Kingdom, and this 
fit particularly well with the U.S. DoD reluctance to get heavily or directly involved in a 
counter-narcotics effort—beyond division of labor, this was further justified through the 
conceptual and prioritized distinction between counter-terror and counter-narcotics 
activities.  After some initial missteps in 2002 involving paying farmers for their 
eradicated poppy crops, the United Kingdom and Afghan authorities began to organize 
bureaucratic institutions and construct a patient, development-oriented approach to 
displacing the opiate economy from the rural social and economic fabric.  By May 2003 
the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy was published, providing a five-pillar 
framework for a coordinated and multi-faceted counter-narcotics approach.  This was 
refined at the February 2004 International Counter-Narcotics Conference in Afghanistan 
when five action plans were developed to coordinate and implement the five pillars of the 
plan.   
It became clear in 2003 that the opiate economy was expanding, and by the end of 
2003 some members of the U.S. Congress began to pressure the U.S. State Department 
and the Defense Department to take stronger action.  The State Department responded 
sooner, and began in February 2004 to push the United Kingdom and Afghan 
Transitional Authority to accelerate their counter-narcotics activities.  By April 2004, the 
State Department pushed for aggressive centralized eradication versus relying on 
Governor-led eradication, and to de-link the coordinated implementation of Alternative 
Development and Eradication programs, claiming that deterring future cultivation was 
the utmost priority.  The de-emphasis on Governor-led eradication marks a priority of 
138 
eradication over building central government authority over the governors and reciprocal 
relationships between the two levels of government, which indicates a lack of perspective 
for the historic cultural and rentier-state governance dynamics of Afghanistan.  
Prioritizing eradication led the United States to advocate focusing efforts on a few major-
cultivating provinces where establishing central government jurisdiction is much more 
difficult, instead of expanding central government jurisdiction into a much larger number 
of small-cultivating provinces where the environment is more permissive.  Focusing on 
eradication is also an argument for a rapid attack on the supply side of the opium 
commodity market, and the projected outcome (deterrence) is based only on the 
anticipated impact of eradication.  Not accounted were the fact that the licit economy is 
underpinned by the illicit opiate economy, and additional influences on cultivation 
behavior such as opium indebtedness via salaam loans, the lack of viable economic 
alternatives for farmers, the fundamental market dynamic that the demand side of the 
commodity market will go unfulfilled, which leads to higher commodity prices and an 
increases stimulus for future cultivation.  April 2004 also marked the establishment of the 
Central Poppy Eradication Force, at the request of the United States.  During the summer 
of 2004, the Defense Department began to acknowledge that the opiate economy required 
more attention, and by late 2004 began substantial indirect support of counter-narcotics 
activities, including constructing Afghan police facilities, providing training, funding the 
establishment of DEA FAST teams, etc., but it assiduously avoided signing up for direct 
counter-narcotic action.   
By the fall of 2004, the State Department developed a U.S. version of the Five-
Pillar Plan, and it advocated a coordinated counter-narcotics effort which fit well with the 
approach developed by the British and Afghans, and well with the U.S. plan for 
stabilizing Afghanistan.  Regardless of the philosophical design of the new plan, the State 
Department had achieved a level of exuberant urgency in their calls for drastic 
eradication measures, and this matched increasing pressure from Congress.  The urgency 
resulted in sustained advocacy for aerial eradication from the fall of 2004 to January 
2005, despite categorical opposition by the Afghan Government and, officially, the 
United Kingdom.  Meanwhile, with the publication of the UNODC Afghanistan Opium 
Survey 2004 in November, pressure on the British and Afghans to pursue a much more 
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aggressive eradication campaign during the 2005 growing season became irresistible.  
The British decided to implement a much more aggressive, centralized eradication 
program which the United States had been calling for since early in 2004.  This 
eradication program resulted in violent confrontations with rural populaces in southern 
Afghanistan, and overall, the centralized eradication program achieved very little 
eradication.  In the face of the complications and a lack of success, the British were 
compelled by their own recently formed sense of urgency to use Afghan National Army 
troops to eradicate.  By doing so, they stepped outside of the Afghan Interior Ministry—
which was supposed to hold the counter-narcotics authority within the Afghan 
government—and outside the carefully constructed larger bureaucratic system within 
which structured coordination was to have shaped a patient, effective, and intentional 
campaign against the Afghan opiate economy.  That system was embodied in the original 
Afghan Five-Pillar Plan and the subsequent action plans, and significantly improved and 
strengthened in the eight-pillar plan, published by President Karzai in February 2005, 
called the 1384 (2005) Counter-Narcotics Implementation Plan.  In the summer of 2005, 
the U.S. State Department began to reconsider a governor-led eradication program, based 
on the dismal performance of the centralized eradication campaign.  Unfortunately, the 
State Department’s focus remains on achieving deterrence, and the perceived value of 
using the program to build central government authority and reciprocal relationships 
remains unacknowledged.  Consistently since 2002, the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) has pursued interdiction operations against the trafficking portion 
of the opiate economy, and has in the past year significantly increased their operational 
capability, but still has only 24 personnel in country at a time.  The United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) has a very broad development plan for 
Afghanistan, only a portion of which is directly targeted to advance counter-narcotic 
policy interests.  This is appropriate.  USAID has also followed the State Department lead 
in focusing on high-cultivation areas.  This is also appropriate, in that the USAID task is 
to facilitate growth of alternative economic options for opium farmers, and this task will 
take many years to achieve in high-cultivation areas—they need to focus on those areas 
now.  They must also consider that poppy cultivation needs to be driven out of the low-
cultivation provinces as well, and implement aid programs targeting these regions.  From 
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a limited-budget USAID perspective, those regions may perceive that the way to gain 
USAID investment is to become a high-cultivation area, or they may be prompted to 
increase cultivation by traffickers as cultivation is displaced elsewhere.  Using a medical 
analogy, preventive medicine is much less expensive than emergency/trauma 
intervention.   
Two themes are central to the philosophical evolution of counter-narcotics policy 
application by the United States since early 2004, and by the United Kingdom since 
November 2004, and they both run contrary to the philosophical policy development 
trajectories of all parties.  All major contributors to counter-narcotics policy had come to 
accept, on paper, the need for a broadly targeted, multi-faceted and coordinated counter-
narcotics strategy which would produce results over a matter of years and gradually 
target both the trafficking and cultivation sides of the opiate economy.  The United States 
and the United Kingdom each, in their own timeline, adopted positions to conduct 
counter-narcotics operations founded on:  (1) a disproportionate focus on the cultivation 
side of the economy; and (2) on the desire to see a rapid collapse of cultivation.  The 
mechanism to achieve this collapse was purported to be massive eradication, which 
would deter future cultivation, and the policy application occurred through the 2005 
growing season. 
If we consider the opiate economy within Afghanistan as a commodity market, 
which it is, then cultivation is the supply side and trafficking is the demand side of that 
market.  By April 2004, the U.S. State Department decided to attack the supply side of a 
market without the tools being in place to simultaneously reduce demand to the degree 
that they claimed supply must be reduced.  Market economics tells us that prices will rise 
with falling supply and constant demand, which will lead to increased future production 
to meet demand, and thereby approach equilibrium.   
D. DETERRENCE, ALTERNATIVE LIVELIHOOD INVESTMENT, OR 
MARKET ECONOMICS:  WHAT ACCOUNTS FOR REDUCED 
CULTIVATION, AND WHAT ARE THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS? 
Cultivation for 2005 is expected to have decreased, which is a good thing from 
the perspective that (likely) there are fewer people trying to participate in the opiate 
economy, at least for this year.  What causes such a decrease to occur?  There are three 
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explanations for the decrease, and each serves as a foundation for policy approaches to 
achieve reduced cultivation.  These explanations are that cultivation can be (or, was) 
deterred, induced as part of a reciprocal relationship founded on Alternative Livelihood 
investment, or that market economics drove the decrease. 
Both the State Department and the retired British officer working in the Central 
Eradication Planning Cell believe in the concept of deterrence to achieve reduced 
cultivation.  As indicated above, this approach in Afghanistan ignores the cultural 
dynamic of salaam loans which force production, the situational economics that some 
Afghans have access to small land parcels which are economically viable only with 
opium poppy cultivation and other job opportunities do not exist, and the general 
economic principle that demand (from traffickers) which goes unfulfilled will cause a rise 
in prices and increased future production to achieve equilibrium.  In addition to these 
conceptual failures of the deterrence approach, we also find that deterrence to achieve 
reduced cultivation is not realizable in Afghanistan based on 2004 statements that 
eradicating roughly 23 percent of the crop across the country is sufficient to establish 
credibility and deter future growth.  In 2005, the Central Poppy Eradication Force 
eradicated just 216 hectares, or an area equal to .165 percent of the 2004 cultivation area 
of 131,000 hectares, using UNODC estimates.  Credibility was not established according 
to the standards of those who advocate deterrence as a means to reduce cultivation.  
Without resorting to extreme actions such as aerial eradication, it is difficult to see how 
credibility can be established.  Even if it could be achieved, the counter-productive 
impacts of focusing on the cultivation side of the opiate economy are simply ignored by 
this approach, as its sole focus is to rapidly collapse the supply side of the market. 
The second means to reduce cultivation is for the central government to engage in 
a reciprocal relationship with the rural qawm and the district and provincial leaders.  In 
exchange for central government jurisdiction and compliance with the constitutional ban 
on narcotics production and trafficking, qawm and the district and provincial leaders 
would earn access to Alternative Livelihood and other development projects funded by 
the USAID, the United Kingdom, and other international donors.  In terms of actually 
inducing compliance with the ban on cultivation, the case study of Nangarhar province 
provided evidence that that this reciprocal relationship was the motivation for 
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substantially reducing cultivation in that province for 2005.  This was the reason given by 
the Governor of Nangarhar in July 2005 to explain Nangarhar’s decreased cultivation this 
year, and the tribal elder Ghulam son of Mohammad, also from Nangarhar, expressed 
support for this idea in February 2004.  So, if by way of example we take the Governor at 
his word, then Alternative Livelihood investment does induce a drop in cultivation.  The 
tactical victory of a drop in cultivation is not the only value of Alternative Livelihood 
investment; the concept implies that a reciprocal relationship between the people and the 
government can achieve compliance with government laws, which is a strategic goal that 
brings us closer to what we are trying to achieve—moving the government from its 
traditional peripheral position in society to the center.  The final advantage of Alternative 
Livelihood investment comes from the recognition that the opiate economy currently 
underpins the licit economy—Alternative Livelihood investment is essential to the task of 
creating a licit means for rural society to sustain itself, and until that happens the opiate 
economy will continue at least at some level.  It is possible that the Governor’s 
statements are not wholly genuine:  another explanation might be that rural acceptance of 
Alternative Livelihood investment is the traditional extractive approach qawm and their 
leaders have taken with the central government, and poppy cultivation fell due to other 
motivations.  This does not destroy the value of the Alternative Livelihood and 
infrastructure development programs however; their conditional nature is a means of 
exercising central government authority over the rural formal and informal power 
structures, and this interactive exercise of authority will build its own legitimacy in time.   
This has value even if in the near term this interaction does not fully explain or motivate 
decreases in opium poppy cultivation.   
The third mechanism to explain and achieve reduced cultivation is the market.  
Opium is a commodity, and if demand for the product goes down, then ultimately so will 
supply.  Demand can fall through two means; one, that traffickers require less product, 
and two, traffickers leave—or are removed from—the market.  On the first means, the 
fact that early spring prices in 2005 remained similar to those for early spring 2004, at a 
time when the reduced output could have been anticipated, indicate that there is 
equilibrium in the market, i.e. the reduced supply will meet trafficker’s demand for fresh 
opium.  There is, however, a substitute for fresh opium gum to meet demand further 
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down the trafficking chain, and that is dried opium gum which is stockpiled by traffickers 
from previous years.  Omar Zakhilwal, an Afghan expert who co-publishes with Barnett 
Rubin, conducted a survey in eastern Afghanistan assessing trading behavior through the 
2004 season.  Poor Afghan farmers generally sold off all of their opium gum harvest, 
while more affluent farmers stockpiled a third of their 2003 harvest and half of the 2004 
harvest.  Mid-level traders were stockpiling about 80 percent of the 2004 harvest for 
future sale.241  Essentially, the market in eastern Afghanistan is becoming saturated with 
supply, which would produce a crash in prices if high levels of production continued.  So, 
the reduced cultivation in Nangarhar may have resulted from market dynamics, and not a 
result of Alternative Livelihood investment and the expectation of a reciprocal 
relationship. (The rural population may still expect the Alternative Livelihood 
investment, once it is promised.  Building a reciprocal relationship will, by definition, 
require continued investment by the government in its people).  The market-based 
explanation for reduced cultivation, however, does not undermine the value of 
Alternative Livelihood investment in terms of building the infrastructure required for a 
licit economy.   
The market-based explanation raises several concerns, but it also leads to a 
productive policy option.  Of concern is that the market is more organized than is 
currently thought; this may develop through three mechanisms.  The first is trafficker’s 
control over portions of the rural populace.  We already know that traffickers who extend 
salaam loans directly control a portion of cultivation behavior, and we know from the 
cultural analysis that the egalitarian and political-economic nature of the qawm and the 
competition to be khan provide the opportunity for traffickers to buy significant influence 
over qawm production choices.  The fact that in the face of reduced cultivation prices 
remained stable should raise concerns that traffickers have achieved significant control 
over the poppy cultivating qawm.  Second, it may be that the market has achieved some 
degree of cartelization, at least along ethnically-connected cultivation and trafficking 
lines—this too could result in a mechanism for price control/stabilization.  There is some 
evidence of this regionally, as noted with the local strongmen limiting farmer’s access to 
traffickers in Badakshan.  Finally, corruption at the local and provincial levels has been                                                  
241   Barnett R. Rubin and Omar Zakhilwal, “A War on Drugs, Or a War on Farmers?,” Wall Street 
Journal, 11 January 2005, Eastern Edition. 
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cited as a major problem by the State Department’s 2005 INCSR.  This may be explained 
by the traditional use of corruption by qawm to keep the government out of its affairs, or 
it may also be a systematized corruption in which the local and provincial leaders are 
directly shaping the Governor-led eradication to achieve market stabilization, not supply 
reduction.  So the three concerns raised by traffickers, (1) that they have captured the 
loyalty of part of the population, (2) that they may be approaching limited cartelization, 
and (3) that they may have captured part of the local and provincial government 
institutions, all add to the general concern that traffickers establish the demand side of the 
market which induces cultivation in the first place.  The solution to all of these problems 
is an aggressive campaign against the trafficking side of the opiate economy.  Focusing 
on taking down the trafficking side of the opiate economy reduces demand for future 
cultivation, ultimately breaks the known and potential links traffickers (may) use to 
harness at least some rural qawm, will challenge the formation of a true cartel situation 
which could direct a more coordinated anti-government campaign, and breaks the ties 
with corrupted officials who would also be prosecuted.  None of these achievements 
would be garnered by a focus on the cultivation side of the economy, which to date has 
been the overwhelming priority of U.S. State Department policy, and to a much greater 












V. COUNTER-NARCOTICS POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
AND AREAS FOR ADDITIONAL STUDY 
The major chapters of this thesis have developed concepts and lessons applicable 
to counter-narcotics policy in Afghanistan by analyzing (1) the relevant cultural and 
historic aspects of Afghan society; (2) the development and extent of the cultivation and 
trafficking portions of the Afghan opiate economy; and (3) the evolution of the counter-
narcotics policies pursued by the post-Taliban Afghan government in all its forms, by the 
United Kingdom as lead nation for counter-narcotics, and by the various departments of 
the United States Government who shape and implement counter-narcotics efforts in 
Afghanistan.  The following paragraphs will summarize those lessons and concepts, and 
lead to a new counter-narcotics policy prescription based on those lessons.  Finally, some 
issues which need to be addressed and studied in future assessments are raised. 
A. SIGNIFICANT CONCEPTS AND LESSONS FROM AFGHAN CULTURE, 
THE OPIATE ECONOMY, AND COUNTER-NARCOTICS POLICY 
1. Lessons and Concepts from Afghan Culture 
There are several cultural and historic factors particular to Afghanistan which 
must be taken into account in developing counter-narcotics policy for that country.  First 
is that individual identity and motivation for action is oriented to the qawm social unit, 
especially in rural and agricultural areas.  Qawm at their most basic level of organization 
are highly village-centric, although some villages have several qawm, and there is some 
shared identity with closely related neighboring qawm which extends into tribal 
affiliations.  Leadership within qawm, embodied in the position of khan, is typically 
established through a competition for earning loyalty based on patronage and 
redistribution of qawm-produced assets.  This egalitarian political-economic model 
provides tremendous social resiliency in rural Afghanistan given its sparse resources, but 
historically has made the rural power structures difficult for the central government to 
engage, and now relatively easy for opiate trafficking networks to capture by providing 
economic resources from outside the qawm economic product to influence who becomes 
khan.  Fixed hierarchical structures above the qawm typically do not exist, but developed 
within the tribes of the Durrani Pashtun confederation based on their historic relationship 
with and dominance within the central government.  All qawm strive to keep government 
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interference out of the local qawm affairs; the Pashtun see its purpose as governing 
conquered non-Pashtun lands, and non-Pashtuns see it as an external imposition to be 
ignored or rejected.  Keeping the government out of qawm affairs often involves bribes 
and corruption, which are seen as a legitimate cost of maintaining autonomy.  Qawm also 
see the government as a source to extract wealth and influence from in order to advance 
qawm interests.  This exclusion-extraction model does not build a reciprocal rural-state 
relationship, and government jurisdiction is often not recognized.  Enforcement of poppy 
cultivation bans, without the consent of the qawm, can result in violent confrontation.  
This is especially true in Pashtun areas where the pashtunwali ethic demands protection 
of the qawm’s namus, or wealth, land and women.  Eradication can be seen to attack the 
first two, and searches of homes will be seen as an attack on the third.  In this manner, the 
opiate economy exacerbates historic rural-state tensions.  These tensions have historically 
remained below the violence threshold based on three factors.  First, the Afghan central 
government’s status as a rentier state allowed the government to not extract significant 
resources from the rural qawm, or enforce excessive impositions on them.  Second, the 
qawm-centric orientation of society allowed the central government to use political-
economic mechanisms to fragment opposition into either manageable or ineffective 
resistance groups.  Third, the government pursued social change only at very slow rates.  
Attempts to impose rapid social change on rural qawm produced the two violent coups 
against Afghan governments in the 20th century, the second being against the communist 
Khalq faction in 1978.  Rapid restructuring of the rural economy using eradication to 
attack rural qawm farming communities who engage in opium poppy cultivation risks 
precisely this generalized backlash.   The rural rebellion in 1978 initiated with resistance 
mounted by traditional lashkar militias, which are drawn from and protect the qawm in a 
manner highly similar to the minuteman model of the early American Revolution.  These 
disparate qawm militias were united in purpose through Islam in jihad, initially against 
the Afghan communists and then against the Soviet occupation.  The Soviets devastated 
the rural agriculture and economic structures which supported the lashkars.   Aggressive 
eradication, particularly aerial eradication, will evoke memories of the helicopter-based 
Soviet destruction of the rural agricultural sector.  Following destruction of the rural 
economic base, the armed resistance was entirely dependent on non-qawm economic, 
147 
military and agriculture/food resources.  The massive external funding of the mujahidin 
resistance transformed certain aspects of the rural society in fundamental ways.  First, aid 
was distributed by the Pakistani ISI to major resistance groups which formed along ethnic 
lines.  This accelerated the crystallization of ethnic identity (a competitor to qawm 
identity) within rural Afghan society, which may have long-term implications for the 
Afghan government’s ability to fragment resistance groups into manageable units, 
especially if political choice becomes highly correlated with ethnic identity.  There is 
now strong evidence that this is happening.  In addition to ethnic crystallization, the 
external funding of mujahidin groups created a new social unit—the non-traditional 
commander (typically termed warlord) and his non-qawm funded military, which now 
may number in the low thousands compared to qawm lashkars which may number in the 
few dozen.  These non-traditional fighting groups were sustained primarily by 
internationally funded finance streams up until the Soviet withdrawal.  Thereafter, several 
non-traditional commanders maintained their illicit armies through the opiate economy 
and tariff-evading smuggling of licit goods into Pakistan.  What was created through the 
international funding of the mujahidin, and is now sustained through illicit international 
funding streams, is a rural branch of a rentier economic model for groups opposed to the 
central government.  In this manner, a bifurcated rentier state has developed and exists in 
Afghanistan, with licit international support going to the Afghan central government, and 
illicit funding streams going to non-traditional armed groups who both by their nature 
and by their politics are staunchly opposed to a strong centralized government.  This 
bifurcated economic model, with funding in the range of $600 million per year, forced 
the Soviets to reach the decision to withdraw by 1987.  In 2004, the trafficking of opiates 
from Afghanistan to the border regions of neighboring countries, i.e. the value estimated 
to be available to anti-government interests within Afghanistan, was estimated to be 
worth $2.2 billion.  A cultural and historic analysis of issues relevant to the opiate 
economy tells us that the Coalition in Afghanistan, whose goal is to stabilize the Afghan 
central government, is fighting a war of economies.  The traffickers will try to drown 
interdiction through sufficient increased cultivation and production, and strangle the 
government through corruption and electing narco-sympathetic politicians to office.  The 
government must try to drown the impact of opium money with rural investment and 
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economic alternatives, and strangle the opiate economy through trafficking interdiction 
and reduced cultivation.  It is also a battle for the hearts and minds of the rural Afghan 
populace who historically do not like the central government, and have been hard for the 
government to engage.  Attempts at rapid rural social re-engineering have resulted in 
successful anti-government jihads, and attacking the economic underpinning of a qawm, 
which is a political-economic entity, through an aggressive eradication campaign 
amounts to rapid social re-engineering.  In the Coalition’s favor, however is information 
derived from polls taken during and just before Afghan Presidential election, which show 
that the rural populace strongly despises the non-traditional commanders.  They want the 
government to confront these illicit organizations, who are also trying to impose their 
priorities on rural qawm and who can manipulate inherent characteristics of the qawm to 
gain undue control over them.  There is nothing in the cultural or historic background 
which precludes success in a counter-narcotics campaign designed to stabilize the central 
government and remove mortal threats to it, but there are plenty of pitfalls and landmines 
waiting to derail a careless effort to do so. 
2. Lessons and Concepts from the Opiate Economy 
The opiate economy was analyzed in terms of its two halves, cultivation and 
trafficking.  Cultivation tends to be tied much more directly to local qawms, and 
trafficking in general supports the non-qawm, non-traditional armed factions, although 
much of the trucking industry in Afghanistan and the bordering Pashtun areas of Pakistan 
are controlled by Pashtun tribal groups which are traditional and qawm-based units of 
social organization.  Data used for analysis was taken from various UNODC annual and 
occasional reports because of their established track record, their access to a variety of 
information streams, and their openly and extensively documented methodology which 
offered valuable opportunities to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the data 
they present. 
Five particular lessons were extracted from analyzing the cultivation side of the 
opiate economy.  First, the aggregate area of cultivation has increased drastically since 
the mid-1990’s; in 1997, 58,000 hectares were cultivated as compared to 131,000 
hectares in 2004, with sharp increases experienced in 1999 and 2004.  Second, cultivation 
expanded from just 18 provinces in 1999 to all 32 provinces in 2004, the first time that 
149 
had occurred.242  The bulk of cultivation is still conducted in provinces where it is deeply 
entrenched in the rural economic fabric; the top three producing provinces, Hilmand 
(mostly Pashtun), Nangarhar (mostly Pashtun), and Badakshan (mostly Tajik) account for 
56 percent of total cultivation area, with the next three largest producing provinces 
raising the total to 72 percent of the whole.  The remaining 26 provinces account for only 
28 percent of the cultivation area.  In terms of social participation, across Afghanistan 14 
percent of the rural population depends on income from poppy cultivation.  In poppy-
cultivating villages, on average one in three families participate, but this skyrockets to 80 
percent participation in areas where cultivation is deeply entrenched, such as Nangarhar.  
These cultivation and participation patters should guide our policy application; we should 
aggressively try to roll back the cultivation which has recently taken root and is not 
deeply entrenched in the 26 small-cultivation provinces—this will serve to limit the 
spread and entrenchment of trafficking networks in those areas, keep the electoral politics 
in those provinces free of opiate money, keep the local licit economies from being 
skewed by illicit funding sources, and foreclose the opportunity for cultivation area to 
bulge in those areas as it is squeezed in the historically high-cultivation areas.  The third 
cultivation lesson is that where opium poppy is cultivated, many individual farmers are 
trapped into production due to the institution of salaam lending—this is where farmers 
are given cash (often by traffickers who have it) and must repay loans in opium gum.  
This system exists in large part because access to rural credit and banking sources is very 
limited.  Fourth, poppy cultivation has severely impacted Afghanistan’s ability to feed 
itself.  In 2004, farmers reduced the area dedicated to cereal cultivation by 600,000 
hectares.  This occurred for two reasons.  One, poppy cultivation is highly labor 
intensive; farmers reported in 2003 that they had difficulty harvesting licit crops such as 
wheat because labor had been absorbed by the opium poppy harvesting process.  In 2004, 
they anticipated further labor shortages and decided to reduce cereal production. Next, 
the reduced-cereal decision was further motivated by anticipated larger profits from 
opium poppy cultivation based on the compared commodity prices and production costs 
of poppy and cereals.  Drought in 2004 reduced the per-hectare productivity of both 
cereal and poppy cultivation, which resulted in lower-than-expected profit from poppy.                                                   
242   The UNODC used the provincial boundaries present at the beginning of the year, when the 
UNODC started their analysis—subsequently, two provinces were subdivided, creating 34 total. 
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For cereals, the combined effects of reduced production and reduced cultivation area 
resulted in Afghanistan meeting only 66 percent of its cereal needs in 2004, as compared 
to meeting 97 percent of needs in 2003.  As a result, international aid had to be diverted 
to meet short-term caloric needs instead of building long-term infrastructure 
improvements, and food aid which is dumped into the qawm political-economic structure 
can influence future agricultural decisions of the qawm as well as perturb the political-
economic balance of the competition to be khan if it is not distributed correctly.   The 
final lesson from the cultivation side of the opiate economy is that only about $600 
million of the estimated $2.8 billion value of the whole opiate economy goes to 
cultivators.  Most of that money is consumed in production costs.  Due to qawm 
redistribution practices and expectations of the qawm members, most of the remaining 
funds are spent on qawm needs.  Some is likely spent on corrupting local and perhaps 
provincial officials; this should be a central concern to the extent that cultivation earnings 
are present in every province, and having a majority of narco-sympathetic elected 
officials would be devastating to the democratic formation of Afghanistan.  However, 
virtually none of the money is available to fund large-scale, organized anti-government 
interests—the money is spent at the most fragmented level of Afghan society and poses 
little threat to central governance.  Overall policy lessons are that we should pursue a roll-
back strategy and take note that the cultivators do not contribute significant funds to the 
anti-government non-traditional militias.  Targeting the high-cultivation areas with 
eradication programs does not confront the most critical threats posed by the cultivation 
side of the opiate economy (a majority of corrupt elected officials) or the most critical 
threat of the overall opiate economy (the funding of anti-government non-traditional 
commanders and their militarized groups). 
For the trafficking side of the opiate economy, five lessons are developed.  First, 
the data available produce an aggregate picture that has far less certainty in it than the 
understanding of the cultivation side of the economy.  This is in large part due to 
assumptions as to when opium gum is trafficked and therefore what price level pertains, 
as prices vary significantly through the year.  Additionally, we do not know how much 
product is trafficked immediately and how much is stockpiled through the year and from 
year to year; for a lack of data, the assumption is that it is all trafficked in order to 
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determine the overall market value of any one year’s product.243  Next, we do not have 
strong data on how much product goes through each trafficking route, and therefore 
questions arise as to which set of regionalized price structures should be applied.  In 
terms of producing a final hard number for market valuation, we cannot be sure our final 
number is a precise estimate.  The second lesson, however, is that we know that the 
overall opiate economy value is huge, that it has been rising from year to year, that the 
trafficker’s share of the opiate economy is much larger than the cultivator’s share, and 
that the trafficker’s share is growing to take a larger cut of the overall opiate economy.  
Third, we know that the price structures which traffickers encounter leave a large profit 
margin, especially when the opium gum is refined into morphine base and particularly 
heroin before it is trafficked across the border.  This profit margin means that product 
which is not interdicted provides a large source of funding to anti-government interests—
the trafficking side of the opiate economy contributes far more to non-traditional 
commanders and their illegal militarized organizations than the cultivation side of the 
opiate economy.  Processing facilities can be targeted, and this greatly impacts the profit 
margin of trafficked product.  The second and third lessons further emphasize the need to 
confront the trafficking side of the opiate economy.  Fourth, we know that trafficking 
functions as the demand side of a commodity market within Afghanistan, and this should 
shape our policy considerations.  If we strangle the demand side of a market, lower 
production will eventually follow just by market forces alone.  Conversely, attacking the 
supply side of a market without proportionately decreasing the demand side will produce 
price increases in the commodity and motivate increased future production.  Here we find 
another supporting argument to attack the trafficking side of the opiate economy instead 
of focusing the majority of our efforts on cultivation.  The fifth and final lesson from 
trafficking price structures and practices are segmented by geographic area across the 
country, and these geographic breakdowns mirror the predominant ethnic divisions 
within Afghan society.  This is typical of trading and smuggling operations world-wide, 
as trust relationships developed through ethnic connections facilitate licit and illicit  
 
                                                 
243  Opium gum has a long shelf life, and is used as a means to store value as there is not a rural 
banking system to accomplish this vital economic function.  Also, traffickers want to time their sales to 
maximize profit; higher expected profits in future years will also motivate long-term holding. 
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activity.  The regional price structures clearly indicate that the opiate economy as a whole 
is not cartelized, although that is less clear within each of the primary ethnically-based 
trafficking routes.   
3. Lessons and Concepts from Counter-Narcotics Policy 
Lessons derived from policy analysis identified constraints to counter-narcotic 
policy imposed by the broader policy environment, as well as productive and counter-
productive policy evolution on behalf of the major contributors to counter-narcotics 
policy in Afghanistan:  the Afghan government in its several forms, the United Kingdom 
as lead nation for counter-narcotics, and the departments of the United States 
Government who shape and implement counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan.   
There are several constraints to counter-narcotics policy which are resident in the 
broader policy environment.   First, there is the unnecessary distinction of counter-terror 
vs. counter-narcotics priorities—the true priority is stabilizing the Afghan government.  
The conceptual framework of the division has been used with great effect by the U.S. 
Defense Department to initially avoid the counter-narcotics issue, and more recently to 
justify indirect support to counter-narcotics efforts instead of directly confronting the 
issue.  Second, the existence of the bifurcated rentier economy which is similar to what 
funded the successful anti-Soviet jihad is not openly acknowledged or discussed, and it is 
clear that the trafficking portion of the opiate economy has become the substitute to 
funding non-traditional commanders and their illegal armies.  It also has the capacity to 
produce funding similar to what defeated the Afghan central government and its 
international support during the anti-Soviet jihad.  The issue of non-traditional 
commanders highlights the third complication, which is a lack of cultural specificity in 
the verbiage used to discuss and develop policy—typically these persons are called 
narco-terrorists, warlords or just commanders.  Lashkar or qawm-based resistance to 
eradication and to interdiction-motivated searches of homes is too easily lumped into the 
narco-terrorist warlord category, and this has contributed to counter-productive policy 
applications which drive the rural populace away from trusting the central government.  
Next, the opiate economy underpins the licit economy of Afghanistan; any rush to rapidly 
dismantle this illicit economy risks collapsing the entire Afghan economy.  This is a 
strong argument for a patient long-term approach which avoids the exuberant urgency 
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seen in recent policy developments.  Ethnic crystallization is the fifth complication, and it 
applies to the broader policy environment as well as counter-narcotics policy.  
Specifically for counter-narcotics, it makes the Afghan government’s ability to use non-
confrontational approaches to fragment opposition harder to implement, there is the 
potential for [the perception of] ethnic bias to enter counter-narcotics implementation 
which would further exacerbate the crystallization, and the ethnic nature of trafficking 
may already be reinforcing this propensity towards ethnic division.  Finally, regional 
power brokers may pursue their own policy interests which conflict with Coalition goals, 
and even attempt to harness the opiate economy specifically in their attempts to do so as 
it is a source of plausibly deniable funding which can be a far more cost-effective means 
to achieving their independent goals. 
The evolution of policy for the essential contributors to counter-narcotic related 
activities in Afghanistan can be summarized as follows.  Essentially at the time of the fall 
of the Taliban, the United States, the soon-to-be Afghan Interim Government and 
international community all declared that confronting the Afghan opiate economy would 
be a priority during the re-establishment and reconstitution of the Afghan government 
and economy.  Within the Coalition, the United States was content to delegate the 
leadership for this task to the United Kingdom, and this fit particularly well with the U.S. 
DoD reluctance to get heavily or directly involved in a counter-narcotics effort—beyond 
division of labor, this was further justified through the conceptual and prioritized 
distinction between counter-terror and counter-narcotics activities.  After some initial 
missteps in 2002 involving paying farmers for their eradicated poppy crops, the United 
Kingdom and Afghan authorities began to organize bureaucratic institutions and 
construct a patient, development-oriented approach to displacing the opiate economy 
from the rural social and economic fabric.  By May 2003 the Afghan National Drug 
Control Strategy was published, providing a five-pillar framework for a coordinated and 
multi-faceted counter-narcotics approach.  This was refined at the February 2004 
International Counter-Narcotics Conference in Afghanistan when five action plans were 
developed to coordinate and implement the five pillars of the plan.   
It became clear in 2003 that the opiate economy was expanding, and by the end of 
2003 some members of the U.S. Congress began to pressure the U.S. State Department 
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and Defense Department to take stronger action.  The State Department responded 
sooner, and began in February 2004 to push the United Kingdom and Afghan 
Transitional Authority to accelerate their counter-narcotic activities.  By April 2004, the 
State Department pushed for aggressive centralized eradication versus relying on 
Governor-led eradication, and to de-link the coordinated implementation of Alternative 
Development and Eradication programs, claiming that deterring future cultivation was 
the utmost priority.  The de-emphasis on Governor-led eradication marks a priority of 
eradication over building central government authority over the governors and reciprocal 
relationships between the two levels of government, which indicates a lack of perspective 
for the historic cultural and rentier-state governance dynamics of Afghanistan.  
Prioritizing eradication led the United States to advocate focusing efforts on a few major-
cultivating provinces where establishing central government jurisdiction is much more 
difficult, instead of expanding central government jurisdiction into a much larger number 
of small-cultivating provinces where the environment is more permissive.  Focusing on 
eradication is also an argument for a rapid attack on the supply side of the opium 
commodity market, and the projected outcome (deterrence) is based only on the 
anticipated impact of eradication.  Not accounted were the fact that the licit economy is 
underpinned by the illicit opiate economy, and additional influences on cultivation 
behavior such as opium indebtedness via salaam loans, the lack of viable economic 
alternatives for farmers, the fundamental market dynamic that the demand side of the 
commodity market will go unfulfilled, which leads to higher commodity prices and an 
increases stimulus for future cultivation.  April 2004 also marked the establishment of the 
Central Poppy Eradication Force, at the request of the United States.  During the summer 
of 2004, the Defense Department began to acknowledge that the opiate economy required 
more attention, and by late 2004 began substantial indirect support of counter-narcotics 
activities, including constructing Afghan police facilities, providing training, funding the 
establishment of DEA FAST teams, etc., but it assiduously avoided signing up for direct 
counter-narcotic action.   
By the fall of 2004, the State Department developed a U.S. version of the Five-
Pillar Plan, and it advocated a coordinated counter-narcotics effort which fit well with the 
approach developed by the British and Afghans, and well with the U.S. plan for 
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stabilizing Afghanistan.  Regardless of the philosophical design of the new plan, the State 
Department had achieved a level of exuberant urgency in their calls for drastic 
eradication measures, and this matched increasing pressure from Congress.  The urgency 
resulted in sustained advocacy for aerial eradication from the fall of 2004 to January 
2005, despite categorical opposition by the Afghan Government and, officially, the 
United Kingdom.  Meanwhile, with the publication of the UNODC Afghanistan Opium 
Survey 2004 in November, pressure on the British and Afghans to pursue a much more 
aggressive eradication campaign during the 2005 growing season became irresistible.  
The British decided to implement a much more aggressive, centralized eradication 
program which the United States had been calling for since early in 2004.  This 
eradication program resulted in violent confrontations with rural populaces in southern 
Afghanistan, and overall, the centralized eradication program achieved very little 
eradication.  In the face of the complications and a lack of success, the British were 
compelled by their own recently formed sense of urgency to use Afghan National Army 
troops to eradicate.  By doing so, they stepped outside of the Afghan Interior Ministry—
which was supposed to hold the counter-narcotics authority within the Afghan 
government—and outside the carefully constructed larger bureaucratic system within 
which structured coordination was to have shaped a patient, effective, and intentional 
campaign against the Afghan opiate economy.  That system was embodied in the original 
Afghan Five-Pillar Plan and the subsequent action plans, and significantly improved and 
strengthened in the eight-pillar plan, published by President Karzai in February 2005, 
called the 1384 (2005) Counter-Narcotics Implementation Plan.  In the summer of 2005, 
the U.S. State Department began to reconsider a governor-led eradication program, based 
on the dismal performance of the centralized eradication campaign.  Unfortunately, the 
State Department’s focus remains on achieving deterrence, and the perceived value of 
using the program to build central government authority and reciprocal relationships 
remains unacknowledged.  Consistently since 2002, the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) has pursued interdiction operations against the trafficking portion 
of the opiate economy, and has in the past year significantly increased their operational 
capability, but still has only 24 personnel in country at a time.  The United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) has a very broad development plan for 
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Afghanistan, only a portion of which is directly targeted to advance counter-narcotic 
policy interests.  This is appropriate.  USAID has also followed the State Department lead 
in focusing on high-cultivation areas.  This is also appropriate, in that the USAID task is 
to facilitate growth of alternative economic options for opium farmers, and this task will 
take many years to achieve in high-cultivation areas—they need to focus on those areas 
now.  They must also consider that poppy cultivation needs to be driven out of the low-
cultivation provinces as well, and implement aid programs targeting these regions.  From 
a limited-budget USAID perspective, those regions may perceive that the way to gain 
USAID investment is to become a high-cultivation area, or they may be prompted to 
increase cultivation by traffickers as cultivation is displaced elsewhere.  Using a medical 
analogy, preventive medicine is much less expensive than emergency/trauma 
intervention.   
Two themes are central to the philosophical evolution of counter-narcotics policy 
application by the United States since early 2004, and by the United Kingdom since 
November 2004, and they both run contrary to the philosophical policy development 
trajectories of all parties.  All major contributors to counter-narcotics policy had come to 
accept, on paper, the need for a broadly targeted, multi-faceted and coordinated counter-
narcotics strategy which would produce results over a matter of years and gradually 
target both the trafficking and cultivation sides of the opiate economy.  The United States 
and the United Kingdom each, in their own timeline, adopted positions to conduct 
counter-narcotics operations founded on:  (1) a disproportionate focus on the cultivation 
side of the economy; and (2) on the desire to see a rapid collapse of cultivation.  The 
mechanism to achieve this collapse was purported to be massive eradication, which 
would deter future cultivation.  The policy application occurred through the 2005 
growing season.  Estimates are that cultivation decreased in 2005, although the final 
UNODC numbers will not be published until October or November of 2005.  A central 
question for future counter-narcotics policy development is what actually accounts for 
decreased cultivation in 2005, and what constitutes a productive policy approach to 
reduce future cultivation?  Three approaches apply. 
There is evidence from the UNODC Afghanistan Opium Rapid Assessment 
Survey 2005 which indicates that some farmers were deterred from cultivating in 2005 
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due to a fear of eradication.  This matches statements from officials in the Central 
Eradication Planning Cell (CEPC) which described multiple pre-cultivation visits to 
traditionally high-cultivation areas to threaten eradication.   
Both State Department and CEPC statements indicate that credibility is essential 
to sustaining deterrence, and the State Department’s apparent standard based on 2004 
statements is that eradicating roughly 23 percent of the crop across the country is 
sufficient to establish credibility and deter future growth.  In 2005, the Central Poppy 
Eradication Force eradicated just 216 hectares, or an area equal to .165 percent of the 
2004 cultivation area of 131,000 hectares, using UNODC estimates.  Credibility was not 
established according to the standards of those who advocate deterrence as a means to 
reduce cultivation.  Without resorting to extreme actions such as aerial eradication, it is 
difficult to see how credibility can be established.  Even if it could be achieved, the 
counter-productive impacts of focusing on the cultivation side of the opiate economy are 
simply ignored by this approach, as its sole focus is to rapidly collapse the supply side of 
the market. 
The second means to reduce cultivation is for the central government to engage in 
a reciprocal relationship with the rural qawm and the district and provincial leaders.  In 
exchange for central government jurisdiction and compliance with the constitutional ban 
on narcotics production and trafficking, qawm and the district and provincial leaders 
would earn access to Alternative Livelihood and other development projects funded by 
the USAID, the United Kingdom, and other international donors.  In terms of actually 
inducing compliance with the ban on cultivation, the case study of Nangarhar province (a 
major poppy cultivating province) provided evidence that that this reciprocal relationship 
was the motivation for substantially reducing cultivation in that province for 2005.  This 
evidence is based on statements by the Governor and Deputy Governor stating this is why 
cultivation decreased; additionally the reciprocal relationship concept was strongly 
supported by tribal elders.  It is possible that these statements are not wholly genuine:  
another explanation might be that is the traditional extractive approach qawm and their 
leaders have taken with the central government.  This does not destroy the value of the 
Alternative Livelihood and infrastructure development programs however, as they are 
essential to creating the economic conditions necessary to substitute licit economic 
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product for what is currently produced by the opiate economy, and they are a means of 
exercising central government authority over the rural formal and informal power 
structures.  This interactive exercise of authority will build its own legitimacy in time, 
and that has value even if in the near term this interaction does not fully explain or 
motivate decreases in opium poppy cultivation.   
The third mechanism to explain and achieve reduced cultivation is the market.  
Opium is a commodity, and if demand for the product goes down, then ultimately so will 
supply.  Demand can fall through two means; one, that traffickers require less product, 
and two, traffickers leave (or are removed from) the market.  On the first means, we 
know that opium gum has a shelf life of many years at least, and that it has been used to 
store value in rural Afghanistan since there is no rural banking system.  If persons who 
stockpile anticipate a glut in the market based on excess production and/or sales of 
stockpiled opium gum, they would have an interest in seeing production go down, at least 
for a year or perhaps two, until stockpiles are reduced.  Research in Nangarhar indicates 
poor farmers sold all of their opium gum harvest, more affluent farmers stockpiled a third 
of their 2003 harvest and half of the 2004 harvest, and mid-level traders were holding 
about 80 percent of the 2004 harvest for future sale.  In early 2005, it was known that 
cultivation was decreasing by perhaps 20 – 30 percent, yet prices for opium gum 
remained comparable to 2004 prices for the same period.  This indicates demand 
decreased along with an expected decrease in supply.  This could occur through 
uncoordinated market forces, or more ominously it could have resulted from coordinated 
action on behalf of traffickers.  We know of the salaam loan system where traders and 
traffickers control farmer behavior directly.  We also know that the qawm political-
economic model is susceptible to being hijacked by non-qawm economic product to 
influence the competition for who becomes khan; traffickers have the motive and 
opportunity to essentially enslave and control qawm production.  When we consider that 
we are trying to establish a new relationship between the central government and the rural 
society, this is a major problem which must be confronted.  Every facet of the market-
based explanation for achieving reduced cultivation indicates that the most productive 
means to do so is to aggressively attack the trafficking side of the opiate economy.  This 
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is the same indication arrived at by analyzing other areas of concern to our counter-
narcotics policy. 
B. COUNTER-NARCOTICS POLICY PRESCRIPTION 
The next several paragraphs will outline the overall policy approach we should 
take to confront the opiate economy in Afghanistan, followed by specific 
recommendations for confronting cultivation, those for confronting trafficking, and 
finally some additional considerations for the future.  The recommendations are primarily 
for shaping U.S. policy initiatives, but are also intended to help guide U.S. influence 
towards our Coalition partners on this policy concern. 
1. The Broad Policy Framework for Counter-Narcotics 
The United States should return to a patient, coordinated and comprehensive 
approach which builds on the philosophy, bureaucratic coordinating mechanisms, and 
enforcement mechanisms established in the 1384 (2005) Counter-Narcotics Strategy of 
Afghanistan.  This approach is present in the U.S. Five Pillar Plan, and it is entirely 
consistent with and reinforces every aspect of stabilizing the central government.  
Patience is necessary, as the licit Afghan economy is underpinned by the opiate economy; 
economic development must occur concurrently with dismantling the opiate economy, 
and this will take time and investment. 
The United States should guard against the exuberant urgency for quick results.  
This bears repeating, as the United States simultaneously developed comprehensive-
approach Five-Pillar plan and ignored its principles in advocating an overly aggressive 
eradication effort—this produced a violent rural backlash and insignificant eradication.  
Entirely abandon any support for aerial eradication.  The fundamental error committed in 
U.S. policy is that it focused narrowly on “the chosen path” to confront (a portion of) the 
opiate economy, and lost sight of the goal of stabilizing the central government. 
The United States should acknowledge the bifurcated rentier economy and 
understand the implication of its anti-Soviet jihad roots.  We cannot ignore the fact that 
the opiate economy functions as a rural branch of a bifurcated rentier economy, funding 
organized anti-government interests who compete for control over portions of the rural 
populace.  This economic model is a continuation of the model used to fund the 
successful anti-Soviet mujahidin, even funding the same non-traditional commanders, but 
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now using illicit funding sources which are likely able to achieve similar funding levels.  
This is justification to abandon the artificial counter-terror vs. counter-narcotics 
paradigm. 
The United States should advocate a roll-back strategy to eliminate cultivation 
from all of the minor-cultivation provinces first.  This is a 180 degree change from our 
current approach which prioritizes the major-cultivation provinces.  With provincial and 
district elections being held in September 2005 and in the spring of 2006, the rural anti-
government interests funded by the opiate economy have direct access to infiltrating and 
fundamentally corrupting the government through many offices.   This strategy is 
feasible—in at least 26 of now 34 provinces opium cultivation is fairly new and not 
deeply entrenched in the rural social and economic fabric.  Eliminating the cultivation 
now will be less costly than waiting for it to increase in those areas.  As cultivation 
decreases in the major-cultivation provinces via Alternative Livelihood investment and 
other elements of the 1384 Plan, traffickers will be looking for alternative cultivation 
areas to provide opium; the first place they will look will be to ethnically similar low-
cultivation areas in Afghanistan. 
2. Confronting the Cultivation Side of the Opiate Economy 
The United States should commit itself to the Governor-led eradication strategy, 
and value it for what it is really worth.  Historically the Afghan central government has 
been relegated to the periphery of society.  Having the central government exercise 
authority over provincial governors, demanding accountability and building reciprocal 
relationships is an essential element to reversing the traditional view of the central 
government.  Prioritize using the central government’s Rapid Reaction Eradication Force 
in the minor-cultivation provinces where Governor-led eradication fails to support the 
roll-back strategy. 
The United States should support using Alternative Livelihood investment and 
other development programs to establish reciprocal relationships between the central 
government and the provincial, district, and qawm power structures.  The first desire is to 
inspire voluntary non-cultivation.  The second is to establish an environment where 
Governor-led, and where necessary Rapid Reaction Eradication Force, eradication 
activity is more likely to be viewed as legitimate by the local qawm.  We cannot 
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fundamentally redirect Alternative Livelihood investment over to the roll-back strategy; 
developing licit economic capacity in major-cultivation areas will take years, and much 
has been promised in some major-cultivation areas—the central government must carry 
through on these promises to maintain any credibility.  Additional funding or careful 
redirection of funds will be needed to assist with the roll-back strategy.  Significant 
development is needed in areas of rural credit and banking to displace salaam lending 
and opium gum stockpiling to store wealth.  Some USAID investment is going to these 
needs, and those programs must be carefully watched to determine if they are sufficient. 
We must remember we are dealing with market dynamics.  As the roll-back 
strategy progresses, seeing cultivation increase slightly in major-cultivation areas as it is 
rolled back in minor-cultivation areas, while not desirable, is not necessarily a bad sign.  
Essentially this promotes a containment strategy:  as trafficking interests meet demand in 
just a few provinces, the central government can consolidate its strength and firmly 
establish jurisdiction over a greater portion of the Afghan territory.  Ethnically-based 
trafficking networks are less likely to expend great energy or resources fighting to 
maintain access to cultivation in rolled-back areas if they can fulfill demand through 
other ethnically related cultivating communities.  Over time the increasing strength of the 
central government can be directed against an ever-smaller and contained cultivation and 
trafficking base. 
Where eradication occurs, it should prioritize clearing irrigated fields, and 
preferably early enough in the growing season to allow farmers to replant the fields with 
cereal crops.  In these cases, some effort should be dedicated to ensuring farmers have 
market access to purchase cereal crop seed (and micro-credit, if needed) to ensure the 
field is used productively.  Interior Ministry interactions with the District Development 
Councils may be a productive mechanism to ensure this; otherwise the USAID 
interaction with the 8600 Community Development Councils may be used. 
The USAID promotes alternative crops, including providing large amounts of 
seed.  These market interventions must be monitored to ensure that assisted crops are not 
overproduced, leading to low farmgate prices.  The USAID should have an emergency 
fund to buy up overproduction of assisted crops to stabilize market prices, and then adjust 
162 
crop assistance levels in future years accordingly.  This is an essential aspect of 
confronting poppy cultivation, because our efforts to establish licit alternatives must be 
economically viable, otherwise farmers will return to illicit crops. 
2. Confronting the Trafficking Side of the Opiate Economy 
The United States should advocate prioritizing efforts to dismantle the trafficking 
portion of the opiate economy.  Interdiction should receive far more investment than it 
does currently.  Rapid air mobility is currently a significant operational constraint, and 
every effort should be made to remove this obstacle now.  This includes purchasing more 
helicopters (and training) for the Afghans to operate themselves, and greatly increased 
Defense Department support for these operations.  This must be a Defense Department 
priority in Afghanistan. 
Parts of the anti-trafficking effort should be directed to support the roll-back 
strategy.  These are using Afghan law enforcement capabilities to prosecute corrupt 
officials, investigate and arrest local traffickers, and interdict bazaars where opiates are 
sold.  Care must be taken to minimize needlessly violating qawm mores, e.g. 
pashtunwali.  Fortunately, the fact that participation in opiate activity is much lower in 
these areas does leave more room for “accidents” to not precipitate massive revolts—
these areas are an ideal training ground for new police units to learn to be effective in all 
respects.  Law enforcement should also be used to take down any processing labs found 
in minor-production areas to maximize the evidentiary value of these sites and any 
associated arrests in order to develop leads which help to expunge trafficking network 
connections from minor-cultivation provinces.  Using market principles, if there is 
essentially no local demand for opium gum, farmers will be much less likely to cultivate.  
This should be accompanied by an aggressive public information campaign in these areas 
emphasizing harsh penalties for traffickers and the reciprocal relationship expected to 
accompany local Alternative Livelihood and other development programs. 
Parts of the anti-trafficking effort should be directed to country-wide interdiction.  
These include the Border Police and Highway Police.  Afghan Counter-Narcotics Police, 
Afghan National Interdiction Unit, DEA FAST team and Afghan Special Narcotics Force 
interdiction capacity not exhausted in the roll-back campaign should focus on processing 
facilities in major-cultivation provinces and major trafficking movements such as the 
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heavily-armed 60-truck convoys described in Congressional testimony by DEA Director 
of Operations Michael Braun.  The Highway Police should assist in these convoy 
interdictions, and the Defense Department should consider providing training and 
equipment to confront armed convoys.  Focusing on these trafficking targets significantly 
degrades profitability, and moves many interdiction operations away from the village-
qawm locale, which greatly reduces the likelihood of violating pashtunwali or other 
qawm mores and inciting wide-spread revolt.   
Since much of the trucking industry in Afghanistan is consolidated within Pashtun 
tribes along the Pakistan border, interdicting their trucks which are carrying opiates 
unavoidably risks offending pashtunwali.  We might borrow a Durrani governance 
technique and attempt to fragment that tribal industry along the lines of qawm who 
abstain from smuggling opiates and those who participate in the illicit activity.  
Extending contractual and tax-based favor to non-participating tribal groups, publicly 
heralding the honor they gain from living up to their agreements, etc. may be productive.  
Tax and customs breaks should also be allowed for licit goods moved on trucks owned 
and operated by compliant tribal trucking concerns, which would provide a huge market 
incentive as the licit portion of the Afghan economy grows.  As in all counter-narcotics 
policy areas, this must be coordinated and approved by the Afghan central government, 
but particularly in this area we should ask for guidance. 
An addition to country-wide interdiction is worth considering; that is using 
airborne military platforms to destroy processing facilities.  The military justification for 
these attacks is that the trafficking portion of the opiate economy funds organized non-
traditional militarized groups which are a fundamental threat to the Afghan central 
government.  Currently, there is not enough law enforcement interdiction capability to 
interdict all of these labs, or courts to try all of the traffickers which could be arrested.  
Processing facilities have distinct heat signatures and can be observed using airborne 
surveillance assets.  Especially if this effort is combined with Special Operations Forces 
observer teams, there is a very high capacity to interdict with a low chance of hitting 
innocent civilians.  Areas where military targeting can occur should be coordinated with 
law enforcement to maximize interdiction effectiveness and to avoid destroying sites 
which may have exceptional evidentiary value.  In areas where these operations are to 
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occur, we should consider a public information campaign, conducted for several months 
before commencement, to warn local villagers that processing facilities will be targeted.  
Mobile processing facilities have been observed, which makes law-enforcement 
interdiction even harder.  This is not a problem when they are discovered as military 
targets of opportunity.   
4. Additional Considerations and a Look Ahead 
Several gaps in the available data must be addressed.  The United States should 
strongly encourage the UNODC to resume collecting tribal and ethnic information about 
poppy-cultivating villages.  This information will be invaluable to the roll-back strategy, 
as trafficking networks extend through ethnic connections.  If in a minor-cultivating 
province there are multiple ethnic groups cultivating, and all but one or two ethnically 
related qawm are convinced to cease cultivating, those few qawm may be enough to keep 
trafficking connections alive in that area within that ethnic group.  Extinguishing 
cultivation in all of the last few ethnically related qawm simultaneously will offer a better 
chance at roll-back success.   
Data on stockpiling must be improved.  The UNODC should undertake collecting 
information on stockpiling practices of farmers and where possible bazaar traders and 
traffickers.  Wealthy farmers who sell off much of their stockpile may be a bellwether 
indicator for the market.  This information is essential to estimating the true value of the 
opiate economy, and falling stockpile levels indicate we should anticipate market forces 
prompting increased cultivation. 
Data on trafficking must be improved.  Likely, much of the trafficking data is 
available in the law enforcement community.  To the maximum extent possible, 
especially in the context of Afghanistan where numerous organizations outside of the law 
enforcement community are involved in counter-narcotics policy development, law 
enforcement data which is being protected to preserve its evidentiary usefulness should 
be regularly and frequently generalized and made available to the policy community.  
Elements of the Afghan Interior Ministry and Coalition counter-narcotics agencies should 
make this data available to the UNODC for inclusion in their annual assessment.   
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The United States and Coalition need to look at future cultivation, and consider 
how to interpret its meaning as it develops.  In 1997, Afghan poppy cultivation was 
58,000 hectares.  1998 cultivation increased 10 percent to 64,000 ha, followed by a 42 
percent increase in 1999.  Cultivation voluntarily dropped by 10 percent in 2000, and was 
followed by the “ban” on cultivation, but not trafficking, imposed by the Taliban in 2001.  
Many analysts believe this was an engineered market correction to advance profiteering 
interests, but the result was a sell-off of excess stockpile.   By 2002, cultivation was 
74,000 ha, followed by an 8 percent increase in 2003 to 80,000 ha, and then by a 64 
percent increase in 2004.  Currently, there is an expectation that cultivation has fallen by 
20 to 30 percent in 2005.  Even if this is followed by a continued decline in 2006 
cultivation, we should not declare that we have turned the corner on defeating the Afghan 
opiate economy.  What this likely indicates is that stockpiles are being cleared out, which 
is not the same as success.  It is, however, a fantastic opportunity.  In the ‘strangle and 
drown’ analogy of the fight against the opiate economy, the point in time when stockpiles 
have been reduced is equivalent to seeing the enemy exhale.  We must prepare for that 
moment as it is the time to engage in an effective and dedicated trafficking strangulation 
campaign to finally kill this illicit economy.  There will be powerful market forces from 
outside Afghanistan for Afghan opiates to keep moving—traffickers will not have the 
luxury of bedding down and riding out the interdiction onslaught.  Strangulation is not a 
quick end however, and we must be committed to the fight for many more years and be 
willing to not let up.  Preparing for that opportunity now is essential, and we are building 
the foundational interdiction capacity to achieve this victory, but much more work 
remains. 
Law enforcement must develop so as to share information across all of 
Afghanistan; although the market is currently fragmented, as transportation infrastructure 
such as the Ring Road and its branches are developed, intra-Afghanistan trade volumes 
will increase, and with it trafficking of illicit goods will “hide” in the legitimate flows.  
Law enforcement must be prepared to pick up on this development and thwart it 
immediately.  A robust information sharing program is also required in that even though 
ethnicities are concentrated in various regions, there are minority ethnic enclaves almost 
throughout Afghanistan.  Just as itinerant workers move throughout the country spreading 
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their newfound opium poppy cultivating skills, they and others will continue to move 
across regions and some will spread criminal knowledge, techniques, etc.  Information 
sharing and law enforcement coordination should also extend to neighboring countries, 
and the organizational infrastructure to do so already exists, at least to some degree, in 
the form of the Economic Cooperation Organization.  This is a regional trading block 
anchored by Iran, but membership extends from Turkey, through Iran to Pakistan, and 
north through Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan.  Essentially, it 
covers all of the current opiate trafficking routes out of Afghanistan, and it already is 
highly focused on the problems of narcotics trafficking.  International support should be 
(and is) directed at improving ECO law enforcement coordination capacity.  Building up 
Afghanistan’s domestic law enforcement ability will fill in a critical piece of the puzzle in 
the ECO combined ability to confront narcotics trafficking. 
Finally, as was discussed earlier at great length, we do not know enough of the 
detailed workings of the business models used to move and exchange opiates.  These 
networks must be infiltrated, shipments must be tracked, and business relationships 
mapped.  Whether this is accomplished using Afghan law enforcement investigators 
trained specifically for this purpose or through rolling over existing traffickers to work as 
moles, or through other government agency expertise provided by the United States or 
other Enduring Freedom Coalition partners.  Understanding the functioning business 
models is critical if we are to intercept shipments and take down established networks.   
These efforts must begin or be accelerated as soon as possible, and where law 
enforcement does not have the capacity to address the situation, Enduring Freedom 
Coalition forces, working along side Afghan government forces when possible, must take 
on these actions as military operations, using military standards of conduct.  With 
permission of the Afghan government, traffickers should be engaged as military targets, 
allowing air and ground strikes against processing facilities and movements in progress.  
Seizures of mobile capital such as trucks should be equated to disarming hostile forces.  
Storage facilities should be gutted of their illegal contraband, equipment therein should 
be destroyed, and the physical property turned over to the control of local leaders, with 
the admonition that the facility has been documented as a trafficking location, and 
subsequent inspections will be made.  If it is found to be used for illicit operations, it will 
167 
be destroyed.  Persons seized as traffickers will be turned over to Afghan military 
tribunals for prosecution, and maximum penalties should be limited to incarceration 
and/or fines.   
Although many would shun taking on the responsibilities outlined above, it must 
be acknowledged that we have already done so; it is critical to U.S. interests that 
Afghanistan’s central government coalesce to maintain effective governance throughout 
its territory, lest we be faced with a future al Qaeda or equivalent entrenched in a lawless 
land bordering one or more nuclear-armed states.  To undertake a military campaign and 
fail to solve the problem, instead leaving the situation for our children to address again, 
would be morally weak, and could lead to reprehensible consequences. 
C. CONCLUSIONS AND ADDITIONAL AREAS FOR STUDY 
Opiate production and trafficking in Afghanistan is a major problem which 
deserves and is receiving international attention and help.  Addressing this problem 
requires that our long-term goals be kept at the forefront, namely strengthening the 
Afghan central government.  Efforts to bankrupt the opium economy in Afghanistan must 
be guided by the knowledge that, in a country where central governance is a foreign 
concept, attacking a significant portion of the population under the auspices of the central 
government will be severely counterproductive.  This is why our focus should be on 
deflating the profitability of the economy in order that farmers will choose to not 
participate on their own, a decision that they have already demonstrated they can make.  
This requires avoiding eradication campaigns, and instead reserving direct action for the 
trafficking side of the problem.  This is the same model used successfully in Peru to 
disrupt coca cultivation in that country, which was fueling an insurgent movement 
against the government.   
Among many further areas of study, this paper would benefit from incorporating 
lessons learned from other counter-narcotic successes and failures around the world.  
Briefly, one may argue that the Peruvian example, in which the Shining Path insurgency 
was successfully dismantled, is not similar to the Afghan problem in that the real victory 
came through the capture of the Shining Path’s highly charismatic leader Abimael 
Guzman, not through attacking the trafficking networks which provided income to the 
group.  The counter to this argument is the fact that no other anti-government movement 
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emerged in its place; by not attacking the populace, the government did not create its own 
new enemies.  This is the pertinent lesson for Afghanistan. 
Clearly, much more study is needed to understand the real workings of the 
trafficking side of the problem, and this may be available via classified resources.  The 
results of such study would also be classified, but such study may shed light on the 
findings and recommendations of this paper, to either verify their appropriateness or 
indicate that other conclusions in the unclassified realm would actually be more 
appropriate. 
As is acknowledged above, a comprehensive analysis of recent and current policy 
avenues and executed actions needs to be done in order to assess their impact on the 
opiate economy in Afghanistan.   
Unfortunately, since the opiate economy in Afghanistan is such a massive and 
complex problem, there is ample time for continued meaningful research, analysis, and 
commentary as to what are the best courses of action.  Hopefully, within the next decade, 
time for further analysis will run out as the problem is successfully addressed.  It would 
then, of course, be time to start the analysis over again in order to draw applicable lessons 













A. SELECTION OF INFORMATION FOR ANALYSIS 
Chapter III relies on data produced by the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC), which has published the Afghanistan Opium Survey each year since 
1994 (and since 2003, with the Afghan Government’s assistance).  The UNODC uses 
data collection methods ranging from extensive village, farm-field, and drug market 
surveys to satellite imagery.  In 2004 they applied a new method (validated through 
testing since 2000) using on-site poppy plant analysis just before harvest to estimate the 
volume of opium gum being produced.  In addition to the locations and area dedicated to 
cultivation, and the potential volumes produced, the UNODC collects information on the 
cost structures, cultivation practices, and social involvement to produce a somewhat 
complete analysis of the production side of the opium business.  All of the UNODC data, 
the methodology for calculating that data, and their collection methods are unclassified 
and fully open to scrutiny; in fact, the 2004 version of the annual Afghanistan Opium 
Survey provided 30 pages of discussion and examples of how each class of data (area 
under cultivation, yield per hectare, processing efficiency for opium-to-heroin, etc.) are 
calculated.  Additionally, each spring the UNODC publishes its Farmer’s Intentions 
Survey, and in 2003 they produced a comprehensive data analysis titled The Opium 
Economy in Afghanistan, An International Problem. 
An alternative source would be to use U.S. data provided in the International 
Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), and various Drug Enforcement 
Administration documents which are published on an occasional basis.  I chose not to 
rely on this data for four reasons.   
First, the UNODC data provides a much broader range of information than does 
the INCSR, especially in terms of particularly relevant variables, such as the regional 
breakdown of cultivation, price structures, and trafficking patterns.  The INCSR provides 
essentially only country-wide estimates.  Second, the INCSR provides a scant one-page 
summary of its methodology used in data collection and calculation.  It states that 
calculations for cultivation area, derived from satellite imagery, is the most reliable, but 
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the rest of the numbers must be understood to be significantly less certain.  Two primary 
causes for this uncertainty are given.  The first is a common challenge for all scientific 
analysis of crop production, which is variability in annual local weather, soil conditions, 
farming techniques, and crop disease.  The second is that “most illicit drug crop areas are 
not easily accessible to the United States Government”244 for scientific analysis.  The 
UNODC typically has had access to send survey teams throughout Afghanistan (and they 
explicitly note where and when they have not been able to survey) which means they can 
collect data on weather, soil conditions, disease, and farming techniques and apply this to 
the overall calculations.  Through consistent presence, they also have the advantage of 
experience and can refine their methodology, which they do.  One may suppose that U.S. 
interests did have access to Afghan poppy fields in 2004, but data collection methods are 
contained in the classified literature.  So, we cannot verify that on-sight inspectors were 
present, nor the veracity of the methods which they would have used if they were present.  
By using a data set whose methodology is unclassified, we can critique the methodology.  
Lessons and insights gained from this can help improve not just future collection efforts 
(for the UNODC and perhaps the United States as well), but also serve to inform policy-
makers as to the strength of the data they rely on. 
The third reason to use 2004 UNODC numbers (published in November) is that a 
long-term comparison of UNODC and U.S. data for the area under opium poppy 
cultivation, what the INCSR purports to be its most reliable data, shows that the U.S. 
numbers experienced tremendous volatility in their 2004 results, as compared to UNODC 
values whose methodology we know and can track.  Historically, the U.S. estimates have 
consistently been lower than UNODC estimates, as demonstrated in Table 5.  In 2004, 
however, the U.S. estimate rocketed to a level nearly 158 percent of that given by the 
UNODC.  Both sources use satellite data to inform their estimates, but we know that the 
UNODC also uses on-sight surveys to verify the interpretations of satellite imagery to 
ensure that what is interpreted to be fields of blooming poppies are actually fields of 
blooming poppies.  It must be noted that, in 2001, all methodological assessments of 
                                                 
244   United States Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume I, Drug and Chemical Control, March 
2005.  p. 23. 
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cultivation area were given an unprecedented challenge by the Taliban’s cultivation ban, 
and that data for that year is acknowledged to be somewhat problematic. 
Table 5. Afghanistan Opium Poppy Cultivation, 1997 – 2004 (Area in Hectares) 
 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 
UNODC 131,000 80,000 74,000 8,000 82,000 91,000 64,000 58,000 




157.8% 76.3% 41.6% 21.1% 78.7% 56.6% 65.2% 67.5% 
The fourth reason for relying on UNODC data is that this is the data relied on by 
key U.S. government offices which provide information for policy analysis.  The subject 
matter expert for Afghanistan in the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research, who was interviewed while researching this thesis, stated that their office will 
note both U.S. and UNODC sources in their products but primarily rely on UNODC data 
for their best judgments.  This expert also has career experience working for the Drug 
Enforcement Administration in intelligence collection matters.245  Additionally, the 
Congressional Research Service Report, Afghanistan:  Narcotics and U.S. Policy, which 
is updated several times per year, relies primarily on UNODC numbers, although they do 
note the U.S. numbers in footnotes and graphic/tabular comments. 
It must be noted that UNODC changed its methodology to develop yield estimates 
for the 2004 report:  now, surveyors go to farmer’s fields throughout the country shortly 
before harvest and use standardized scientific methodology to determine the volumes of 
the poppy capsules to produce an estimate of the opium gum that will yield.246  This is 
multiplied out to a yield-per-hectare factor and averaged across the country; for 2004 it 
was 32 kg/ha, (+/- 2.5).  In previous years, yield estimates were “measured” by asking 
farmers, often before harvest, what they expected their fields would produce; in 2003 that 
figure was 45 kg/ha.  Confidence in an actual drop in kg/ha (instead of attributing the 
drop to new measuring methodology) is increased based on the fact that farmers reported 
significant crop damage in all regions of the country except the north-eastern areas such 
                                                 
245   Interview conducted at the State Department, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 10 June 2005. 
246  UNODC, Opium Survey 2004, p. 99. 
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as Badakshan, where yields this year were measured to be 44.2 kg/ha (+/- 3.3),247 levels 
similar to production estimates from previous years (using the old methodology) when 
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